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Fraud and security · Securing your accounts

Two-factor authentication and passkeys: which second factor to use

How text codes, authenticator apps, push approvals, security keys and passkeys compare against phishing, SIM swaps and push floods, per NIST and CISA.

On this page
  1. What a second factor is
  2. The common second factors
  3. Which attacks each method stops
  4. Synced and device-bound passkeys
  5. Limits and trade-offs
  6. How to set it up on a brokerage account
  7. How Finabase does it
  8. Frequently asked questions
  9. Summary
  10. Check your understanding

Two-factor authentication asks for a second proof, besides your password, before it lets you in: a code, a tap on your phone, a security key or a fingerprint that unlocks a key stored on your device. It is the setting that turns a stolen password from a disaster into a nuisance. But the second factors brokers and banks offer differ a great deal in what they stop, and the weakest ones fail against exactly the attacks investors face most: fake login pages, phone number theft and floods of approval requests.

This lesson explains how each common second factor works, how each holds up against those three attacks according to US government guidance from NIST and CISA, why passkeys and security keys are the only common kind a fake site cannot use, and what to set up on a brokerage account today.

What a second factor is

Security people group proofs of identity into three kinds: something you know (a password or PIN), something you have (a phone, a security key) and something you are (a fingerprint or face). Multi-factor authentication, often shortened to MFA or 2FA, requires two or more different kinds. A password plus a code from your phone is two factors; a password plus a security question is still only one, because both are things you know.

The point is that a criminal who steals one factor still lacks the other. The weakness is in how the second factor travels. If it is a number you read and type, anyone who can make you type it into the wrong place, or who can receive it in your place, has both factors.

The common second factors

Text and voice codes

The service sends a short code by text message or automated call to your phone number. It is the most widely offered method and the easiest to set up. It is also the weakest. NIST, the US standards body, lists codes sent over the phone network as a "restricted" method in its July 2025 guidance (SP 800-63B-4): a service that uses them must offer an alternative and tell users about the risks. CISA's fact sheet says text or voice should be used only as a last resort, because the codes can be phished, intercepted through weaknesses in the phone network's signaling system (SS7) and redirected by a SIM swap, in which a criminal gets your number moved to their SIM card.

Email codes

Some services email a code or a link. NIST's guidance says email shall not be used for this kind of out-of-band check. The practical problem is that your email is often how the account's password is reset as well, so one break-in gives a criminal both. If email is the only option your broker offers, secure the email account as carefully as the broker account.

Authenticator app codes

An authenticator app on your phone shows a six-digit code that changes every 30 seconds or so. The code is calculated on the phone from a secret shared once at setup, so nothing travels over the phone network and a SIM swap does not touch it. It can still be phished: the code is something you read and type, so a fake login page can collect it and replay it on the real site while it is still valid.

Push approvals

Some apps send a notification asking "Is this you signing in?" with Approve and Deny buttons. It is convenient and avoids phone network codes, but it opened a new attack, which CISA calls push bombing or MFA fatigue: a criminal who already has your password triggers sign-in after sign-in, sometimes hundreds of prompts in a short time, until you tap Approve by accident, to make it stop, or because you assume one of them is real.

The fix is number matching: the login screen shows a number and you must type it into the app to approve. A tap alone no longer works, and a prompt you did not start shows a number you cannot see. CISA recommends number matching as the interim step for services that cannot yet offer phishing-resistant methods. NIST's 2025 guidance goes further: it no longer accepts the version in which you only compare two numbers and tap, because people approve without really comparing, and it tells services to limit how many push requests they send.

Hardware security keys and passkeys

A security key is a small physical device, plugged into a USB port or tapped against a phone, that holds a cryptographic key. A passkey is the same idea stored in your phone or computer and unlocked with your fingerprint, face or device PIN. Both use the FIDO and WebAuthn standards. The SEC's investor bulletin describes a passkey as a private key kept on your device and paired with the account, with nothing for you to remember or type.

The key never leaves the device. When you sign in, the site sends a challenge, your device signs it, and the site checks the signature against the public half of the key it stored when you set it up. Crucially, your browser or phone includes the site's real address in what is signed, and a passkey made for your broker simply does not exist for any other address.

Which attacks each method stops

Second factors against three common attacks Second factor Fake login site SIM swap Push flood Text or voice code Exposed Exposed Not affected Authenticator app code Exposed Not affected Not affected Push approval, tap only Exposed Not affected Exposed Push with number matching Exposed Not affected Resists Hardware security key Resists Not affected Not affected Passkey Resists Not affected Not affected
How common second factors hold up against three attacks. Fake login site: NIST SP 800-63B-4 (July 2025), which says codes and out-of-band methods are not phishing-resistant. SIM swap and push flood: CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA (October 2022).

The grid shows why the ranking runs the way it does. Every method that ends with you reading something and acting on it can be turned against you by a convincing fake page, because the fake page simply passes along whatever you give it. That is the whole difference between a code and a passkey.

Why a fake site can use your code but not your passkey A typed code A passkey or security key You type password and code Look-alike site address Real broker accepts both Attacker relays them in seconds: signed in as you. You unlock with face, finger, PIN Look-alike site address The browser checks the address. No key exists for the fake one, so nothing is signed or sent. Nothing to relay.
A typed code works wherever it is typed. A passkey or security key is bound to the address it was made for, which is what NIST calls verifier name binding.

NIST calls this property phishing resistance and defines it as protection that does not depend on the user noticing the fake. Its 2025 guidance says one-time codes and out-of-band methods (texts, calls and push approvals) shall not be considered phishing-resistant, and names WebAuthn (the standard behind passkeys and security keys) as a method that is. CISA's 2022 fact sheet says FIDO and WebAuthn are the only widely available phishing-resistant option and calls phishing-resistant MFA the gold standard.

Synced and device-bound passkeys

Passkeys come in two forms, and the difference matters for recovery and for strength.

  • Synced passkeys are copied across your devices through the cloud account of your phone or computer platform. Lose a phone and the passkey is still on your laptop or a new phone once you sign in to that cloud account. NIST calls these syncable authenticators and permits them at its first two assurance levels, but not at its highest (AAL3), because a key that can be copied is not bound to one piece of hardware.
  • Device-bound passkeys, including those on a hardware security key, never leave the device. They are stronger, and losing the device means losing the key, so you need a second one.

A synced passkey is only as safe as the cloud account it syncs through. If that account can be reset with a text code, a SIM swap can reach your passkeys indirectly. Give that account its own strong protection.

Limits and trade-offs

  • The weakest enabled method wins. If a service lets anyone fall back to a text code when the passkey "isn't working", a criminal will choose the fallback. Where you can, remove phone-number recovery after adding stronger methods.
  • Support desks are a back door. A criminal with enough personal data may talk a call center into resetting your login. No second factor stops that; a verbal PIN on the account, where offered, helps.
  • Strong factors do not stop you acting. A passkey stops a fake site from signing in as you. It does not stop a caller from talking you into moving money yourself. The FBI's November 2025 warning on account takeovers described exactly that: callers posing as a bank or broker's fraud team who ask for passwords and codes.
  • Availability varies. Many brokers offer only text codes or an app. Use the strongest option each one offers, and ask the firm when it will support passkeys or security keys.
  • Lockout is real. With strong methods and no backup, losing a device can lock you out for days. That is why the steps below start with two methods and recovery codes.

How to set it up on a brokerage account

  1. Find the security settings. Sign in by typing the broker's address or using its app, not through a link in a message, and open the security or login settings.
  2. Add the strongest method offered. A passkey or security key first; an authenticator app next; text codes only if nothing else is available.
  3. Add a second method. A passkey on a second device, a second security key, or an authenticator app as backup. Two strong methods mean a lost phone is an inconvenience, not a lockout.
  4. Save recovery codes. Store them in a password manager or on paper somewhere safe, never in an email to yourself.
  5. Remove weak fallbacks where the broker allows it, especially text codes once a stronger method works.
  6. Protect the reset paths. Secure your email account and set a PIN and a SIM change lock with your mobile carrier, so neither can be used to get around the factors above.
  7. Test it. Sign out and back in on another device to confirm everything works before you need it.

How to secure your brokerage account: a layered checklist puts this step in the context of the other account protections.

How Finabase does it

Finabase accounts are signed into with Google, Apple, or an email address and password (Sign in to Finabase on the web and manage your account). When you choose Google or Apple, the second factor is the one on that Google or Apple account: turning on its strongest method, including a passkey or security key if you have set one up there, protects your Finabase sign-in too. Finabase does not offer its own second factor for email-and-password accounts today, so if you use that method, give it a long, unique password.

The Security & signed-in devices page shows every browser signed in to your account and can sign out any of them, which is the first thing to check if you think someone else signed in. Finabase never asks for a one-time code by phone, text or email, and a Finabase sign-in cannot reach any brokerage account, because Finabase does not connect to brokers.

Frequently asked questions

Is SMS two-factor authentication safe?

It is safer than a password alone, but it is the weakest common method. Text codes can be phished on a fake site and redirected by a SIM swap, and CISA advises using them only as a last resort. Use an authenticator app, a passkey or a security key where offered.

Is a passkey better than an authenticator app?

Against phishing, yes. An app code can be typed into a fake page and relayed; a passkey is bound to the real site's address, so a fake page gets nothing usable. Both are unaffected by SIM swaps.

What is MFA fatigue or push bombing?

It is a flood of sign-in approval requests sent by someone who already has your password, hoping you tap Approve to make them stop. Never approve a prompt you did not start, and change your password at once, because the flood means it has leaked.

What happens if I lose the phone with my passkeys?

Synced passkeys come back when you sign in to the same platform account on a new device. Device-bound passkeys and security keys do not, which is why you should register a second method and keep recovery codes.

Do I need two-factor authentication on my email too?

Yes. Email is how most passwords are reset, so a criminal in your email can often get past the broker's protections. Give the email account the strongest second factor it offers.

Summary

A second factor stops a stolen password from being enough, but only some second factors stop the attacks investors meet. Text and voice codes can be phished and redirected by a SIM swap; authenticator app codes can be phished; push approvals can be flooded unless they use number matching. Passkeys and hardware security keys are bound to the real site's address and are the only common methods a fake site cannot use. Use the strongest method each account offers, register a backup, keep recovery codes safe, protect your email and phone number, and never read a code to anyone who contacts you.

Check your understanding

4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.

  1. You type your password and a six-digit authenticator app code into a page that looks exactly like your broker but is a fake. What can the criminal behind the page do?

    1. Relay the password and code to the real site within seconds and sign in as you
    2. Nothing, because authenticator app codes cannot be phished
    3. Only see your password, because app codes are encrypted
    Show the answer

    A. Relay the password and code to the real site within seconds and sign in as you A code you read and type works wherever you type it while it is still valid. NIST says one-time codes are not phishing-resistant for that reason. A passkey or security key would have produced nothing usable for the fake address.

  2. Your phone suddenly shows a dozen "Approve sign-in?" prompts you did not start. What does that tell you, and what should you do?

    1. Someone has your password; deny every prompt and change the password at once
    2. The app is glitching; approve one to make the prompts stop
    3. Your broker is testing its system; ignore the prompts
    Show the answer

    A. Someone has your password; deny every prompt and change the password at once This is push bombing, or MFA fatigue: an attacker with your password keeps triggering prompts hoping you tap Approve. Never approve a prompt you did not start, and replace the leaked password.

  3. Which second factor does a SIM swap put at risk?

    1. Codes sent by text message or voice call
    2. A hardware security key
    3. Codes generated in an authenticator app
    Show the answer

    A. Codes sent by text message or voice call A SIM swap moves your phone number to the criminal's SIM card, so codes sent to that number go to them. App codes and security keys do not travel over the phone network, so the swap does not reach them directly.

  4. Why does NIST not allow synced passkeys at its highest assurance level (AAL3)?

    1. Because the key can be copied between devices, so it is not bound to one piece of hardware
    2. Because synced passkeys can be phished like text codes
    3. Because synced passkeys require a password every time
    Show the answer

    A. Because the key can be copied between devices, so it is not bound to one piece of hardware Synced passkeys are still bound to the real site address, so they resist phishing. NIST excludes them from AAL3 only because their keys are exportable; device-bound keys never leave the device.

Sources and further reading

  1. NIST — SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management (July 2025)
  2. NIST CSRC — SP 800-63B-4 publication record (final, July 2025)
  3. CISA — Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA, fact sheet (October 2022)
  4. CISA — Implementing Number Matching in MFA Applications, fact sheet (October 2022)
  5. SEC Investor.gov — Protecting Your Online Investment Accounts from Fraud, Investor Bulletin (April 23, 2026)
  6. FBI IC3 — PSA I-020822-PSA: Criminals Increasing SIM Swap Schemes to Steal Millions of Dollars from US Public (February 8, 2022)
  7. FBI IC3 — PSA I-112525-PSA: Account Takeover Fraud via Impersonation of Financial Institution Support (November 25, 2025)