Articles · Market history
The European debt crisis (2010–2012): Greece, spreads and Draghi
How Greece’s hidden deficit set off a euro-area debt crisis, why bond spreads exploded, what the bailouts did, and how the ECB’s July 2012 pledge turned markets.
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In October 2009 a newly elected Greek government told the European Union that its budget deficit for the year would be about 12.5% of GDP, not the 3.7% reported in the spring. Within months, investors were asking whether Greece could pay its debts, and then whether Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy could. For nearly three years the euro area lurched from one emergency summit to the next, while government bond yields in the south rose to levels that had seemed impossible inside a single currency.
The crisis ended, in market terms, with a single sentence. On July 26, 2012, the president of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, said the ECB would do whatever was needed, within its mandate, to preserve the euro. This article tells the market side of the story: what happened to bond spreads and stocks, why the bailouts kept failing to calm markets, and why words from a central bank finally did. The economics of the currency union itself are covered in The euro-area economy: the ECB, the debt crisis and the euro.
Why a deficit in a small country shook a continent
When the euro started in 1999, investors treated the bonds of all member governments as nearly equally safe. In June 2007, Greek ten-year bonds yielded 4.80% on average and German ones 4.56%, a gap of about a quarter of a percentage point. That gap, the spread, is the market's price for the extra risk of lending to one government rather than another (see Credit ratings and credit spreads: how bond risk is priced).
A currency union removes two shock absorbers. A member cannot devalue its currency to regain competitiveness, and it cannot have its own central bank print money to pay its debts. Its bonds behave less like US Treasuries and more like the bonds of a US state: they can default. Once investors understood that, they began pricing each country's sovereign debt on its own fiscal record, and the record in several countries was poor.
The second link ran through the banks. European banks held large amounts of their own governments' bonds. Falling bond prices weakened the banks, and governments that had to rescue their banks, as Ireland and Spain did, saw their own debts rise. Economists called this the doom loop between banks and sovereigns.
The timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Oct 2009 | Greece revises its 2009 deficit forecast to 12.5% of GDP |
| May 2, 2010 | First Greek programme: €110 billion from euro-area countries (€80B) and the IMF (about €30B) |
| May 9–10, 2010 | European Financial Stability Facility agreed; ECB starts buying bonds under its Securities Markets Programme |
| Nov 28, 2010 | Ireland agrees an €85 billion programme after the cost of rescuing its banks |
| May 2011 | Portugal agrees a €78 billion programme |
| Aug–Nov 2011 | Contagion to Italy and Spain; Italy's ten-year yield passes 7% intraday on November 9 |
| Feb–Mar 2012 | Second Greek programme of up to €130 billion; private bondholders take a 53.5% haircut |
| Jul 20, 2012 | Up to €100 billion approved to recapitalize Spanish banks |
| Jul 26, 2012 | Draghi's London speech |
| Sep 6, 2012 | ECB announces Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) |
| Oct 8, 2012 | The permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is inaugurated |
Cyprus followed in March 2013 with a €10 billion programme, the first in which large bank deposits took losses.
What the bond market showed
The figure below shows each country's ten-year government bond yield in its worst month of the crisis. These are monthly averages, so the daily highs were higher still. Spain's ten-year yield reached about 7.6% on July 24, 2012, and Italy's touched 7.48% on November 9, 2011.
Seven percent became a watched threshold. At that level, a country that rolls over a large part of its debt every year sees its interest bill rise quickly, and the three countries that had already needed bailouts had crossed it before they asked for help. Italy mattered most: its government debt was the largest in the euro area, too large for the rescue funds of the time to cover.
Meanwhile Germany's yield fell to record lows. Investors sold southern bonds and bought German ones as a safe haven, so the spread widened from both ends. That flight to safety is visible in the July 2012 contrast: Spain at 6.8%, Germany at 1.2%, two governments that issued debt in the same currency.
What the stock market showed
The Euro Stoxx 50, an index of 50 large companies in euro-area countries, had already fallen from 4,557.57 (July 16, 2007) to 1,809.98 (March 9, 2009) in the global financial crisis, a decline of about 60%. It recovered for a year, then fell back through the sovereign crisis. In monthly bars, it dropped about 18% from the end of July 2011 to the end of September 2011, when contagion reached Italy and Spain, and closed at 1,995.01 on September 12, 2011. Its 2012 low came on June 1, at 2,068.66, as Spain's banking problems came to a head.
Bank shares fell hardest, because banks sat at the center of the doom loop. Companies that earned most of their revenue outside Europe fared better, which is one reason the index fell less than the bond market's alarm might suggest.
Why the bailouts did not end it
Each rescue package bought time but left the central question open: if a large country such as Italy or Spain lost access to the bond market, was there enough money to cover it? The rescue funds had to be approved by national parliaments, and the amounts were always finite. The bailouts also came with Austerity, spending cuts and tax increases that deepened recessions and, in the short run, made the debt-to-GDP ratios worse.
The Greek debt exchange of March 2012 showed that private bondholders really could take losses inside the euro area. About €197 billion of bonds were exchanged, with a nominal haircut of 53.5%, cutting Greek debt by roughly €107 billion. It was necessary for Greece, but it also taught investors that the bonds of other troubled members carried real default risk.
"Whatever it takes"
The ECB was the only institution with unlimited means, because it can create euros. But its treaties forbid it from financing governments directly, and several member countries were wary of it buying government bonds at all.
At an investment conference in London on July 26, 2012, Draghi said, in effect, that within its mandate the ECB was ready to do whatever it took to preserve the euro, and he added that it would be enough. He also argued that some of the yield spreads reflected fear that the euro would break up, which he considered within the ECB's remit to address.
The market reaction was immediate. The Euro Stoxx 50 closed at 2,159.09 on July 25 and at 2,301.23 two days later, up 6.6%. On September 6 the ECB gave the pledge a form: Outright Monetary Transactions, purchases of one-to-three-year government bonds with no limit set in advance, available to a country that accepted a rescue programme with conditions. The tool was never activated during the crisis. Its existence was enough to pull Spanish and Italian yields down, and by the end of 2013 the Euro Stoxx 50 stood near 3,109, about 50% above its June 2012 low.
The episode is a lesson about credible backstops. Markets ran on Spain and Italy because there was a limit to what could be lent to them. When a lender with no practical limit said it would act, the run stopped without the lender spending anything. The same logic explains why deposit insurance stops most bank runs (see The bank failures of 2023: SVB, Signature and First Republic for what happens when depositors doubt it).
How Finabase helps
The Euro Stoxx 50 chart shows the index's full monthly history from 2007, so you can compare the 2008 and 2011–2012 declines with later ones. The indices page puts European, Asian and US indexes side by side for the current session. For the rates side, the US ten-year yield chart shows the American benchmark over the same years, a reminder that US yields fell through the euro crisis as global investors sought safety.
Frequently asked questions
What caused the European debt crisis?
Large government deficits and debts in some euro-area countries, revealed most dramatically by Greece's revised figures in late 2009, combined with weak banks and a currency union that had no common backstop for government debt. Investors began charging very different interest rates to different members, which made the debts harder to carry.
What does "whatever it takes" refer to?
It refers to Mario Draghi's July 26, 2012 speech in London, in which the ECB president said the central bank was ready, within its mandate, to do whatever was needed to preserve the euro. The pledge was formalized in September 2012 as the OMT bond-buying program.
Did Greece default?
In effect, yes, on its privately held bonds. The March 2012 exchange imposed a 53.5% face-value loss on about €197 billion of bonds held by private investors. Greece did not leave the euro.
How far did European stocks fall?
The Euro Stoxx 50 closed at 1,995.01 in September 2011 and 2,068.66 in June 2012, well below its 2007 high of 4,557.57 but above its March 2009 low of 1,809.98.
Summary
The European debt crisis began with Greece's revised deficit in late 2009 and spread through bond markets to Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, with banks and governments dragging each other down. Rescue programmes and a record Greek debt restructuring bought time but never convinced markets that there was enough money to protect the largest borrowers. Spreads peaked in 2011 and 2012, and the Euro Stoxx 50 hit its crisis lows in September 2011 and June 2012. Draghi's July 2012 pledge and the OMT program that followed ended the acute phase by putting an unlimited lender behind the euro, without the program ever being used.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
Why could a euro-area government default in a way the United States federal government effectively cannot?
- Euro-area governments are not allowed to issue bonds
- Each member borrows in a currency it does not control, so it cannot have its own central bank create money to pay its debts
- Euro-area bonds have no credit rating
Show the answer
B. Each member borrows in a currency it does not control, so it cannot have its own central bank create money to pay its debts Inside the euro, a member's bonds behave more like those of a US state: there is no national central bank to backstop them, so default risk is real and shows up in spreads.
In July 2012 Spain's 10-year yield averaged 6.8% while Germany's averaged 1.2%. What drove the gap from both ends?
- Investors sold Spanish bonds over default and break-up fears and bought German bonds as a safe haven
- The ECB raised German rates and cut Spanish ones
- Spain issued bonds in pesetas
Show the answer
A. Investors sold Spanish bonds over default and break-up fears and bought German bonds as a safe haven Flight to safety widened the spread twice over: Spanish yields rose as prices fell, and German yields fell as safe-haven buying pushed prices up.
The OMT bond-buying program announced in September 2012 was never activated during the crisis. Why did it still calm markets?
- It replaced all bailout programmes
- It cut Greek debt by half
- A lender with no preset limit stood behind the bonds, so the reason to run on them, that the backstop might run out, disappeared
Show the answer
C. A lender with no preset limit stood behind the bonds, so the reason to run on them, that the backstop might run out, disappeared Runs happen when investors fear there is not enough money to cover everyone. A credible, unlimited backstop removes that fear, often without having to be used.
What was the "doom loop" between banks and governments?
- Banks held their own governments' bonds, so falling bond prices weakened banks, and rescuing banks raised government debt further
- Governments taxed banks to pay for bailouts
- Banks refused to lend to governments
Show the answer
A. Banks held their own governments' bonds, so falling bond prices weakened banks, and rescuing banks raised government debt further Each side's weakness fed the other's, which is why Ireland's and Spain's bank problems became sovereign problems.
Sources and further reading
- European Commission — Report on Greek Government Deficit and Debt Statistics, COM(2010) 1, January 8, 2010
- Council Decision 2011/57/EU (Eurostat’s November 2010 validation of Greek 2009 deficit and debt)
- IMF — Press release 10/187 on the May 2010 Greek arrangement
- ECB — Press release on the Securities Markets Programme, May 10, 2010
- ESM — What was the private sector debt restructuring of March 2012?
- IMF — Press releases on Ireland (Dec 2010), Portugal (May 2011) and Spain’s bank support (July 2012)
- ECB — Speech by Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference in London, July 26, 2012
- ECB — Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, September 6, 2012
- ESM — European Stability Mechanism inaugurated, October 8, 2012
- OECD long-term interest rates via FRED (series IRLTLT01GRM156N and peers), monthly averages
- STOXX — Euro Stoxx 50 historical daily closes
- Finabase chart data — Euro Stoxx 50 (^STOXX50E) monthly bars, 2007–2014
