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The Panic of 1907: trust runs, J.P. Morgan and the birth of the Fed

How a failed copper corner set off runs on New York trust companies in October 1907, how J.P. Morgan’s bankers stopped them, and why it led to the Federal Reserve.

On this page
  1. The setting: a boom with thin cushions
  2. What happened: October to November 1907
  3. The numbers
  4. Why it led to the Federal Reserve
  5. What 1907 has in common with later crises
  6. Lessons for investors
  7. How Finabase helps
  8. Frequently asked questions
  9. Summary
  10. Check your understanding

In October 1907 a failed attempt to corner the shares of a copper company set off a chain of runs on New York's trust companies, then the fastest-growing and least-regulated part of the banking system. Within days depositors were queuing in the street, call-money rates on the Stock Exchange soared, and the market was close to shutting. There was no central bank to lend. The run was stopped by a private banker, J. Pierpont Morgan, who organized rescues from his library.

The panic is the reason the United States has a Federal Reserve. It showed that a country with large banks, a busy stock market and no lender of last resort was one rumor away from a liquidity crisis. This lesson follows the panic day by day, explains why trust companies were so exposed, and shows the market data and the policy changes that followed.

The setting: a boom with thin cushions

The years after 1897 were a boom for American industry and for Wall Street. The San Francisco earthquake of April 1906 then destroyed a large part of the city and pulled gold out of London and New York to pay insurance claims. The Bank of England raised its rate in late 1906 and took steps to slow the flow of gold to America. Credit in New York was tight by early 1907, and share prices were already falling. The Dow Jones Industrial Average, then an index of 12 stocks, had closed at a high of 103.00 on 19 January 1906.

Why trust companies were exposed

Trust companies were state-chartered firms that took deposits and made loans much like banks, but under lighter rules. In New York they had grown faster than national banks over the previous decade. Two differences mattered:

  • Lower cash reserves. National banks in New York had to hold reserves of 25% of deposits; trust companies held only about 5% in cash, by Federal Reserve History's account.
  • Loans to the market. Trusts lent heavily to brokers and investors against shares as collateral, much of it as call loans repayable on demand.

They also sat outside the New York Clearing House, the banks' own association, which in earlier panics had pooled reserves and issued certificates to settle balances between members. A trust in trouble had no club to turn to.

What happened: October to November 1907

October–November 1907: from a failed corner to the Fed 16 Oct United Copper corner collapses 21–22 Oct Run on Knickerbocker Trust; it closes 24 Oct Morgan’s bankers’ pool lends call money to the Exchange Early Nov U.S. Steel buys TC&I; trust run subsides 1908 → 1913 Aldrich-Vreeland Act; Federal Reserve Act (23 Dec 1913) Sources: Federal Reserve History, “The Panic of 1907”; FDIC, deposit insurance history 1900–1919.
The Panic of 1907 in five steps. Sources: Federal Reserve History; FDIC.

The copper corner

F. Augustus Heinze, a copper magnate who had moved into banking, and his brother Otto tried in mid-October to corner shares of United Copper, buying heavily to squeeze investors who had sold the stock short. The attempt failed within days: the shares the brothers expected to be scarce turned up for sale, and United Copper's price collapsed. Heinze was president of the Mercantile National Bank, and depositors in banks linked to him and his ally, the speculator Charles W. Morse, began to withdraw money.

The Knickerbocker run

The Knickerbocker Trust Company, one of New York's largest trusts, was tied to the same circle through its president, Charles Barney. Depositors began to pull money out. Morgan sent a team led by Benjamin Strong, later the first head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to inspect its books. After about half a day they could not say it was solvent, and Morgan declined to lend. Knickerbocker closed on 22 October. The run then moved to other trusts, above all the Trust Company of America.

The Stock Exchange nearly closes

Because trusts lent so much to the market, the runs reached the Exchange at once. Trusts called in their loans to raise cash, brokers could not borrow to carry positions, and on 24 October call-money rates rose to levels that made borrowing nearly impossible. The president of the Exchange asked Morgan for help. Within the afternoon, Morgan's group of bankers committed money to lend on the floor, and the market stayed open. Further pools followed in the next days, including help for New York City's own finances.

The end of the run

Morgan also brokered a deal in early November for U.S. Steel to buy the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company, whose shares were held as collateral by a troubled brokerage. President Theodore Roosevelt let the deal proceed without antitrust action. Around the same time the trust company presidents, under pressure from Morgan, agreed to support one another. The runs eased in November; the Dow closed at its low of 53.00 on 15 November 1907.

Dow Jones Industrial Average: 1906 high and 1907 low (published closes) 103.00 19 Jan 1906 53.00 (−48.5%) 15 Nov 1907 Price index of 12 stocks, no dividends. Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices DJIA history.
Dow Jones Industrial Average, published closes. Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices.

The numbers

  • Stocks. The Dow fell 48.5% from its January 1906 high to the November 1907 low (103.00 to 53.00). Much of that fall came before October; the panic was the final, sharpest leg.
  • Trust deposits. Federal Reserve History reports that New York City trust companies lost more than 36% of their deposits between 22 August and 19 December 1907, while deposits at the city's national banks rose.
  • The economy. The recession that the National Bureau of Economic Research dates from May 1907 to June 1908 was among the sharpest of the era: by Federal Reserve History's figures, industrial output fell 17% and real GNP 12% in 1908.
  • Currency. Banks around the country restricted cash withdrawals, and various kinds of substitute money (clearing house certificates, scrip) circulated until cash returned.

Why it led to the Federal Reserve

The panic had been stopped by private bankers pooling money on a handshake. That worked once, but it depended on one man's authority, and Morgan was 70. It also left the impression that a few financiers had too much power over the system. Congress responded in steps:

  1. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 let groups of national banks issue emergency currency in a crisis. It was used once, in 1914, when the outbreak of the First World War closed the Stock Exchange.
  2. The National Monetary Commission, created by the same act and led by Senator Nelson Aldrich, studied European central banks and reported in 1912.
  3. The Federal Reserve Act, signed on 23 December 1913, created a central bank able to lend to banks against good collateral in a panic, an "elastic" currency, and twelve regional Reserve Banks. See how the Federal Reserve works.

What 1907 has in common with later crises

The same pattern appears in later panics, with different names for the weak link.

Crisis The lightly regulated lender What ran Who stopped it
1907 Trust companies Depositors J.P. Morgan and a bankers' pool
1929–33 (The crash of 1929: causes, the 1929–32 decline and lessons) Small, unit banks without deposit insurance Depositors Nobody, until the 1933 banking holiday
2008 (The 2008 financial crisis: housing, Lehman, TARP and the 57% fall) Investment banks, money funds, the repo market Short-term lenders The Fed, Treasury and FDIC
2023 Banks with large uninsured deposits Uninsured depositors FDIC, Fed lending facility

In each case the institution that grew fastest did so partly because it held less of a cushion, and it was the first to fail when lenders wanted their money back.

A worked example: why a run can sink a solvent bank

Suppose a trust has $100 million of deposits, $10 million of capital and $110 million of assets: $5 million in cash and $105 million in loans that it can recall only slowly or sell at a discount. If depositors ask for $30 million in a week, the trust pays the first $5 million in cash. To find the other $25 million it must sell loans in a market where everyone is selling. If it gets 70 cents on the dollar, it must sell about $35.7 million of loans to raise $25 million, losing about $10.7 million and wiping out its capital. A firm that was solvent on Monday is insolvent by Friday because of the run itself. A central bank that lends against those loans at a fair value, as the Fed was designed to do, breaks that chain.

Lessons for investors

  • Liquidity and solvency are different. A firm can be worth more than it owes and still fail if it cannot pay today. The Bank run entry explains the mechanics.
  • Watch the fastest-growing lender. Booms often run through institutions outside the established rules.
  • Panics end when someone credible stands behind the system. In 1907 it was a private banker; since 1913 it has usually been a central bank.

How Finabase helps

Today's panics show up first in volatility and in index moves around the world. The Indices page shows major markets live, and a long-run chart of the Dow ETF (DIA) puts any fall in a decades-long frame. The History of stock market crashes: every major US drawdown compared lesson compares later drawdowns on real data.

Frequently asked questions

What caused the Panic of 1907?

The immediate trigger was a failed attempt to corner United Copper shares in mid-October 1907, which led to runs on banks and trust companies tied to the people involved. Tight credit after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and trust companies' thin reserves made the system fragile.

How much did stocks fall in 1907?

The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell from 103.00 on 19 January 1906 to 53.00 on 15 November 1907, a decline of 48.5% on published closes.

What did J.P. Morgan do in 1907?

He organized groups of bankers to lend to troubled trust companies and to brokers on the Stock Exchange, pushed trust presidents to support one another, and brokered U.S. Steel's purchase of the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company.

Did the Panic of 1907 create the Federal Reserve?

It led directly to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 and the National Monetary Commission, whose work fed into the Federal Reserve Act signed on 23 December 1913.

Summary

The Panic of 1907 began with a failed copper corner and became a run on New York's trust companies, which held little cash and lent heavily to the stock market. With no central bank, J.P. Morgan stopped the run with private pools of money, but the Dow had already fallen 48.5% from its 1906 peak and the economy fell into a sharp recession. The lesson Congress drew, that a modern financial system needs a lender of last resort, produced the Federal Reserve six years later.

Check your understanding

4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.

  1. Why did runs on New York trust companies in 1907 reach the stock market so quickly?

    1. Trust companies owned most listed shares directly
    2. Trusts had lent heavily to brokers on call; to raise cash they called those loans, and brokers could not borrow to carry positions
    3. The Exchange required trusts to guarantee every trade
    Show the answer

    B. Trusts had lent heavily to brokers on call; to raise cash they called those loans, and brokers could not borrow to carry positions Call loans repayable on demand tied the trusts to the Exchange. When the trusts needed cash, call money dried up and its rate soared.

  2. A trust has $5 million cash and must pay out $30 million in a week, selling loans at 70 cents on the dollar. Why can the run itself make it insolvent?

    1. Because selling loans below their value turns a cash shortage into a capital loss
    2. Because depositors are paid interest during a run
    3. Because cash loses value in a panic
    Show the answer

    A. Because selling loans below their value turns a cash shortage into a capital loss Raising $25 million at 70 cents means selling about $35.7 million of loans, a loss of about $10.7 million. That can exceed the capital cushion.

  3. What gap in the 1907 system did the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 mainly fill?

    1. A lender of last resort able to lend to banks against good collateral in a panic
    2. Deposit insurance for every account
    3. A ban on trust companies
    Show the answer

    A. A lender of last resort able to lend to banks against good collateral in a panic In 1907 private bankers had to pool money themselves. The Fed was designed to provide that liquidity as a public institution.

  4. The Dow fell 48.5% from January 1906 to November 1907. What does that say about the October panic?

    1. All of the fall happened in October
    2. Much of the fall came before October; the panic was the final, sharpest leg of a longer decline
    3. The panic did not affect stock prices
    Show the answer

    B. Much of the fall came before October; the panic was the final, sharpest leg of a longer decline Prices had been sliding since early 1906 as credit tightened. The trust runs added the last, fastest part.

Sources and further reading

  1. Federal Reserve History — The Panic of 1907 (Moen and Tallman)
  2. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics — Crisis Chronicles: The Panic of 1907 (2015)
  3. FDIC — A brief history of deposit insurance, 1900–1919
  4. Bruner and Carr — The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm, Wiley, 2007
  5. S&P Dow Jones Indices — Dow Jones Industrial Average history and closing milestones
  6. National Monetary Commission, Report, 1912