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Silver Thursday 1980: the Hunt brothers and a silver corner that broke

How the Hunt brothers pushed silver to about $49 an ounce, how margin rules and calls broke them on 27 March 1980, and why the high stood for 45 years.

On this page
  1. The build-up: buying a market
  2. The rule changes
  3. Silver Thursday
  4. The 45-year shadow
  5. A worked example: leverage in a commodity corner
  6. Lessons for investors
  7. Comparison with other leveraged collapses
  8. How Finabase helps
  9. Frequently asked questions
  10. Summary
  11. Check your understanding

On Thursday 27 March 1980 the price of silver closed at $10.80 an ounce, down from about $49 two months earlier. The fall broke the largest attempt in modern times to dominate a commodity market: Texas oil heirs Nelson Bunker Hunt and William Herbert Hunt, with partners, had bought silver and silver futures until they controlled a large share of the deliverable supply. When exchanges changed the rules and the price turned, the brothers could not meet their margin calls, and their brokers, their banks and the Federal Reserve were drawn in.

Silver Thursday is a case study in leverage, the limits of buying a market, and the power of the people who write exchange rules. It also has a long tail: in nominal terms, silver futures only briefly matched the 1980 high in April 2011 and moved clearly above it in late 2025. This lesson tells the story with the published prices and the real futures data we hold.

The build-up: buying a market

The Hunts began buying silver in the early 1970s as a hedge against inflation, which they expected to erode paper money. Their holdings grew through the decade, in physical bullion and in futures contracts on COMEX in New York and the Chicago Board of Trade. In 1979 they formed a venture with Saudi investors to buy more. By the end of 1979, by the SEC staff's later account, the group and its associates controlled a very large position in bullion and in near-month futures, the contracts that require delivery of real silver.

How a corner works

A corner tries to own so much of what must be delivered that people who have sold contracts short cannot find the metal to deliver, and must buy back their contracts from the cornering party at whatever price it names. It needs two things: a supply that cannot grow quickly, and the money to keep buying. The Hunts insisted on taking delivery of much of the silver they bought rather than rolling contracts forward, which shrank the silver available to others.

The price response was dramatic. Silver went from about $6 an ounce at the start of 1979 to a London fix of $49.45 on 18 January 1980. Households sold silverware to be melted down, and jewelers and film makers, then large users, faced costs several times higher than a year before.

Silver, 1979–1980: three published prices (US$ per ounce) $0 $10 $20 $30 $40 $50 Oct 1978 Apr 1979 Oct 1979 Apr 1980 Oct 1980 Early 1979: about $6 18 Jan 1980: $49.45 (London fix) 27 Mar 1980: $10.80 The dashed line only joins the three prices; silver moved up and down in between.
Silver, 1979–1980: three published prices. The dashed line only joins them. Sources: SEC staff report (1982), LBMA.

The rule changes

Futures exchanges set margin (the deposit a trader must post) and position limits. In January 1980 they used both:

  1. Higher margins. Exchanges raised the deposit required per silver contract several times, so the same position needed far more cash. See Futures margin and leverage: initial, maintenance and margin calls.
  2. Silver Rule 7. On 7 January 1980 COMEX's board adopted rules capping the number of silver contracts any one trader could hold, and on 21 January it allowed only trades that reduced positions ("liquidation only"). New buying, the engine of the rise, was cut off.

The exchanges said the rules were needed to keep an orderly market; critics, then and later, pointed out that some board members' firms were short silver and stood to gain. Either way, the effect was the same: the price stopped rising, and a leveraged long position that needs a rising price is in trouble once it stalls.

Silver Thursday

From late January the price slid. Each fall triggered margin calls: demands for more cash to cover the loss on futures held with borrowed money. The Hunts met calls for weeks by borrowing more, including large loans from banks against their silver. In the week of 24 March their broker, Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, made a margin call reported at more than $100 million, and the Hunts said they could not pay.

On 27 March silver fell to $10.80. Bache sold the Hunts' collateral to cover their debts, and shares of Bache's parent were briefly suspended on the New York Stock Exchange. Other brokers and the banks that had lent against silver faced losses too. Because those lenders were large, the Federal Reserve, then led by Paul Volcker, was involved in the response, which was negotiated in the following weeks.

The bailout of the Hunts' lenders

In April 1980 a group of banks lent about $1.1 billion to a Hunt family company, secured on the family's oil properties and other assets, so that the brothers could repay their silver debts in an orderly way. The loan was controversial at the time, coming during a Fed program to restrain credit, because it looked like help for speculators. The argument for it was the same one made for LTCM in 1998 (Long-Term Capital Management (1998): how leverage sank a genius fund): a disorderly default could have spread losses through brokers and banks.

What came later

The brothers' fortunes did not recover. A long-running civil suit brought by a Peruvian state minerals company ended in 1988 with a jury finding that the Hunts had conspired to manipulate the silver market and awarding damages; Nelson Bunker Hunt and William Herbert Hunt filed for bankruptcy the same year. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission later barred them from trading on futures exchanges as part of a settlement.

The 45-year shadow

Silver Thursday set a nominal high that stood for a long time. The chart below shows silver futures since 2000 with the 1980 fix as a line. The monthly high reached $49.52 in April 2011, level with the 1980 fix for a few days, and silver did not trade clearly above it until October 2025, when it touched $53.34. A futures contract and the London fix are not the same price series, so treat the comparison as approximate.

Silver futures (SI=F), monthly highs and closes, Sep 2000 – Oct 2025, against the 1980 high $20 $40 1980 London fix high $49.45 Apr 2011 high $49.52 Oct 2025 high $53.34 Monthly close Monthly high 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Silver futures (SI=F), monthly bars, Sep 2000 – Oct 2025. Data: Finabase chart API, frozen 2026-11-18.

After inflation, the 1980 high is far higher than either. US consumer prices roughly quadrupled between January 1980 and 2025 (BLS CPI-U), so $49.45 in January 1980 is equal to roughly $200 in 2025 dollars. Even the sharp rally that followed in late 2025 and early 2026 left silver well below its 1980 price in real terms, which shows how far the corner had pushed it above what users and long-run investors would pay.

A worked example: leverage in a commodity corner

Suppose a trader holds futures on 10 million ounces of silver, bought at an average of $30, with margin of $3 an ounce posted, $30 million in all, and the rest effectively borrowed.

  • Silver rises to $40. The position gains $100 million. Paper wealth looks huge.
  • The exchange doubles margin to $6 an ounce. The trader must post another $30 million in cash, even though the price has not fallen.
  • Silver falls to $20. The position has lost $100 million from the $30 cost, far more than the margin posted. Each day's fall brings a call for more cash. If the trader cannot pay, the broker sells the position, pushing the price lower and triggering other traders' calls.

The same leverage that drove the price up becomes the force that drives it down. The Margin calls: when they trigger, how to calculate them, what to do lesson explains how calls work in a stock account.

Lessons for investors

  • You cannot buy a market forever. A price driven by one buyer's purchases falls when the buying stops, and the buyer's own position is too large to sell without crushing the price.
  • Exchange rules can change mid-game. Margins and position limits are set by exchanges and regulators, and they tend to rise exactly when a position is most stretched.
  • Leverage turns a fall into a forced sale. Margin calls make holders sell at the worst time.
  • Real prices tell a different story from nominal ones. A 1980 high that took 45 years to pass in dollars was never passed after inflation.

Comparison with other leveraged collapses

Episode Year Leveraged player What broke it
Silver Thursday 1980 The Hunt brothers Margin increases, position limits
Long-Term Capital Management (1998): how leverage sank a genius fund 1998 A bond-arbitrage hedge fund Russia's default, a flight to safety
The Archegos collapse (2021): swaps, hidden leverage and bank losses 2021 A family office using swaps Falling prices in a few concentrated stocks

How Finabase helps

The silver futures chart (SI=F) with range=max shows monthly bars back to 2000, and the comparison chart puts the silver fund SLV beside the gold fund GLD. Futures quotes on Finabase come with contract details, and the Futures margin and leverage: initial, maintenance and margin calls lesson explains how margin works.

Frequently asked questions

What happened on Silver Thursday?

On 27 March 1980 silver closed at $10.80 an ounce after the Hunt brothers failed to meet margin calls on their huge silver futures position. The fall threatened their broker and lenders and led to a bank rescue loan of about $1.1 billion.

How high did silver go in 1980?

The London fix reached $49.45 an ounce on 18 January 1980, up from about $6 in early 1979. Sources give slightly different peaks depending on the market and whether they use intraday prices.

Did the Hunt brothers try to corner the silver market?

That is how regulators and a 1988 jury saw it. The brothers said they were buying silver as a hedge against inflation, but a civil jury found that they had conspired to manipulate the market.

When did silver pass its 1980 high?

In nominal terms, silver futures touched $49.52 in April 2011, level with the 1980 fix, and first traded clearly above it in October 2025, at $53.34, in the data we hold. After inflation, the 1980 high is roughly four times higher.

Summary

The Hunt brothers bought silver with borrowed money until the price rose from about $6 to $49.45 an ounce in a year. Exchanges raised margins and cut off new buying in January 1980, the price fell, and on 27 March 1980 the brothers' missed margin calls sent silver to $10.80 and forced a bank rescue to protect their lenders. The episode shows how leverage drives both the rise and the fall of a cornered market, and its 1980 price took about 45 years to pass clearly even before inflation.

Check your understanding

4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.

  1. What two conditions does a commodity corner need?

    1. A supply that cannot grow quickly and the money to keep buying
    2. Low interest rates and a weak dollar
    3. A government guarantee and a short position
    Show the answer

    A. A supply that cannot grow quickly and the money to keep buying A corner works only if new supply cannot arrive fast and the buyer can keep absorbing what is offered. Silverware melted into bullion and cut-off credit undermined both in 1980.

  2. COMEX doubled silver margin and later allowed only trades that reduced positions. Why did that hurt a leveraged long holder even before the price fell?

    1. It forced the holder to post more cash and stopped the new buying that had been pushing the price up
    2. It made silver illegal to own
    3. It cancelled existing contracts
    Show the answer

    A. It forced the holder to post more cash and stopped the new buying that had been pushing the price up Higher margin needs more cash for the same position, and liquidation-only rules remove new buyers. A position that depends on rising prices stalls.

  3. A trader holds 10 million ounces of silver futures bought at $30 with $3 an ounce of margin. Silver falls to $20. Roughly how does the loss compare with the margin posted?

    1. The loss is $100 million against $30 million of margin, so the trader faces calls far beyond the original deposit
    2. The loss equals the margin
    3. There is no loss until the contract expires
    Show the answer

    A. The loss is $100 million against $30 million of margin, so the trader faces calls far beyond the original deposit Futures are marked to market daily. A $10 fall on 10 million ounces is $100 million, more than three times the deposit.

  4. Silver passed its January 1980 fix of $49.45 in nominal terms only in 2025. What about in real terms?

    1. It passed it in 1987
    2. It has never come close, because consumer prices roughly quadrupled from 1980 to 2025
    3. Real and nominal prices are the same for metals
    Show the answer

    B. It has never come close, because consumer prices roughly quadrupled from 1980 to 2025 With prices about four times higher, $49.45 in 1980 dollars is roughly $200 in 2025 dollars.

Sources and further reading

  1. US Securities and Exchange Commission — The Silver Crash: report of the staff of the SEC, October 1982
  2. US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations — Silver prices and the adequacy of federal actions in the marketplace, 1979–80 (hearings, 1980)
  3. Commodity Exchange, Inc. (COMEX) — Silver Rule 7, adopted 7 January 1980
  4. Fay — Beyond Greed: The Hunt Family’s Bold Attempt to Corner the Silver Market, Viking, 1982
  5. LBMA — Historical London silver fix prices
  6. US Bureau of Labor Statistics — CPI-U, all items