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China’s 2015 stock crash and the US open of August 24, 2015

How margin lending inflated Shanghai stocks in 2015, how the state tried to stop the fall, and why US ETFs traded far below their value when the selling reached New York.

On this page
  1. The boom: a policy-backed bull market
  2. Margin: the accelerant
  3. The crash and the rescue
  4. August 24, 2015, in New York
  5. What changed afterwards
  6. Lessons for investors
  7. How Finabase helps
  8. Frequently asked questions
  9. Summary
  10. Check your understanding

Between the summer of 2014 and June 2015, China's main stock index, the Shanghai Composite, more than doubled. Millions of new investors opened brokerage accounts, and much of the buying was done with borrowed money. On June 12, 2015, the index closed at 5,166.35. Three weeks later it was down by about a third, and the Chinese government was using brokers, state funds, trading suspensions and selling bans to stop the slide. A second leg of the fall in August spread to markets worldwide.

On Monday, August 24, 2015, that selling reached New York, and the US open became one of the strangest mornings in modern market history. Some of the largest exchange-traded funds traded 20% or more below the value of the stocks they held, and trading was paused more than 1,200 times. This article covers both halves: how leverage built and broke the Chinese boom, and what the US open showed about market plumbing.

The boom: a policy-backed bull market

China's stock market in 2014 was dominated by individual investors, unlike the US market, where institutions own most shares. Several things lined up at once. The central bank cut interest rates from November 2014, making deposits less attractive. State media cheered the rally. The Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connect, opened in November 2014, signaled further opening of the market. And it had become far easier to borrow to buy shares.

The Congressional Research Service measured a 108% rise in the Shanghai Composite from June 2014 to June 2015, and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission put the year-on-year rise at about 149% as of early June. Either way, the index had more than doubled in a year, during which China's economic growth was slowing.

Margin: the accelerant

Buying on margin means borrowing from a broker to buy more stock than your cash would allow (see Buying on margin: how margin loans, interest and leverage work). Official margin lending by Chinese brokers rose to about RMB 2.27 trillion on June 18, 2015, according to China Securities Finance Corp. data reported by Caixin. On top of that sat a grey market: trust companies and online lenders that offered leverage of several times an investor's capital, often through "umbrella" accounts that split one brokerage account among many borrowers. Its size was never measured precisely.

Leverage works in both directions. If an investor borrows four yuan for every one of their own, a 20% fall in the shares wipes out their stake. Lenders then sell the shares to recover their loans, which pushes prices down and triggers the next margin call. When regulators began tightening rules on grey-market lending in June 2015, that unwinding started.

The crash and the rescue

Shanghai Composite, June 2015 to January 2016: a selection of published closes 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 Jun 2015 Jul 2015 Aug 2015 Sep 2015 Oct 2015 Nov 2015 Dec 2015 Jan 2016 Feb 2016 Jun 12, 2015: 5,166.35 (peak) Jul 8: 3,507.19 Aug 24: 3,209.91 (−8.5% that day) Aug 26: 2,927.29 Jan 28, 2016: 2,655.66 (−48.6%) Dashed line only joins the selected closes; the index moved up and down in between.
Shanghai Composite, a selection of five published closing values, June 12, 2015 to January 28, 2016 (Reuters, PTI, Sharecast). We hold no daily data for this index; the dashed line only joins the selected closes.

From its June 12 peak, the index fell 32% to 3,507.19 by July 8. The government's response was one of the largest interventions in a stock market by any major economy in recent decades:

  1. June 27: the People's Bank of China cut its benchmark rate and banks' reserve requirements.
  2. July 4: 21 brokerages pledged about RMB 120 billion to buy blue-chip stock funds and hold them while the index stayed below 4,500. New listings (IPOs) were suspended.
  3. July 5: the central bank promised liquidity to China Securities Finance Corp., which lent to brokers so they could keep buying.
  4. July 8: shareholders owning more than 5% of a company were barred from selling for six months.
  5. By July 9, about 1,476 companies, more than half of those listed, had suspended trading in their own shares. A suspended stock cannot fall, but its holders cannot sell either.

The measures stopped the slide for a few weeks. Then on August 11, the central bank changed how it set the daily reference rate for the yuan and lowered it by about 1.9% against the dollar, its largest one-day move in two decades. Investors around the world read the devaluation as a sign that China's economy was weaker than reported. On Monday, August 24, the Shanghai Composite fell 8.49% to 3,209.91, its biggest one-day drop since 2007, and it closed at 2,927.29 on August 26.

In January 2016 China tried a market-wide circuit breaker: a 5% move would pause trading for 15 minutes and a 7% move would close the market for the day. It triggered twice in its first four trading days, on one of them within about 30 minutes of the open, and was suspended from January 8, 2016. The pauses had encouraged investors to sell before the next threshold, the "magnet effect" critics of Market-wide circuit breakers: the 7%, 13% and 20% halt rules warn about. The index's lowest close of the slide came on January 28, 2016, at 2,655.66, down 48.6% from the June peak.

August 24, 2015, in New York

Asian and European markets fell sharply overnight, and US stock-index futures dropped by their 5% limit before the open. What followed was a liquidity failure, not a loss of value.

The open was slow. The New York Stock Exchange invoked its Rule 48, which lets it open stocks without the usual pre-open price indications. Even so, by 9:35 a.m. only 38% of the NYSE-listed S&P 500 stocks had opened there. Many stocks traded first on other venues at depressed prices.

ETFs lost their anchor. An ETF's price normally stays close to the value of its holdings because authorized participants and market makers trade the gap away. To do that, they need prices for the underlying stocks. With many stocks not yet open or swinging wildly, market makers widened their quotes or stepped back. According to the SEC staff note, the iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (IVV) fell more than 20% and QQQ more than 17% at points in the first minutes, far more than the indexes they track. Across all exchange-traded products, 19.2% fell 20% or more from the prior close at some point, against 4.7% of stocks.

The halts multiplied. The single-stock Limit Up-Limit Down bands pause a security for five minutes when it moves outside a band around its recent price. On August 24 they fired 1,278 times in 471 securities. 83% of the pauses were in exchange-traded products, which became trapped in a loop: halted, reopened at a gap, halted again. A quarter of the affected securities were halted in the first minute of trading.

Limit Up-Limit Down trading pauses on August 24, 2015 ETPs (327 products) 1,058 pauses Other stocks (144) 220 pauses Source: SEC staff research note, Equity Market Volatility on August 24, 2015 (Dec 2015).
LULD trading pauses on August 24, 2015: 1,058 in 327 exchange-traded products and 220 in 144 other securities. Source: SEC staff research note, December 2015.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell about 1,089 points in the first minutes, then recovered much of the loss and closed down 588.40 at 15,871.35. The S&P 500 closed down 3.9% at 1,893.21. Investors who had placed stop orders on ETFs were among the biggest losers: their orders became market orders as prices gapped down, and they sold at prices that existed for a few minutes before the funds returned near their holdings' value.

What changed afterwards

In the US, the SEC staff study was followed by changes to the exchanges' opening and reopening procedures and the Limit Up-Limit Down plan, so that halted securities reopen through a more orderly auction and the price bands are less prone to repeated triggers. In China, regulators kept tighter control of margin lending and moved more slowly with new market experiments after the circuit breaker's failure.

Lessons for investors

  • Leverage turns a correction into a crash. Margin calls force selling into falling prices, which feeds the next round of calls. The The 2008 financial crisis: housing, Lehman, TARP and the 57% fall showed the same mechanism in credit markets.
  • A price is only as good as the liquidity behind it. An ETF holds real shares, but its market price can still break away from their value when market makers cannot hedge (see Premiums and discounts in ETFs: why price and NAV disagree).
  • Stop orders do not guarantee a price. In a gap, a stop becomes a market order and fills at whatever is available. A stop-limit order avoids that, at the risk of not filling at all.
  • Interventions can delay but not fix. The July 2015 rescue paused the decline for a few weeks; the index still made lower lows in August and January.

How Finabase helps

Our stored data does not include the Shanghai Composite itself, which is why the chart above uses published closing values. For the wider picture, the FXI chart shows the iShares China Large-Cap ETF, which holds Hong Kong-listed Chinese companies, over its full history, including the 2015 peak and fall. The SPY history tab lists daily open, high, low and close, so you can see how far the August 24, 2015 low sat from the close. The lesson on China’s economy covers the economic backdrop.

Frequently asked questions

Why did the Chinese stock market crash in 2015?

Prices had more than doubled in a year on heavy borrowing by individual investors. When regulators tightened grey-market margin lending in June 2015, forced selling began, and a surprise yuan devaluation in August deepened the fall.

How much did the Shanghai Composite fall?

From 5,166.35 on June 12, 2015 to 2,927.29 on August 26 (about 43%), and to 2,655.66 on January 28, 2016, about 49% below the peak.

What happened in the US on August 24, 2015?

US stocks opened sharply lower after overnight falls in Asia and Europe. Many stocks opened late, ETFs traded at deep discounts to their holdings, and Limit Up-Limit Down pauses fired 1,278 times. The Dow fell about 1,089 points early and closed down 588.

Why did ETFs fall more than the stocks they hold?

Market makers keep an ETF's price close to its holdings by trading both. When many holdings had not opened or were swinging wildly, they could not price or hedge the funds, so they quoted much lower bids or none at all.

Summary

China's 2015 boom was a borrowed one: margin and grey-market lending helped double the Shanghai Composite in a year, and the unwinding cut it nearly in half by January 2016 despite an unprecedented state rescue. The August 2015 yuan devaluation exported the fear, and on August 24 the US open showed how fragile prices become when liquidity disappears: ETFs broke from their holdings, LULD halts fired 1,278 times, and stop orders filled at prices that lasted minutes.

Check your understanding

4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.

  1. An investor buys Chinese shares with four yuan of borrowed money for every yuan of their own. Roughly how far must the shares fall to wipe out the investor's own money?

    1. 80%
    2. 50%
    3. 20%
    Show the answer

    C. 20% Total position is 5 yuan per 1 yuan of equity. A 20% fall loses 1 yuan, the whole stake, which is why grey-market leverage made the 2015 unwinding so violent.

  2. During the July 2015 rescue, about half of listed Chinese companies suspended trading in their shares. What did that do for their holders?

    1. It guaranteed them the pre-suspension price
    2. It stopped the reported price from falling, but also stopped holders from selling
    3. It converted the shares into bonds
    Show the answer

    B. It stopped the reported price from falling, but also stopped holders from selling A suspended stock shows no new price, but its owners are locked in. Selling pressure moved to the stocks that still traded.

  3. On August 24, 2015, why did some large US ETFs trade 20% or more below the value of the stocks they held?

    1. Their holdings were suddenly worth 20% less
    2. With many underlying stocks unopened or swinging wildly, market makers could not price or hedge the funds, so bids fell far below fair value
    3. The ETFs had been delisted
    Show the answer

    B. With many underlying stocks unopened or swinging wildly, market makers could not price or hedge the funds, so bids fell far below fair value ETF prices are kept in line by arbitrage that needs reliable prices for the holdings. When that broke down, ETF prices briefly lost their anchor.

  4. An investor had a stop order on an ETF on the morning of August 24, 2015. What risk did it carry?

    1. The stop became a market order when triggered and could fill far below the stop price during the gap
    2. The stop would be cancelled by the LULD pause
    3. None; stop orders guarantee the stop price
    Show the answer

    A. The stop became a market order when triggered and could fill far below the stop price during the gap A stop turns into a market order. In a fast gap it fills at whatever bid exists, which that morning could be far below fair value for a few minutes.

Sources and further reading

  1. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission — China’s Stock Market Collapse and the Government’s Response (July 13, 2015)
  2. Congressional Research Service — China’s stock market collapse (Insight IN10325, 2015)
  3. SEC Division of Trading and Markets — Research note: Equity Market Volatility on August 24, 2015 (December 2015)
  4. Reuters via Business Standard — Shanghai Composite closes, June 12 and July 8, 2015; brokerage rescue fund, July 4, 2015
  5. Al Jazeera / Reuters — China stocks suffer biggest one-day loss in eight years (August 24, 2015)
  6. Business Standard / PTI — Shanghai close, August 26, 2015
  7. Sharecast — Shanghai closes at lowest level in more than a year (January 28, 2016)
  8. Caixin — margin lending data (peak of about RMB 2.27 trillion, June 18, 2015)
  9. Caixin — China’s stock market circuit breakers last just four days (January 8, 2016)