Articles · Market history
The Asian financial crisis of 1997: pegs, hot money and contagion
How Thailand’s baht float on 2 July 1997 became a regional crash, why dollar pegs and short-term foreign debt were the weak point, and what Hong Kong’s data shows.
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On 2 July 1997 the Bank of Thailand stopped defending the baht's link to the US dollar and let it float. Within months the currencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea had collapsed too, their stock markets had lost half or more of their value, and the IMF and other lenders had put together rescue loans totaling about $118 billion. The crisis reached Hong Kong in October, Wall Street on 27 October, and Russia and the hedge fund LTCM in 1998.
The Asian crisis is the clearest modern example of contagion: a problem in one small market spreading to many others that shared the same weakness. This lesson explains that weakness (fixed exchange rates plus short-term borrowing in dollars), walks through the spread, uses Hang Seng data to show what it did to a market that defended its peg, and draws out the lessons for anyone who owns foreign assets.
The setup: a decade of fast growth
In the early 1990s the "Asian tigers" grew faster than almost anywhere. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea had high savings, rising exports and booming property markets. Foreign money poured in. Much of it was short-term: bank loans and portfolio flows that could leave quickly.
Why the pegs mattered
Most of these countries kept their currencies fixed, or nearly fixed, against the US dollar. A peg made borrowing in dollars look safe: if a Thai company borrowed dollars at 6% instead of baht at 12%, and the exchange rate never moved, it saved six points a year. Banks and finance companies borrowed abroad in dollars, short-term, and lent at home in baht, long-term, often to property developers.
That created a double mismatch:
- Currency mismatch. Debts in dollars, assets and income in local currency.
- Maturity mismatch. Short-term debts that had to be rolled over, funding long-term loans.
As long as the peg held and lenders rolled over the loans, the arrangement worked. If either failed, the borrowers' debts grew in local terms just as their ability to refinance disappeared.
A worked example: what a devaluation does to a dollar debt
A Thai finance company borrows $100 million when the rate is 25 baht per dollar. Its debt is worth 2.5 billion baht, and it lends that sum to local developers. Then the baht loses half its value, so a dollar costs 50 baht. The company still owes $100 million, but that is now 5 billion baht, while its loans to developers are still worth at most 2.5 billion baht, less if the developers cannot pay. The company's debt has doubled in its own currency overnight. Multiply that across a banking system and a currency fall becomes a solvency crisis.
The spread, step by step
- Thailand, July 1997. After months of speculative attacks that drained its reserves, the Bank of Thailand floated the baht on 2 July. The currency fell at once, and much further over the following months.
- The neighbors, July to October. Lenders and investors asked which other countries had the same pegs and dollar debts. The Philippine peso, Malaysian ringgit and Indonesian rupiah came under attack and were allowed to fall. The Reserve Bank of Australia's 1998 review found that at their lows the baht had lost about half its value, the ringgit and peso around 40%, and the rupiah about four-fifths.
- Hong Kong, October. Hong Kong kept its currency board, which links the Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar at a fixed rate. Under that system, when money leaves, local interest rates rise automatically. On 23 October overnight interbank rates (HIBOR) briefly touched 280%, according to the HKMA. Stocks fell hard.
- Wall Street, 27 October. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 554.26 points, 7.2%, and the New York Stock Exchange used its circuit breakers for the first time, closing early. It recovered most of the loss the next day.
- South Korea, November to December. Korea's large conglomerates had borrowed heavily abroad. As foreign banks declined to roll over loans, the won fell and reserves ran out. On 3 December 1997 Korea agreed a $57 billion package with the IMF and others, the largest ever at the time.
- Indonesia, 1998. The rupiah's collapse turned into a banking, economic and political crisis; President Suharto resigned in May 1998.
- Russia and beyond, August 1998. Russia devalued and defaulted on its domestic debt on 17 August 1998, setting off the flight to safety that sank Long-Term Capital Management (1998): how leverage sank a genius fund.
What it did to Hong Kong's market
Hong Kong is a useful case because it chose a different trade-off. It defended its peg, so the pressure came out through interest rates and the stock market instead of the currency.
In our data the index reached about 16,820 in August 1997. In late October it fell below 9,000: on 28 October it lost 1,438 points, 13.7%, its largest one-day fall to that point, closing at about 9,059 after trading as low as about 8,776. After a partial rebound it fell again to about 6,545 in August 1998, roughly 61% below the 1997 high. In August 1998 the Hong Kong government took the unusual step of buying shares directly in the market to counter speculators who, it said, were shorting the currency and the stock market together. The index recovered strongly in 1999.
The same shock also showed up in US volatility: the VIX reached about 49 in October 1997 in our monthly data, then higher still in the autumn of 1998.
Why the crisis spread
Economists still debate the weights, but several channels are widely accepted:
| Channel | How it worked |
|---|---|
| Common weakness | Investors asked "who else has a peg and dollar debts?" and pulled money from every country that did |
| Trade competition | A devalued baht made Thai exports cheaper, putting pressure on rivals to devalue too |
| Bank lending | Foreign banks that lost money in one country cut lending across the region |
| Forced selling | Investors who lost in one market sold assets elsewhere to raise cash or cut risk |
The IMF's response was itself controversial. Its programs asked for higher interest rates, budget cuts and the closure of weak banks. Critics argued that this deepened the recessions; supporters argued that without credible policies the currencies would have fallen further. Malaysia took a different path in September 1998, imposing capital controls to limit money leaving the country.
Lessons for investors
- A foreign stock is also a currency position. A US investor in Thai shares in 1997 lost on the stocks and again on the baht. See Currency risk in a portfolio: how exchange rates change returns.
- Pegs hide risk until they break. A fixed exchange rate encourages borrowing in the anchor currency, which makes the eventual break much more damaging.
- Contagion follows shared weaknesses, not geography alone. Markets that look different can fall together if lenders see the same flaw in them.
- Defending a currency moves the pain, it does not remove it. Hong Kong kept its peg and paid with extreme interest rates and a 61% fall in stocks.
The Emerging-market economies: definitions, dollar debt and crises lesson covers how these economies have changed since, including the larger foreign-exchange reserves many built after 1998.
How Finabase helps
The Hang Seng chart (^HSI) with the maximum range shows the 1997–98 fall in context, and the
comparison chart puts an emerging-markets fund (EEM) beside SPY. The Indices page shows the major
Asian markets live, so you can see how often they move together on a bad day.
Frequently asked questions
What caused the Asian financial crisis?
Several Asian economies had currencies pegged to the dollar while their banks and companies had borrowed heavily in dollars, short-term. When Thailand could no longer defend its peg on 2 July 1997, investors and lenders pulled money from countries with the same weakness.
Which countries were hit hardest?
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea needed large international rescue programs; Malaysia and the Philippines were also badly hit. Indonesia suffered most: its currency lost about four-fifths of its value at the worst point, and the crisis brought down its government.
How did the Asian crisis affect US stocks?
On 27 October 1997 the Dow fell 554.26 points, 7.2%, and the NYSE used its circuit breakers for the first time. US stocks recovered quickly, but the 1998 aftershocks, Russia's default and the LTCM rescue, caused a sharper fall that summer.
Could a crisis like 1997 happen again?
Many Asian countries now hold much larger foreign-exchange reserves and let their currencies float, which reduces the risk of a sudden peg break. The general mechanism, short-term foreign-currency debt meeting a fixed exchange rate, can recur wherever both are present.
Summary
The 1997 crisis started when Thailand floated the baht on 2 July and spread to every economy that shared the same weakness: a dollar peg plus short-term dollar borrowing. Currencies collapsed, international lenders mobilized about $118 billion, and Hong Kong, which kept its peg, saw interest rates spike and its stock market fall about 61% from peak to trough. For investors, the lessons are that foreign holdings carry currency risk and that markets with a shared flaw tend to fall together.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
A company borrowed $100 million at 25 baht per dollar and lent the 2.5 billion baht locally. The baht falls to 50 per dollar. What happens to its debt in baht?
- It stays at 2.5 billion baht
- It doubles to 5 billion baht while its baht loans are worth no more than before
- It halves to 1.25 billion baht
Show the answer
B. It doubles to 5 billion baht while its baht loans are worth no more than before The debt is fixed in dollars. When each dollar costs twice as many baht, the debt in baht doubles, a currency mismatch.
Why did the crisis spread from Thailand to countries such as Indonesia and South Korea?
- They shared the same weakness, pegged currencies and short-term dollar debts, so lenders pulled back from all of them
- They traded only with Thailand
- They all used the baht
Show the answer
A. They shared the same weakness, pegged currencies and short-term dollar debts, so lenders pulled back from all of them Contagion followed a common flaw. Investors asked who else had a peg and dollar debts.
Hong Kong kept its currency peg in October 1997. Where did the pressure show up instead?
- Nowhere; the peg absorbed it
- In interest rates, which spiked (overnight HIBOR touched 280%), and in a steep fall in stock prices
- In a higher Hong Kong dollar
Show the answer
B. In interest rates, which spiked (overnight HIBOR touched 280%), and in a steep fall in stock prices Under a currency board, money leaving pushes local rates up. Very high rates hit share prices.
A US investor bought Thai shares in early 1997. Why did the loss in dollars exceed the fall in Thai share prices?
- Because the baht also fell, so each baht of share value was worth fewer dollars
- Because US taxes rose
- Because Thai shares stopped paying dividends
Show the answer
A. Because the baht also fell, so each baht of share value was worth fewer dollars A foreign holding is also a currency position. Falling shares and a falling currency compound.
Sources and further reading
- Federal Reserve History — Asian Financial Crisis
- Reserve Bank of Australia — McFarlane and others, The origin of the Asian financial turmoil, RDP 9805, 1998
- Hong Kong Monetary Authority — Annual Report 1997, monetary policy and the October 1997 turbulence
- Hong Kong Monetary Authority — Asian Financial Crisis: the battle to defend Hong Kong’s financial stability (2019)
- IMF — The IMF’s response to the Asian crisis (1999)
- Hong Kong Provisional Legislative Council, Panel on Financial Affairs — paper on the October 1997 market turbulence
- Finabase chart API — ^HSI three-month bars and ^VIX monthly bars, frozen 2026-11-18
