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Volmageddon (February 2018): how short-volatility products blew up
Why the VIX more than doubled on February 5, 2018, how the inverse VIX note XIV lost about 96% in a day, and what it teaches about crowded leveraged products.
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On Friday, February 2, 2018, the Cboe Volatility Index, the VIX, closed at 17.31. On Monday, February 5, it closed at 37.32, a rise of 115.6% in one session. In Cboe's records back to 1990 it is still the largest one-day percentage jump in the index. The S&P 500 fell 4.1% that day and the Dow lost 1,175 points, at the time its biggest point drop ever.
The stock decline was painful but ordinary by historical standards. What made February 5 famous was what happened after the close to a group of products that had bet on volatility staying low. The largest, an exchange-traded note nicknamed XIV, lost about 96% of its value in one evening and was shut down within days. Traders called the episode Volmageddon. This article explains what those products were, why they could not survive a day like that, and why their own trading made the day worse.
The calm before: 2017
To understand the blowup, start with how quiet the market had been. In 2017 the S&P 500 rose almost every month and rarely moved more than 1% in a day. The VIX, which measures the volatility that S&P 500 option prices imply for the next 30 days (see Volatility and the VIX: historical vs implied volatility explained), spent most of the year near record lows. Its monthly bar for November 2017 reached down to 8.56 intraday, and it closed at 9.15 on January 3, 2018.
The VIX itself cannot be bought. Products that offer "VIX exposure" instead hold VIX futures, contracts that settle on the index's value at a future date. In calm markets, futures for next month usually trade above the spot VIX, a shape called Contango. As each contract approaches expiry, its price tends to drift down toward the lower spot level. A product that is long VIX futures loses that drift every month; a product that is short them collects it.
That made short-volatility products remarkably profitable through 2017. XIV, the VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Short-Term ETN, rose strongly that year as the futures it was short kept sliding toward a sleepy spot index. According to the Bank for International Settlements, leveraged and inverse volatility products held about $4 billion at the end of 2017. Many other investors sold volatility directly, through options, with the same underlying bet.
How an inverse daily product works
XIV promised to pay the inverse of each day's percentage move in an index of short-term VIX futures, minus fees. If the futures index fell 3% in a day, XIV rose about 3%; if the index rose 10%, XIV fell about 10%. The key word is daily. To deliver −1 times every single day, the product has to reset its exposure every evening, and the way it resets is the root of the problem.
So on a day when volatility jumps, every inverse and leveraged VIX product needs to buy futures, in proportion to the jump, in the last minutes of trading before its value is calculated. If those products are large relative to the futures market, their buying moves the price they are trying to match. That is a crowded trade feeding on itself, the same structure that made portfolio insurance dangerous in Black Monday 1987: the 22.6% crash and why circuit breakers exist.
February 5, 2018
Stocks had already fallen on Friday, February 2, after a strong wage report raised fears of faster inflation and higher interest rates. On Monday the selling continued in the afternoon, and the VIX climbed through the day.
Then came the rebalancing. The BIS found that in the single minute of 4:08 p.m., 115,862 VIX futures contracts traded, roughly a quarter of the entire VIX futures market by the BIS's estimate, as leveraged and inverse products bought before the 4:15 p.m. price that set their values. Futures that were already up sharply rose further.
XIV's published indicative value had been $108.37 at the close on Friday. Monday's closing indicative value was $4.22, a loss of about 96%. The SEC later found that the note had traded around $99 at the 4:00 p.m. close, because the index provider's systems were holding the published intraday values while futures kept moving; it fell to about $10 in after-hours trading as the real value became visible. (The SEC fined the index provider, S&P Dow Jones Indices, $9 million in 2021 for that failure.)
XIV's offering documents contained an acceleration clause: if its intraday indicative value fell to 20% or less of the previous day's close, a drop of 80% or more, Credit Suisse could redeem the notes early. On February 6 it announced that it would. XIV stopped trading after February 15, 2018, and holders were paid the value calculated on that date. The ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF (SVXY), a fund rather than a note, survived, but in late February it cut its target from −1x to −0.5x of the daily futures move.
Why it was a crash of structure, not news
Nothing new on February 5 explained a doubling of expected volatility in one session. A 4% fall in the S&P 500 is a bad day, not a historic one. Three structural features made the difference:
- Inverse exposure resets daily, so a large one-day jump destroys most of the capital, and a jump of 100% or more destroys all of it, before the product can adjust.
- The rebalancing was predictable and crowded. Every product had to buy the same futures at the same time, and other traders knew it.
- Selling volatility has an asymmetric payoff. It earns small gains most of the time and suffers a very large loss occasionally. Years of steady returns attracted money that did not expect the occasional loss, much as calm periods attract leverage in bubbles.
The lesson applies well beyond VIX products. Any position that collects a small premium for insuring against a rare event, from writing out-of-the-money options to carry trades, looks like a steady earner until the event happens. See Leveraged and inverse ETFs: daily reset math and volatility drag for the daily-reset maths in ordinary markets and ETNs vs ETFs: an unsecured note is not a fund for how an ETN's issuer terms, such as an acceleration clause, differ from a fund's.
What changed afterwards
- Product design. Issuers cut leverage on remaining volatility products (SVXY to −0.5x, its leveraged sibling UVXY from 2x to 1.5x).
- Regulation. In October 2020 the SEC adopted Rule 18f-4, which limits a fund's derivatives risk through a value-at-risk test that in practice caps leveraged and inverse funds at about 200% exposure. Existing funds above that level were allowed to continue.
- Brokers. Some brokers added warnings, knowledge checks or restrictions before customers could buy complex volatility products.
How Finabase helps
The VIX chart covers the index's monthly history back to 1990, so you can see February 2018 alongside 2008 and March 2020, both far larger spikes that built over weeks rather than hours. The VIX history tab lists the daily values, the easiest way to check how fast a move happened. If you are considering any volatility product, its prospectus and the lesson on Leveraged ETF decay: what holders of TQQQ, SSO and SOXL actually got explain why such products are built for days, not years.
Frequently asked questions
What was Volmageddon?
The nickname for February 5, 2018, when the VIX rose 115.6% in a day and products that bet against volatility, above all the XIV note, lost almost all their value. XIV was redeemed early by its issuer and stopped trading after February 15.
Why did XIV lose 96% in one day?
It paid the inverse of each day's move in short-term VIX futures. Those futures roughly doubled between Friday's close and Monday's calculation, so the inverse product lost almost everything, and its terms let Credit Suisse redeem it after a drop of 80% or more.
Did the stock market crash in February 2018?
Not by historical standards. The S&P 500 fell 4.1% on February 5 and about 10% from its January high over the following days. The extreme moves were in volatility products, not stocks.
Can the VIX itself be bought?
No. It is a calculated index. Products that track it hold VIX futures, which behave differently from the index and lose value over time in calm markets when the futures curve is in contango.
Summary
After an unusually calm 2017, billions of dollars sat in products that earned steady returns by betting volatility would stay low. On February 5, 2018, the VIX rose 115.6% to 37.32, and those products' daily rebalancing forced them to buy VIX futures into the spike, adding to it. The XIV note's value fell from $108.37 to $4.22 and it was redeemed early. The episode showed how daily-reset leverage, crowded rebalancing and an asymmetric payoff can turn an ordinary bad day into the end of a product, and it led to lower leverage in volatility funds and the SEC's 2020 derivatives rule.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
XIV aimed to deliver −1 times the daily move in short-term VIX futures. What happens to such a product if the futures rise 100% or more in one day?
- It loses about half its value
- It loses all or nearly all its value, because the inverse exposure resets only once a day
- It automatically switches to a long position
Show the answer
B. It loses all or nearly all its value, because the inverse exposure resets only once a day A −1x product loses one percent for each percent the underlying rises. A 100% rise in a day consumes the whole of its capital before it can rebalance.
After VIX futures jump, why do both inverse and leveraged-long VIX products have to buy futures near the close?
- Their rules require them to hold more futures in volatile markets
- The inverse product must cut its now-oversized short, and the leveraged-long product must top up its exposure to restore leverage; both mean buying
- They must deliver the futures to their investors
Show the answer
B. The inverse product must cut its now-oversized short, and the leveraged-long product must top up its exposure to restore leverage; both mean buying Daily-reset products rebalance in the direction of the move. On February 5, 2018, that buying arrived together and pushed futures higher still.
Why were short-volatility products so profitable in 2017?
- The VIX rose steadily all year
- In calm markets VIX futures usually trade above spot VIX and drift down as they near expiry, and a short position collects that drift
- Credit Suisse guaranteed a minimum return
Show the answer
B. In calm markets VIX futures usually trade above spot VIX and drift down as they near expiry, and a short position collects that drift With the futures curve in contango and the spot VIX near record lows, being short futures earned a steady roll yield, until volatility jumped.
Which payoff pattern best describes selling volatility?
- Rare large gains and frequent small losses
- Frequent small gains and rare large losses
- Gains and losses of similar size and frequency
Show the answer
B. Frequent small gains and rare large losses Selling volatility is like selling insurance: premiums come in steadily until the event happens, and then the loss can exceed years of gains.
Sources and further reading
- Cboe — VIX daily price history (VIX_History.csv)
- Credit Suisse AG — Announcement of an acceleration event for XIV, February 6, 2018 (Form 8-K exhibit 99.1)
- Nasdaq — Trader notice ETA2018-13 on the XIV halt
- SEC — Order in the matter of S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, Release 33-10943 (May 17, 2021)
- BIS Quarterly Review, March 2018 — Box A on the volatility event of 5 February 2018 (Sushko and Turner)
- SEC — Notice 34-83000 (ProShares change of SVXY to −0.5x, effective February 27, 2018)
- SEC — Rule 18f-4 on fund use of derivatives, adopted October 28, 2020
- Associated Press — closing values for the Dow and S&P 500, February 5, 2018
- Finabase chart data — ^VIX monthly bars, 2016–2019
