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Fraud and security · Securing your accounts

SIM swap attacks and your phone number: signs, locks and FCC rules

How SIM swaps and port-outs hijack the phone number behind your accounts, the signs, the carrier locks to turn on, and the FCC rules due in December 2026.

On this page
  1. What a SIM swap and a port-out are
  2. Why investors are targets
  3. The SEC's own account: January 9, 2024
  4. Signs a SIM swap may be under way
  5. What to do if it happens
  6. Protections to turn on today
  7. The FCC rules for carriers
  8. Limits
  9. How Finabase does it
  10. Frequently asked questions
  11. Summary
  12. Check your understanding

Your phone number has quietly become a key to your money. Banks, brokers and crypto exchanges send sign-in codes to it, and many let you reset a password with a text message. A SIM swap takes that key: a criminal persuades your mobile carrier to move your number onto a SIM card they hold, and from that moment their phone receives your calls and texts, including those codes. A port-out does the same by moving your number to another carrier.

This lesson explains both attacks, the signs that one is under way, the carrier protections to switch on today, the US rules carriers must meet from December 2026, and the January 2024 incident in which the SEC's own X account was taken over this way. It describes the attack only as far as you need to recognize and stop it.

What a SIM swap and a port-out are

A SIM (subscriber identity module) is the chip, physical or built into the phone as an eSIM, that ties your phone to your number on the carrier's network. Carriers move numbers to new SIMs all the time, when a phone is lost, broken or replaced. A SIM swap abuses that service: someone who is not you gets the carrier to make the change.

A port-out abuses a different service, number portability, which lets you keep your number when you switch carriers. In port-out fraud, a criminal posing as you asks a new carrier to take your number, and your old carrier releases it. The FCC describes the result of both the same way: the criminal controls your mobile account and receives the texts and calls meant for you, without ever touching your phone.

The FBI's 2022 warning described three ways criminals get the change made: posing as the customer to the carrier's support staff, paying a carrier employee to do it, and tricking carrier staff into installing malicious software that gives access to carrier systems. Personal details from data breaches and social media make the impersonation easier, which is why limiting what you post about yourself, your phone number and your investments helps.

Why investors are targets

With your number, a criminal can request password resets and receive the one-time codes that banks, brokers and crypto exchanges send by text. CISA's fact sheet on multi-factor authentication lists SIM swaps among the attacks that defeat text and voice codes, and recommends that those codes be used only as a last resort. People who post about their holdings, especially crypto, are an obvious target; the FBI advises not sharing details of your financial assets online.

SIM swap losses reported to the FBI (IC3), US, by year (complaints in brackets) $72.7 million (2,026) 2022 $48.8 million (1,075) 2023 $26.0 million (982) 2024 $17.4 million (971) 2025 FBI IC3 Internet Crime Reports 2024 and 2025. Reported complaints and losses only.
SIM swap complaints and losses reported to the FBI IC3, United States. Sources: IC3 Internet Crime Reports for 2024 (2022 figures) and 2025.

Reported SIM swap losses fell by about three-quarters from 2022 to 2025, and complaints roughly halved. The reports do not say why. They count only complaints filed under this crime type; a swap that leads to a drained brokerage or crypto account may be reported under another heading, so the figures are a floor. For scale, the FBI's 2022 warning counted 320 complaints and about $12 million in losses for the three years 2018 to 2020 combined, and 1,611 complaints with more than $68 million in 2021 alone.

The SEC's own account: January 9, 2024

The best-known recent case hit a regulator. Shortly after 4:00 pm Eastern on January 9, 2024, an unauthorized party took control of the SEC's account on X and at 4:11 pm posted a false announcement that the Commission had approved spot bitcoin exchange-traded funds. The SEC warned the public through its chair's account at 4:26 pm and said at 4:42 pm that the account had been compromised.

The SEC X account takeover, January 9, 2024 (times Eastern) ~4:00 pm access begins through the linked number 4:11 pm false post: spot bitcoin ETFs "approved" 4:26 pm warning posted from the Chair's account 4:42 pm @SECGov says it was compromised Jan. 11 carrier and SEC find an apparent SIM swap Jan. 22 SEC publishes finding; MFA had been off Source: SEC statement on the @SECGov X account (updated January 22, 2024). Access ended between 4:40 and 5:30 pm.
The @SECGov takeover, January 9, 2024, as set out in the SEC statement updated January 22, 2024.

On January 22 the SEC said that, two days after the incident, it had determined with its telecom carrier that the party had taken control of the phone number linked to the account through an apparent SIM swap. Access came through the carrier, not SEC systems. Multi-factor authentication had been on, but was switched off at staff request in July 2023 because of access problems, and stayed off until after the attack. The lessons for anyone: a phone number linked to an account is part of its security, and a second factor that has been switched off protects nothing.

Signs a SIM swap may be under way

FINRA's October 2024 investor guide lists the signs to watch for:

  • your phone suddenly has no signal or service, while other devices on the same Wi-Fi work;
  • a notice that a new device or number was activated on your account, when you added none;
  • you cannot sign in to your online accounts;
  • transactions you did not make, or requests for them;
  • an unusual number of calls or texts.

Losing service at an odd time is not proof, since networks fail too. But if it comes with an unexpected carrier notice or a failed login elsewhere, act as if it is a swap.

What to do if it happens

Speed matters, because a criminal with your number can reset passwords within minutes.

  1. Call your carrier from another phone, or reach it over Wi-Fi, through the number on its website or your bill. Report a fraudulent SIM change or port-out and ask it to restore your number and lock the account.
  2. Secure your email first, then your financial accounts: change passwords from a device you trust and check for new forwarding rules, phone numbers or linked bank accounts.
  3. Call your broker, bank and any crypto exchange on numbers you found yourself, and ask them to flag or freeze the accounts and watch for transfers.
  4. Place a fraud alert or credit freeze if personal details were exposed (Credit freezes and fraud alerts: how they work and how they differ).
  5. Report it to the FBI at ic3.gov, and keep a record of every call, name, date and reference number.

Under the FCC's rules (below), your carrier must give you, at no cost, documentation of a fraudulent SIM change or port-out on your account when you ask for it. Keep it; banks and brokers may want it.

Protections to turn on today

  • Carrier account PIN or passcode. Most carriers let you set one that support staff must hear before making changes. Make it unique: not your birthday or the last digits of your Social Security number.
  • SIM change lock and number transfer lock. Ask your carrier what it calls these and turn them on. They block a SIM change or port-out until you lift the lock yourself.
  • Second factors that do not use your number. An authenticator app, a passkey or a hardware security key is not moved with your number. The FBI recommends stronger methods than text codes; Two-factor authentication and passkeys: which second factor to use compares them.
  • Remove the number as a recovery path on important accounts once a stronger method works, where the service allows it.
  • Keep your number and holdings private. Do not post your number, or what you own, publicly.
  • Never read a carrier PIN or code to someone who called you. Hang up and call the carrier.

Crypto held in a self-custody wallet is reached through its seed phrase, not your phone number (Seed phrases: how a wallet backup works and how to protect it), but exchange accounts that reset by text are exposed like any other.

The FCC rules for carriers

In November 2023 the Federal Communications Commission adopted rules that apply to every US wireless carrier, including resellers (FCC 23-95, published at 88 FR 85794 on December 8, 2023). Carriers must:

  • authenticate securely before a SIM change or a port-out, with methods that do not rely on readily available information such as biographical details, account information, recent payments or call records, and review those methods at least once a year;
  • notify you immediately when a SIM change or port-out is requested, before carrying it out;
  • offer a free account lock that blocks SIM changes, and one that blocks port-outs, until you lift it;
  • tell you, on their website and app, what protections they offer;
  • give you a free, clear way to report fraud, investigate promptly, and provide documentation of a fraudulent change on request;
  • train staff to recognize fraudulent requests and keep employees from seeing account data until the caller has been authenticated, and keep records of SIM change requests for at least three years.

Parts of the rules needed a federal paperwork review, so they did not take effect at once. The Office of Management and Budget approved them on January 15, 2025, and the FCC's notices in the Federal Register set the dates: the last SIM change provisions took effect on November 17, 2026, with compliance required by December 17, 2026, and the port-out rules took effect on November 18, 2026, with compliance required by December 18, 2026.

FCC rules on SIM changes and port-outs: from adoption to compliance Nov 15, 2023 FCC adopts the SIM swap and port-out order Dec 8, 2023 published in the Federal Register Jan 15, 2025 paperwork review approved (OMB) Nov 17–18, 2026 last parts take effect Dec 17, 2026 carriers must comply: SIM changes Dec 18, 2026 carriers must comply: port-outs FCC 23-95; 88 FR 85794; 91 FR 73684 (Nov 17, 2026) and 91 FR 74126 (Nov 18, 2026). 47 CFR 64.2010(h), 52.37.
Dates from FCC 23-95 and the Federal Register notices of November 17 and 18, 2026 (91 FR 73684 and 91 FR 74126). Rules at 47 CFR 64.2010(h) and 52.37.

The rules set a floor; they do not make a swap impossible. A determined impersonator may still pass a carrier's checks, and a notice only helps if you see it in time. Keep using locks and strong second factors whatever your carrier promises.

Limits

  • Locks have to be switched on, and you must remember how to lift them when you change phones.
  • A notice can arrive too late. It helps only if you see it before the change goes through, and a text to the number being moved may never reach you. Ask your carrier how else it can notify you.
  • Text codes remain a weak spot on any account that still uses them, whatever the carrier does.
  • Insiders. The FBI has described carrier employees being paid to make swaps. No customer setting fully prevents that, which is why the strongest defence is not relying on the number.

How Finabase does it

Finabase sign-in does not use your phone number. You sign in with Google, Apple, or an email address and password (Sign in to Finabase on the web and manage your account), so a SIM swap could reach a Finabase account only through the recovery options of that Google or Apple account or that email. Protect those with a second factor that does not use your phone number. Finabase does not connect to brokers or banks, so a hijacked Finabase account cannot move money. If you suspect someone else is signed in, the Security & signed-in devices page can sign out every browser except the one you are using.

Frequently asked questions

How do I know if I have been SIM swapped?

The usual first sign is that your phone loses all signal for no clear reason while Wi-Fi works, often with a carrier notice about a new device or SIM you did not request, or with logins that suddenly fail. Call your carrier from another phone straight away.

How do I protect my phone number from a SIM swap?

Set a unique account PIN with your carrier, turn on its SIM change and number transfer locks, and move important accounts to an authenticator app, a passkey or a security key instead of text codes.

What is the difference between a SIM swap and a port-out?

A SIM swap moves your number to a new SIM card at the same carrier. A port-out moves your number to a different carrier. Both give a criminal your calls and texts, and the FCC's rules cover both.

Do the FCC's SIM swap rules protect me now?

The rules were adopted in November 2023, but carriers must comply with the SIM change rules by December 17, 2026 and the port-out rules by December 18, 2026. Many carriers already offer PINs and locks; ask yours.

Can a SIM swap empty my brokerage account?

It can if the account lets someone sign in or reset its password with a text code. A second factor that does not use your phone number, and alerts for any change of contact details, close that path.

Summary

A SIM swap or port-out moves your phone number to a criminal, who then receives the text codes and password resets meant for you. Watch for a sudden loss of service and unexpected carrier notices, and call the carrier from another phone at once. Set a carrier PIN, turn on the SIM change and port locks, and take your important accounts off text codes. US carriers must meet the FCC's authentication, notice and free-lock rules by December 2026, but the SEC's own account showed in 2024 that the safest defence is not letting a phone number alone unlock anything.

Check your understanding

4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.

  1. Your phone suddenly shows "No service" while your laptop on the same Wi-Fi works, and a minute later your email says a password reset was requested. What should you do first?

    1. Call your carrier from another phone and report a possible SIM swap
    2. Restart the phone and wait an hour for service to return
    3. Reply to the password reset email to cancel it
    Show the answer

    A. Call your carrier from another phone and report a possible SIM swap Sudden loss of service plus an unexpected reset are the classic signs of a SIM swap. A criminal with your number can reset passwords within minutes, so getting the number back and locked comes first; then secure your email and financial accounts.

  2. Which change best protects a brokerage account against a SIM swap?

    1. Replacing text-message codes with an authenticator app, a passkey or a security key
    2. Choosing a longer phone number
    3. Turning off account alerts so the criminal cannot see them
    Show the answer

    A. Replacing text-message codes with an authenticator app, a passkey or a security key A SIM swap gives the criminal your texts and calls. Second factors that do not travel over the phone network are not moved with the number, so a swap no longer unlocks the account.

  3. Under the FCC's 2023 SIM swap and port-out rules, what must US wireless carriers do once compliance is required in December 2026?

    1. Offer a free lock against SIM changes and port-outs, and notify you before carrying out a request
    2. Refuse every SIM change request for 30 days
    3. Reimburse any money stolen after a SIM swap
    Show the answer

    A. Offer a free lock against SIM changes and port-outs, and notify you before carrying out a request The rules require secure authentication, immediate notice before a SIM change or port-out, free account locks, a free fraud-reporting process and staff training. They do not promise reimbursement of losses at banks or brokers.

  4. What did the SEC report about the January 9, 2024 takeover of its X account?

    1. The phone number linked to the account was taken through an apparent SIM swap, and multi-factor authentication had been switched off
    2. Hackers broke into SEC computer systems and stole data
    3. An SEC employee posted the false bitcoin ETF approval by mistake
    Show the answer

    A. The phone number linked to the account was taken through an apparent SIM swap, and multi-factor authentication had been switched off The SEC said access came through its telecom carrier, not SEC systems, after an apparent SIM swap, and that MFA on the account had been disabled at staff request in July 2023. A linked phone number is part of an account's security.

Sources and further reading

  1. FCC — Report and Order FCC 23-95, Protecting Consumers from SIM Swap and Port-Out Fraud (adopted November 15, 2023)
  2. Federal Register — FCC, Protecting Consumers from SIM-Swap and Port-Out Fraud, final rule, 88 FR 85794 (December 8, 2023)
  3. Federal Register — FCC, SIM change rules: effective and compliance dates, 91 FR 73684 (November 17, 2026)
  4. Federal Register — FCC, port-out rules: compliance date, 91 FR 74126 (November 18, 2026)
  5. eCFR — 47 CFR 64.2010(h), Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) changes
  6. eCFR — 47 CFR 52.37, Number portability requirements for wireless providers
  7. SEC — Statement on the compromise of the @SECGov X account (updated January 22, 2024)
  8. FBI IC3 — PSA I-020822-PSA: Criminals Increasing SIM Swap Schemes to Steal Millions of Dollars from US Public (February 8, 2022)
  9. FBI IC3 — 2025 Internet Crime Report (SIM swap complaints and losses, 2023 to 2025)
  10. FBI IC3 — 2024 Internet Crime Report (SIM swap complaints and losses, 2022)
  11. FINRA — SIM Swapping Risks to Investors (October 29, 2024)
  12. CISA — Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA, fact sheet (October 2022)