Articles · Market history
The Archegos collapse (2021): swaps, hidden leverage and bank losses
How a family office built $160 billion of hidden exposure through total return swaps, why its March 2021 default cost banks over $10 billion, and what the trial found.
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In late March 2021, a firm most investors had never heard of failed to meet its margin calls, and some of the world's largest banks sold, by press estimates, more than $20 billion of stock in a few days to cover themselves. The firm was Archegos Capital Management, the family office of former hedge fund manager Bill Hwang. A family office manages one family's money, so Archegos had no outside clients and filed almost nothing with regulators. Yet according to the SEC, at its peak it controlled stock exposure of more than $160 billion on about $36 billion of its own capital.
Most of that exposure was invisible to the market because it was held through total return swaps, contracts with banks rather than shares in Archegos's own name. When the prices of a few heavily concentrated holdings fell, the leverage worked in reverse, and the banks that had financed it lost more than $10 billion between them. This article explains how the swaps worked, how the collapse unfolded day by day, why one bank lost far more than the others, and what the criminal trial established.
How a total return swap works
In a total return swap, a bank buys shares and agrees to pass their full economic result to its client. The client receives any rise in price plus dividends and pays any fall, plus a financing fee. The client puts up only a fraction of the position's value as collateral, called margin. Economically, it is like buying the stock with borrowed money, as in Buying on margin: how margin loans, interest and leverage work, but with three differences that mattered here:
- The bank owns the shares, so the client does not appear as a shareholder. Ownership rules that require disclosure above 5% of a company, and the quarterly 13F filings: what institutional holdings reports show and miss, did not capture Archegos's swap positions.
- Margin terms are negotiated privately, and can be far lower than the 50% initial margin that applies to ordinary stock purchases on credit under the Fed's Regulation T.
- Each bank sees only its own slice. Archegos had swaps with several prime brokers at once. Each knew its own exposure but not the total.
Building the position
From March 2020 to March 2021 Archegos's capital grew about twentyfold, mainly through a handful of concentrated bets on US media companies and Chinese technology companies listed in the US. Its holdings included ViacomCBS (later renamed Paramount Global), Discovery, Baidu, Tencent Music, Vipshop, iQIYI, GSX Techedu and Farfetch. Because Archegos was such a large buyer, often through several banks at once, its own buying helped push these stocks higher, which raised its capital, which let it borrow and buy more.
The SEC and prosecutors later alleged that this was not just aggressive investing. They charged that Archegos deliberately bought to drive prices up, and that its executives lied to banks about the size and concentration of the portfolio to obtain more credit.
The collapse: March 22–26, 2021
ViacomCBS shares had roughly tripled since the autumn of 2020, and the company decided to raise money. On March 22, 2021 it announced an offering, and on March 24 it priced 20 million Class B shares at $85, together with $1 billion of convertible preferred stock, about $3 billion in total. New supply at a discount, with no Archegos to absorb it, sent the stock down sharply. Several of Archegos's other concentrated holdings were falling that week too.
The Credit Suisse report traces the effect on one lender. Archegos held about $5.1 billion of ViacomCBS through Credit Suisse on March 22. By March 24 its margin cushion at the bank was gone. On March 25 Credit Suisse called for more than $2.8 billion of margin, and Archegos said it could not pay: its cash had already gone to other brokers' calls. That evening the banks met with Archegos to discuss an orderly wind-down, which never happened.
On Friday, March 26, banks started selling on their own. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley sold large blocks of Baidu, Tencent Music, Vipshop, ViacomCBS and Discovery to other investors, by press estimates more than $10 billion for Goldman alone. ViacomCBS and Discovery each fell about 27% that day. Banks that sold early recovered their loans; banks that waited sold later into lower prices.
Who lost what
| Bank | Reported loss |
|---|---|
| Credit Suisse | about $5.5 billion |
| Nomura | about $2.9 billion over two fiscal years |
| Morgan Stanley | $911 million ($644 million credit loss plus $267 million trading) |
| UBS | $861 million ($774 million in Q1 2021 plus $87 million in Q2) |
| MUFG | about $270 million (company estimate) |
Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and Wells Fargo reported no material losses. The difference was not luck alone. The banks that lost least had demanded more margin and sold quickly.
Why Credit Suisse lost the most
Credit Suisse's board commissioned an independent report from the law firm Paul, Weiss, published on July 29, 2021. It described a bank that had repeatedly seen warnings and not acted:
- Archegos's swap margin had been cut in 2019 to about 7.5% from about 20%, and averaged about 5.9% by September 2020, among the lowest of its prime brokers.
- Margin was static: set when a position was opened and not raised as the positions grew larger and more concentrated.
- Risk limits were breached for months. One measure of potential exposure had a limit of $20 million and stood at about $530 million by August 2020.
The report found a "lackadaisical attitude towards risk" in the business, though no fraud by Credit Suisse staff. The bank's losses that year, together with the collapse of a supply-chain finance fund it had sold to clients, damaged confidence in it for good. Two years later it was taken over by UBS in a government-arranged rescue, a story told in The bank failures of 2023: SVB, Signature and First Republic.
The charges and the trial
On April 27, 2022, the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and federal prosecutors in New York charged Hwang and Archegos's chief financial officer, Patrick Halligan, with racketeering conspiracy, securities fraud, wire fraud and market manipulation. Two other executives also faced charges and cooperated. At trial in 2024, prosecutors argued that Hwang had used the swaps to manipulate the prices of the stocks he held and that the firm had lied to banks to keep credit flowing.
A jury convicted Hwang on 10 of 11 counts on July 10, 2024, and Halligan on all counts against him. On November 20, 2024 Hwang was sentenced to 18 years in prison; Halligan later received 8 years.
What changed afterwards
- Disclosure. In December 2021 the SEC proposed Rule 10B-1, which would require public reporting of large security-based swap positions. It came months after Archegos, and the episode was widely cited in support of it.
- Prime brokerage. Banks moved toward dynamic margin, which rises as a client's positions grow more concentrated or less liquid.
- Systemic view. The Federal Reserve's May 2021 Financial Stability Report noted that a highly leveraged family office had been unable to meet margin calls on total return swaps, and that the wider market spillovers appeared limited. The damage stayed with the lenders.
How Finabase helps
Archegos failed from leverage and Concentration risk: when one holding dominates a portfolio, and both can be checked in an ordinary portfolio. The portfolio page shows each holding's weight, so you can see how much of your money rides on a few names. A stock's holders tab lists reported institutional owners, a reminder of what public filings show and, as Archegos proved, what they can miss. For margin specifically, see Margin calls: when they trigger, how to calculate them, what to do.
Frequently asked questions
What was Archegos Capital?
A New York family office run by Bill Hwang that invested his own fortune, more than $36 billion at its peak according to the SEC. It used total return swaps from several banks to control more than $160 billion of stock exposure.
Why didn't anyone know how big Archegos's positions were?
Its positions were held through total return swaps, so the banks, not Archegos, owned the shares. Swaps were not covered by the usual ownership disclosures, and each bank saw only its own exposure.
How much did banks lose on Archegos?
More than $10 billion in total, led by Credit Suisse at about $5.5 billion and Nomura at about $2.9 billion. Morgan Stanley and UBS each lost under $1 billion; Goldman Sachs reported no material loss.
What happened to Bill Hwang?
He was convicted of fraud and market manipulation on July 10, 2024, and sentenced to 18 years in prison on November 20, 2024.
Summary
Archegos turned about $1.5 billion into more than $36 billion of capital in a year by borrowing heavily through total return swaps and concentrating in a handful of stocks, while staying almost invisible to public filings. When a ViacomCBS share sale broke the cycle of rising prices in March 2021, margin calls went unpaid, banks dumped the stock in blocks, and the slowest lenders absorbed the losses, above all Credit Suisse at about $5.5 billion. Hwang's 2024 conviction established the fraud; the lesson for everyone else is how fast concentration plus leverage can erase capital.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
Why did Archegos's huge stakes in companies such as ViacomCBS not appear in public ownership filings?
- Family offices are exempt from all securities laws
- It held them through total return swaps, so the banks owned the shares and Archegos only had the economic exposure
- The positions were too small to report
Show the answer
B. It held them through total return swaps, so the banks owned the shares and Archegos only had the economic exposure Ownership disclosures such as 13F filings and the 5% rules applied to the shares the banks held, not to the swap exposure Archegos had.
Archegos had swaps with several banks at once. Why did that make the risk harder to manage?
- Each bank saw only its own slice, so none knew how concentrated and leveraged the total position was
- The banks were required to share all client data daily
- Swaps with several banks automatically cancel each other out
Show the answer
A. Each bank saw only its own slice, so none knew how concentrated and leveraged the total position was Each lender judged its own exposure as manageable, but they were all exposed to the same few stocks and would all need to sell them at once.
Goldman Sachs reported no material loss from Archegos while Credit Suisse lost about $5.5 billion. What mainly explains the difference?
- Goldman had no exposure to Archegos
- Goldman held more margin and sold its positions early, while Credit Suisse had thin, static margin and sold later into lower prices
- Credit Suisse was required by law to hold its positions
Show the answer
B. Goldman held more margin and sold its positions early, while Credit Suisse had thin, static margin and sold later into lower prices In a default, the first lenders to sell recover their loans at higher prices. Low margin plus a slow exit left Credit Suisse with the largest loss.
A fund with $10 billion of capital holds $50 billion of stock, half of it in five names. Those five fall 20%. What happens to the fund's capital, ignoring everything else?
- It falls 10%
- It falls 20%
- It falls 50%
Show the answer
C. It falls 50% $25 billion × 20% = $5 billion of losses, half of the $10 billion of capital. Leverage and concentration multiply a sector move into a fund-threatening loss.
Sources and further reading
- SEC — Press release 2022-70: SEC charges Archegos and its founder with massive securities fraud (April 27, 2022)
- US Department of Justice — Four charged in connection with the collapse of Archegos Capital Management (April 27, 2022)
- US Attorney, SDNY — Founder of Archegos, Bill Hwang, sentenced to 18 years in prison (November 20, 2024)
- Credit Suisse Group Special Committee of the Board — Report on Archegos Capital Management (Paul, Weiss), July 29, 2021
- ViacomCBS — Prices offerings of Class B common stock and mandatory convertible preferred stock (March 2021)
- UBS Group — First-quarter 2021 report (Form 6-K)
- Morgan Stanley, Nomura and MUFG — first-quarter 2021 disclosures as reported by the financial press (April 2021)
- Federal Reserve Board — Financial Stability Report, May 2021
- SEC — Proposed Rule 10B-1 on reporting of large security-based swap positions (December 15, 2021)
- Reuters / Al Jazeera — Hwang convicted on 10 of 11 counts (July 10, 2024)
