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David Swensen and the Yale model of endowment investing
How David Swensen built the Yale endowment model, what Yale reports it returned, why it is hard to copy, and why his advice for individuals was low-cost index funds.
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David F. Swensen (1954–2021) managed Yale University's endowment for 36 years and changed how large, long-lived institutions invest. When he arrived in 1985, a typical endowment held mostly US stocks and bonds. Swensen moved Yale's money into a wide mix of assets most institutions then avoided: hedge funds run for absolute returns, private equity and venture capital, real estate, timber and oil and gas. The approach became known as the Yale model, or the endowment model, and hundreds of foundations and universities tried to copy it.
What makes Swensen especially interesting for individual investors is that he told them not to copy it. In his second book he argued that people investing their own money should use a few low-cost index funds. This article explains the model, the returns Yale reports for it, why it is hard to replicate, and the simpler portfolio he recommended to everyone else.
Who Swensen was
Swensen grew up in River Falls, Wisconsin, and earned a doctorate in economics at Yale, where the Nobel laureate James Tobin was a major influence. He then spent several years on Wall Street, at Salomon Brothers and Lehman Brothers; at Salomon he worked on an early currency swap between IBM and the World Bank. In 1985, at 31 and with no experience managing a portfolio, he returned to Yale to run its investments office. He stayed until his death from cancer in May 2021, turning down far better-paid offers, and taught an undergraduate course on investing for many years. Several of his former staff went on to run other major endowments.
The problem an endowment has
An endowment is meant to last forever. A university spends a small share of it each year, usually around 4% to 5%, to support teaching and research, and needs the rest to grow faster than inflation so that future students get the same support. Its horizon is unlimited and its withdrawals are predictable and modest. That makes it unusually able to accept short-term volatility and to lock money up for years in exchange for higher expected returns.
Swensen started from that fact. In Pioneering Portfolio Management (2000) he argued that endowments should be equity-oriented, because over long periods ownership earns more than lending; diversified, so that no single market decides the result; and willing to hold illiquid assets that other investors avoid, because investors who need liquidity pay for it and those who do not can collect the premium. He also drew an idea from Keynes's King's College experience (see Keynes as an investor: from market timer to value stock picker): a long-term institution should not behave like a trader.
What the Yale model holds
By the end of Swensen's tenure the portfolio barely resembled a traditional one. Yale's targets for fiscal 2021 put 2.25% in US stocks and 7.5% in bonds and cash, the two asset classes that make up a classic 60/40 fund. The rest went to:
- Absolute return (23.5%): hedge funds that aim to earn returns unrelated to the stock market, such as event-driven and value-based strategies.
- Venture capital (23.5%) and leveraged buyouts (17.5%): private equity funds that own young or private companies for years.
- Foreign equity (11.75%), real estate (9.5%) and natural resources (4.5%), the last including timber, oil and gas, and mining.
Yale also set two guardrails: at least 30% of the portfolio in assets not sensitive to the stock market (cash, bonds and absolute return), and no more than 50% in illiquid assets.
Three practices tied the model together. Rebalancing brought the portfolio back to its targets after markets moved, which meant selling what had risen and buying what had fallen (see Rebalancing a portfolio: calendar vs threshold, drift and taxes). Manager selection mattered more than in public markets: Yale hired outside firms for nearly everything and spent much of its effort finding, negotiating with and monitoring them. And a spending rule smoothed what Yale took out each year by blending the previous year's spending with a target rate applied to the endowment's current value, so the university's budget did not swing with markets.
The reported results
Yale publishes its results every year, and the figures below are Yale's own, net of fees, as reported by the university.
- Over Swensen's 36 years to June 2021, the endowment earned 13.7% a year, according to Yale. That beat the average endowment, as measured by Cambridge Associates, by 3.4 points a year and a traditional 60/40 mix by 4.0 points. Yale says a dollar invested at the start would have grown to nearly $103 with no withdrawals, against slightly more than $50 in the S&P 500.
- In fiscal 2021, his last year, the return was 40.2%, lifting the endowment to $42.3 billion.
- Over the 20 years to June 30, 2020, Yale reports 9.9% a year, against 6.2% for US stocks, 5.1% for US bonds and an estimated 5.6% for the average college endowment.
Two cautions apply. The private funds that make up much of the portfolio are valued by their managers, often with a lag, so their reported returns are smoother than market prices and can flatter risk-adjusted comparisons. And the comparison depends on the period. Over the ten years to June 2020, Yale reported 10.9% a year against 13.7% for US stocks, because the long US bull market rewarded the one asset Yale barely owned. Yale still beat the average endowment's 7.4% over that decade.
Why the model is hard to copy
Many institutions adopted the label without getting the results, and several reasons explain why.
Manager dispersion. In public markets the gap between a good and a bad stock fund is modest. In venture capital and buyouts the gap between top-quartile and bottom-quartile funds is enormous, so the average private fund is far less attractive than the best. Yale's returns came largely from being an early investor with some of the most successful private firms, which do not take new money from everyone.
Illiquidity. Money in private funds can be locked up for ten years or more, and investors must meet capital calls when the fund asks. Institutions that needed cash in 2008 found they had to sell private holdings at steep discounts or cut spending.
Scale and staff. Running the model requires a team of experienced analysts to pick and monitor dozens of managers, and the bargaining power of a large, prestigious client.
Fees. Hedge and private equity funds typically charge a management fee plus a share of profits. Only very good managers clear those costs; the average does not.
The crowd arrived. As many endowments adopted the model in the 2000s, more money chased the same strategies and the illiquidity premium Swensen had captured early became harder to earn.
Swensen's advice for individuals
In Unconventional Success (2005) Swensen turned to personal investing and reached a blunt conclusion: individuals cannot get the access, staff or terms that made Yale's approach work, and most of the mutual fund industry serves its own profits rather than its investors. His recommended alternative was a portfolio of six low-cost index funds:
| Asset class | Suggested weight |
|---|---|
| US stocks | 30% |
| Foreign developed-market stocks | 15% |
| Emerging-market stocks | 5% |
| Real estate investment trusts (REITs) | 20% |
| US Treasury bonds | 15% |
| Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) | 15% |
The portfolio keeps the spirit of the Yale model, equity-oriented and spread across several return sources, while using only cheap, liquid, public-market funds. He urged regular rebalancing back to the targets and criticized actively managed funds, high fees and frequent trading in terms very close to John Bogle's (see John Bogle and index investing: the cost matters hypothesis). The weights were his suggestion for a typical investor, not a rule; the general logic of choosing a mix is in Asset allocation: how stock, bond and cash mixes have behaved.
How Finabase helps
Finabase cannot give anyone access to private funds, but it can show the public-market building blocks of Swensen's individual portfolio. A comparison chart such as VTI against VEA, VNQ and TIP puts US stocks, developed foreign stocks, REITs and inflation-protected Treasuries on one chart, so you can see how differently they behave. A portfolio holds a model mix and shows how far it drifts from its targets, which is the signal to rebalance, and the indices page tracks the world markets behind the foreign weights.
Frequently asked questions
What is the Yale model?
It is the endowment investing approach David Swensen developed at Yale from 1985: an equity-oriented portfolio spread across many asset classes, with large allocations to hedge funds, private equity, venture capital and real assets, careful outside manager selection and regular rebalancing.
How well did the Yale endowment do under Swensen?
According to Yale, it returned 13.7% a year over his 36-year tenure to June 2021, about 3.4 points a year more than the average endowment, and grew from $1.3 billion to $42.3 billion while funding more than $21 billion of spending.
Can individual investors copy the Yale model?
Swensen himself said they generally should not try. Individuals lack access to the best private fund managers and pay higher fees; he recommended a simple mix of six low-cost index funds instead.
What portfolio did David Swensen recommend for individuals?
In Unconventional Success (2005) he suggested 30% US stocks, 15% developed foreign stocks, 5% emerging-market stocks, 20% REITs, 15% Treasury bonds and 15% TIPS, held in low-cost index funds and rebalanced regularly.
Summary
David Swensen turned a modest university endowment into one of the largest in the world by building a diversified, equity-oriented portfolio that leaned heavily on illiquid private assets and outside managers chosen with great care. Yale reports a 13.7% annual return over his tenure, well ahead of other endowments, though private asset valuations and the choice of period both shape that comparison. The model depends on access, scale and patience that few investors have, and Swensen's own advice to individuals was the opposite of exotic: a handful of low-cost index funds, held for the long run and rebalanced.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
Which feature of a university endowment made Swensen’s approach possible?
- It needs all its money back within a year
- It has an unlimited horizon and modest, predictable withdrawals, so it can accept volatility and lock money up for years
- It is exempt from market risk
Show the answer
B. It has an unlimited horizon and modest, predictable withdrawals, so it can accept volatility and lock money up for years An investor who does not need liquidity can earn the extra return that others pay to avoid illiquid assets.
Over the ten years to June 2020, Yale reported 10.9% a year while US stocks returned 13.7%. What does this show?
- The Yale model failed
- Comparisons depend on the period: a diversified portfolio with little in US stocks lags when US stocks lead
- Yale owned mostly US stocks
Show the answer
B. Comparisons depend on the period: a diversified portfolio with little in US stocks lags when US stocks lead Yale still beat the average endowment that decade. Diversification gives up the top performer’s return in exchange for not depending on it.
Why is the Yale model hard for most investors to copy?
- Index funds are not available
- Its returns depend on access to top private fund managers, whose results differ hugely from average ones, plus long lockups, large staff and high fees
- It is illegal for individuals
Show the answer
B. Its returns depend on access to top private fund managers, whose results differ hugely from average ones, plus long lockups, large staff and high fees In private markets the gap between the best and the average manager is very wide, and the best do not take money from everyone.
What did Swensen recommend for individual investors?
- Hedge funds and venture capital
- A mix of low-cost index funds across US, foreign and emerging stocks, REITs, Treasuries and TIPS, rebalanced regularly
- A single technology stock
Show the answer
B. A mix of low-cost index funds across US, foreign and emerging stocks, REITs, Treasuries and TIPS, rebalanced regularly In Unconventional Success (2005) he argued that individuals lack the access and terms that made Yale’s approach work.
Sources and further reading
- Swensen — Pioneering Portfolio Management: An Unconventional Approach to Institutional Investment, Free Press, 2000 (revised 2009)
- Swensen — Unconventional Success: A Fundamental Approach to Personal Investment, Free Press, 2005
- Yale News — Investment return of 6.8% brings Yale endowment value to $31.2 billion, September 24, 2020
- Yale News — David Swensen’s coda (fiscal 2021 results and the record of his tenure), October 22, 2021
- Yale School of Management — David Swensen, renowned endowment manager and teacher, has died, May 2021
- Yale Investments Office — The Yale Endowment, annual reports
- NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments (annual endowment returns and allocations)
