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John Templeton: global investing and buying at maximum pessimism
How John Templeton bought 104 stocks under $1 in 1939, built the Templeton Growth Fund, invested early in Japan and left before its bubble, and what his record shows.
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Sir John Templeton (1912–2008) is remembered for two ideas that were unusual when he acted on them. The first was that the best time to buy is when everyone else is most discouraged, which he called the point of maximum pessimism. The second was that an American investor should look for bargains all over the world, not just at home. He applied both for more than half a century, first with his own savings in 1939 and then through the Templeton Growth Fund, launched in 1954.
The Templeton Foundation reports that $10,000 invested in the fund at its launch, with dividends reinvested, had grown to about $2 million by 1992, when he sold his fund business. This article covers the 1939 purchase that made his name, how he invested, his early move into Japan and his exit before its bubble burst, and what his record does and does not prove.
Who Templeton was
Templeton was born in Winchester, Tennessee, in 1912. He worked his way through Yale during the Depression, graduating in 1934, and studied law at Balliol College, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar. Before starting work he traveled through dozens of countries, which he later said shaped his view that opportunities were global. In 1937 he took a job at a Wall Street brokerage, and in 1940 he bought an investment counseling business, which became the base of his firm.
He launched the Templeton Growth Fund in Toronto in 1954 and later moved to Nassau in the Bahamas, away from Wall Street, a distance he credited with helping him think independently. In 1972 he created the Templeton Prize for progress in religion and spirituality. He was knighted in 1987 for his philanthropy. He became a British citizen after moving to Nassau. In 1992 he sold the Templeton fund group to Franklin Resources, in a deal reported at about $913 million, and spent his later years on philanthropy. He died in Nassau in July 2008, aged 95.
The 1939 purchase
The story that made Templeton famous comes from his own retellings and from biographies, so treat the exact numbers as approximate.
In September 1939, as Germany invaded Poland, US stocks were still far below their 1929 levels and many companies were in or near bankruptcy. Templeton reasoned that a war would raise demand for almost everything American industry made, and that the cheapest, most neglected companies would benefit most. He asked his broker to buy 100 shares of every stock on the major US exchanges trading at $1 or less, paid for with about $10,000 borrowed from his former employer. The broker found 104 such companies; by most accounts 34 of them were in bankruptcy.
He held the basket for about four years. Only four of the companies reportedly became worthless. He sold the rest for around $40,000, roughly four times his money.
How he invested
Templeton wrote down his principles many times, most fully in a 1993 list, the "16 Rules for Investment Success." In paraphrase, the core ideas were these.
- Buy at maximum pessimism. Prices are lowest when the news is worst and most sellers have already sold. He described bull markets as being born in pessimism, growing on skepticism, maturing on optimism and dying on euphoria.
- Search worldwide. If you look in more places, you find more bargains. A stock that is expensive at home may have a cheaper equivalent abroad.
- Value, not outlook. He compared a company's price with its earnings and assets over many years, not with this year's headlines. He favored low price-to-earnings ratios relative to a company's own history and to similar companies elsewhere.
- Diversify. Even a careful analyst is often wrong, so he held many positions across countries and industries.
- Be humble and keep learning. He assumed that even careful investors are wrong often and treated mistakes as material to study, not to hide.
The common thread is relative value: the same rules as Benjamin Graham's, applied across borders when very few American investors looked outside the US.
Japan: in early, out early
Templeton began buying Japanese shares in the 1960s, when Japan's economy was growing fast but its stocks traded at low multiples of earnings, foreign investors were few and many Americans still thought of Japanese goods as cheap imitations. Over the following two decades Japan was among the best-performing markets in the world, and Japanese holdings made up a large part of his fund for years.
By the mid-1980s he judged that Japanese prices had outrun their earnings, and he sold most of the fund's Japanese shares, years before the market peaked. For a while it looked like a mistake: the Nikkei 225 kept climbing. Then it fell.
The Nikkei closed at a record 38,915.87 on 29 December 1989. Our quarterly data show it below 8,000 at the end of the first quarter of 2003, about 80% lower, and it did not close above the 1989 record until 22 February 2024, more than 34 years later. An investor who bought at the peak waited a third of a century to break even on the index price. Japan’s economy: lost decades, deflation and the BOJ’s exit explains the bubble and the long stagnation that followed.
The episode shows both halves of the contrarian approach. Templeton bought when Japan was unpopular and cheap, and he sold when it was popular and expensive, without trying to pick the exact top. Selling early cost him some gains in 1987–1989; it spared his investors the collapse.
The record
| Measure | Figure | Reported by |
|---|---|---|
| 1939 basket | About $10,000 to about $40,000 in ~4 years | Templeton's own accounts; biographies |
| Templeton Growth Fund, 1954–1992 | $10,000 to about $2 million, dividends in | Templeton Foundation; 2008 obituaries |
| Implied annual rate, 1954–1992 | About 15% a year | Our arithmetic from the line above |
| Fund since inception (1954) | Roughly 11% a year (Class A) | Franklin Templeton fund page |
Two cautions. The 1954–1992 figure ignores sales charges, which were common on funds then, and taxes. And the later record, after Templeton sold the business and others managed the fund, has been much more ordinary; the long since-inception figure blends his years with theirs. Templeton's results are a record of one investor's skill and temperament, not a feature of the fund's name.
What it means for investors
- Cheap is the point, unpopular is a symptom. Templeton bought out-of-favor markets because they were cheap. A market can be unpopular because it deserves to be.
- Home bias is a choice. Most investors hold mostly their own country's stocks (see Home bias and familiarity bias: why investors stay close to home). Templeton's career is the strongest argument for looking further, and today a broad international index fund does that at low cost.
- Selling early is part of the method. Leaving a rising market before the peak feels like a mistake at the time; the Japan exit shows why he accepted that.
- Pessimism takes nerve and time. The 1939 basket took four years to pay off. A strategy of buying at the point of maximum pessimism requires holding through more bad news.
How Finabase helps
The indices page shows the Nikkei 225 and other world indexes live, so you can see which markets are near highs and which are far below them. To compare a country fund with US stocks, open a comparison chart such as EWJ against SPY. The screener can filter for low price-to-earnings ratios, the kind of starting list Templeton built by hand; it shows cheapness, not whether a company deserves to be cheap.
Frequently asked questions
What did John Templeton do in 1939?
He borrowed about $10,000 and bought around 100 shares each of 104 US companies selling for $1 or less, a third of them in bankruptcy. By the usual account he sold about four years later for roughly $40,000.
What does "maximum pessimism" mean?
It is Templeton's phrase for the moment when the outlook seems worst and most sellers have already sold, which he believed was usually the best time to buy. It assumes the price has fallen below long-term value, not just that the news is bad.
How good was the Templeton Growth Fund?
As reported by the Templeton Foundation, $10,000 invested at the fund's 1954 launch grew to about $2 million by 1992 with dividends reinvested, about 15% a year. Results after he sold the business in 1992 were much less remarkable.
Did Templeton predict the Japanese crash?
He did not predict its timing. He judged that Japanese stocks had become expensive in the mid-1980s and sold most of them, years before the 1989 peak, which spared his investors the long decline that followed.
Summary
John Templeton made his name buying 104 stocks under $1 at the outbreak of the Second World War and built the Templeton Growth Fund into one of the best long-run records of its era, about 15% a year from 1954 to 1992 as reported. His method was relative value applied globally: compare prices across countries, buy what is cheap and out of favor, diversify widely and sell when a market becomes popular and expensive, as he did in Japan before 1989. His story is a strong case against home bias and for patience, with the caveat that cheapness, not unpopularity, was what he was buying.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
Templeton's 1939 basket held 104 stocks priced at $1 or less, a third of them bankrupt. Why did it not end in heavy losses?
- He knew which companies would survive
- The basket was widely diversified, so a few failures were small next to many recoveries, and his view that war demand would revive industry proved right
- Stocks priced under $1 cannot fall much further
Show the answer
B. The basket was widely diversified, so a few failures were small next to many recoveries, and his view that war demand would revive industry proved right Each stock was very risky, but spreading the money across 104 of them limited the damage from the four that failed. The bet also rested on a specific catalyst, not just on low prices.
What does "buying at maximum pessimism" require besides bad news?
- A price that has fallen below a reasonable estimate of long-term value
- A market that has fallen at least 50%
- A forecast of exactly when the market will turn
Show the answer
A. A price that has fallen below a reasonable estimate of long-term value Templeton bought what was cheap relative to value. A market or stock can be unpopular because it deserves to be; pessimism alone is not a reason to buy.
Templeton sold most of his Japanese shares in the mid-1980s and the Nikkei kept rising until December 1989. How should that decision be judged?
- As a mistake, because he missed the last years of the rise
- By its reasoning: prices had outrun earnings, and selling early spared his investors a decline of about 80% that took 34 years to recover on the index
- As luck, because no one could know prices were high
Show the answer
B. By its reasoning: prices had outrun earnings, and selling early spared his investors a decline of about 80% that took 34 years to recover on the index Selling before the top is part of a value approach. He gave up some late gains in exchange for avoiding the collapse; judging it only by the next two years would miss that.
The Templeton Growth Fund turned $10,000 into about $2 million from 1954 to 1992. About what annual return does that imply?
- About 5% a year
- About 15% a year
- About 50% a year
Show the answer
B. About 15% a year A 200-fold increase over about 38 years is 200^(1/38) − 1 ≈ 15% a year. Compounding turns a steady 15% into a very large multiple over decades.
Sources and further reading
- Templeton Foundation — Sir John Templeton biography (1939 purchase; Templeton Growth Fund record to 1992)
- Washington Post — Sir John Templeton, 95; investor and philanthropist, obituary, 9 July 2008
- Institutional Investor — Legendary investor dies, July 2008 (Franklin Resources purchase, 1992)
- Franklin Templeton — Templeton Growth Fund, Inc. (TEPLX), inception 29 November 1954, performance since inception
- Templeton — 16 Rules for Investment Success, 1993
- Train — The Money Masters, 1980 (chapter on Templeton)
- Nikkei Inc. — Nikkei 225 record closes (38,915.87 on 29 December 1989; 39,098.68 on 22 February 2024)
- Finabase chart data — ^N225 quarterly closes, 1985 to 2026
