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Fraud and security · Cyberattacks in finance

Cyberattacks on financial firms: four cases and what they changed

How the 2014 JPMorgan breach, the 2016 Bangladesh Bank theft and the 2023 ION and ICBC ransomware attacks unfolded, and what each one changed.

On this page
  1. Why finance is a target
  2. JPMorgan Chase, 2014: data at enormous scale
  3. Bangladesh Bank, 2016: a trusted channel used against its owner
  4. ION, 2023: when a software vendor goes dark
  5. ICBC Financial Services, 2023: a crack in Treasury clearing
  6. The common thread: disclosure
  7. What these cases do not show
  8. How Finabase does it
  9. Frequently asked questions
  10. Summary
  11. Check your understanding

Banks, brokers and market utilities hold two things criminals want: money that moves at the press of a key, and data about millions of people. They also run systems that the rest of the market depends on. When one of those systems stops, trades cannot be matched, margin cannot be calculated and reports to regulators do not arrive. That is why US regulators now treat cyberattacks as a risk to the financial system, not only to a single firm.

This lesson tells the story of four incidents that are well documented in public records: the 2014 breach at JPMorgan Chase, the 2016 theft from Bangladesh Bank's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the 2023 ransomware attack on the derivatives software firm ION, and the 2023 ransomware attack on the US broker-dealer of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). For each one it explains what happened, what the public record shows about the damage, and what it changed. It stays at the level a reader needs to understand the risk. It does not describe how any attack was carried out.

Why finance is a target

Most crime follows money, and in finance the money is already digital. A payment order, a trade confirmation or a change of bank details is a message between computers. If an attacker can send a message that looks real, value can move before anyone notices. If an attacker can stop the messages, the firm cannot do business at all.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the group of US financial regulators chaired by the Treasury Secretary, describes the risk with three words used across the security field: confidentiality, integrity and availability. In its 2023 annual report the Council explains each in financial terms:

  • Confidentiality. Stolen customer data can feed identity theft and fraud, and a loss of confidence in how a firm protects data and assets could lead customers to pull their money.
  • Integrity. If records at a trade repository, clearing house or transfer agent are corrupted, who owns what can become uncertain, and market participants could stop trading.
  • Availability. A disruption at a service many firms rely on, such as a software provider, data vendor or cloud provider, could threaten the stability of the whole system.

The four cases below line up neatly with those three words. JPMorgan was a theft of data. Bangladesh Bank was an abuse of a trusted payment channel. ION and ICBC were attacks on availability that rippled out to firms that had never been attacked themselves.

Four cyber incidents at financial firms, and the rule that followed Oct 2014 JPMorgan Chase: contact data of 76m households and 7m small firms Feb 2016 Bangladesh Bank: fake SWIFT orders sought $851m; about $81m stolen Jan 30, 2023 ION ransomware: 16 futures brokers back to manual processing Nov 8, 2023 ICBC FS ransomware: Treasury clearing for clients disrupted Dec 18, 2023 SEC Item 1.05: material incidents on Form 8-K in four business days Sources: JPMorgan Chase 8-K (2014); US Treasury (2018, 2019); FSOC 2023 Annual Report; SEC release 2023-139.
Four documented cyber incidents at financial firms, 2014 to 2023, and the SEC disclosure rule that followed. Sources: JPMorgan Chase Form 8-K (2014), US Treasury press releases (2018, 2019), FSOC 2023 Annual Report, SEC press release 2023-139.

JPMorgan Chase, 2014: data at enormous scale

On October 2, 2014, JPMorgan Chase filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission about a cyberattack on the bank. It said the compromised data affected approximately 76 million households and 7 million small businesses. What was taken was contact information for users of Chase.com and the bank's mobile apps (names, addresses, phone numbers and email addresses) along with internal bank information about those users.

The filing was just as careful about what was not taken. The bank said it had found no evidence that account numbers, passwords, user IDs, dates of birth or Social Security numbers were compromised, and that it had not seen any unusual customer fraud tied to the incident. It also reminded customers that they are not liable for unauthorized transactions on their accounts if they alert the bank promptly.

What it changed

The JPMorgan case showed how large a breach could be at a single bank, even when no money moved. A list of names, emails and phone numbers tied to one bank is exactly what a criminal needs to write a convincing fake message from that bank. That makes the follow-on risk phishing, not an empty account: after a breach like this, an unexpected call, text or link that seems to come from the bank deserves extra suspicion.

Policy then moved toward sharing threat information between firms and government. Congress passed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which the FSOC's 2016 annual report called a foundation for sharing cyber information between companies and between the public and private sectors. The idea behind it is simple: an attack seen at one bank today is often tried at another bank tomorrow.

Bangladesh Bank, 2016: a trusted channel used against its owner

In February 2016, criminals tried to empty part of the account that Bangladesh Bank, the country's central bank, held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. According to the US Treasury, they sent more than 36 large transfer requests using stolen SWIFT credentials, seeking a total of $851 million. SWIFT is the messaging network banks use to send each other payment instructions. Treasury says a typographical error alerted staff and stopped the attempt, but not before about $81 million was taken.

Bangladesh Bank, February 2016: what the fake orders asked for and what was taken Requested in fake orders $851 million Stolen about $81 million US Treasury press releases sm473 (Sept 6, 2018) and sm774 (Sept 13, 2019). Over 36 transfer requests.
Bangladesh Bank, February 2016: the amount requested in fake payment orders against the amount stolen, about 9.5% of it. Source: US Treasury press releases sm473 (2018) and sm774 (2019).

The point that unsettled bankers was that the orders did not come from outside. They were sent with real credentials through the normal channel. To the receiving bank, an instruction from a central bank's own account looked like routine business. The defence that worked was a human noticing something odd, not a technical control.

Who was blamed, and what followed

On September 6, 2018, the Justice Department unsealed criminal charges against Park Jin Hyok, a North Korean programmer, and Treasury placed sanctions on him and the company he worked for, describing him as part of the conspiracy behind the Bangladesh Bank theft. On September 13, 2019, Treasury went further and sanctioned three North Korean state-sponsored hacking groups: Lazarus Group and two sub-groups, Bluenoroff and Andariel. It said Bluenoroff had tried to steal more than $1.1 billion from financial institutions by 2018 and had targeted the SWIFT system as part of its campaigns.

The three institutions most involved also worked in the open. On May 10, 2016, the New York Fed, Bangladesh Bank and SWIFT met in Basel, Switzerland, and agreed on three goals: recover the stolen money, bring those responsible to justice, and protect the global financial system from similar attacks. A second statement on July 3, 2017 reported progress on rebuilding Bangladesh Bank's SWIFT-related systems so that its correspondent banking could run securely. That statement still spoke of recovering the proceeds, which tells you how slowly money stolen across borders comes back, if it comes back at all.

What it changed

The lesson of Bangladesh Bank is that a payment network is only as trustworthy as the computers that connect to it. If an attacker controls a member's terminal and its credentials, the network will faithfully deliver forged orders. Banks learned to treat large or unusual payment instructions with the same suspicion a careful person brings to an unexpected request to wire money, which is the same lesson every individual fraud victim learns too.

ION, 2023: when a software vendor goes dark

The ION attack shows a different risk: a firm few investors had heard of, whose software sat in the middle of the US futures market.

ION Group is a privately held financial software and data firm based in Ireland. One of its products, XTP, is used by futures commission merchants (FCMs, the brokers that hold customer accounts for futures trading) to process cleared derivatives from start to finish: trade matching and allocation, settlement and clearing, margin calculations, and reports to exchanges, clearing houses, regulators and customers.

The FSOC's 2023 annual report includes a case study of what happened next:

  • On the evening of January 30, 2023, ION was hit by a LockBit ransomware attack that affected XTP. Ransomware is malicious software that locks a victim's systems, usually followed by a demand for payment.
  • The next morning, FCMs that relied on XTP could not use it to process cleared derivatives.
  • Of the roughly 60 FCMs registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 16 used XTP, though the damage varied from firm to firm.
  • Without XTP, those firms had to match and allocate trades, manage positions and margin, and produce their reports by hand.
  • Most of ION's services were not restored until February 19, 2023, about three weeks later.

The effects reached the public. On February 2, 2023, the CFTC said the incident was hurting some clearing members' ability to send it timely, accurate data, told affected firms to file their daily large-trader reports on best estimates and correct them later, and delayed its weekly Commitments of Traders report. On February 16 it postponed the report again and said it hoped to resume as early as February 24, catching up on the missed weeks by mid-March.

What it changed

The good news in the FSOC account is as important as the bad. Thanks to required disaster recovery plans, manual workarounds and help from the clearing houses (which did not use XTP), firms met their margin obligations on time, and no defaults occurred. ION and two outside firms it hired concluded that no data had been taken.

The lesson the Council drew was about concentration. One vendor's outage disrupted about a quarter of the registered futures brokers at once. Afterward, many clearing houses, FCMs and other market participants began reviews of their own and their vendors' cybersecurity and disaster recovery plans. For investors, ION is the clearest recent example of operational risk that travels through shared suppliers rather than through balance sheets.

ICBC Financial Services, 2023: a crack in Treasury clearing

The US Treasury market is the base of the financial system. Trades in Treasury securities and the repurchase agreements (repos) that finance them must settle every day, and many smaller firms do not clear their trades themselves. They rely on a clearing firm.

On November 8, 2023, the US broker-dealer subsidiary of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which provides clearing services for Treasury transactions, was hit by a ransomware attack. In its 2023 annual report the FSOC called the event an example of the type of incident that could disrupt the functioning of the financial system. Its account focuses less on the attack than on the response:

  • The event was not immediately communicated to other regulators or to industry participants outside the core affected parties, such as small investment managers and trading, clearing and settlement venues.
  • The first meeting of the Core Executive Response Group (CERG), the coordination group named in the report, was not called until nearly 12 hours after the attack was identified and had started affecting trade processing.
  • The Council said this raised questions about timing, impact, awareness, escalation and coordination across the industry that needed to be reassessed.

What it changed

ICBC Financial Services is a small part of a very large bank, yet its outage touched one of the most important markets in the world. The case pushed the conversation from "is each firm secure?" to "how fast does everyone else find out?" In the same report, in light of the ransomware attacks on financial firms over the year, the Council recommended that government agencies review those incidents thoroughly to understand the weaknesses that led to them.

The common thread: disclosure

Each of these incidents became public in a different way: a voluntary 8-K from JPMorgan, a criminal case and sanctions for Bangladesh Bank, regulator statements for ION, and an annual report for ICBC. Investors were often the last to know, and the details depended on what each firm chose to say.

That changed for US public companies on December 18, 2023. Under rules the SEC adopted on July 26, 2023, a company must now describe a cybersecurity incident it has decided is material in Item 1.05 of a Form 8-K, within four business days of that decision, and must explain how it manages cyber risk every year in its 10-K. How companies disclose cyberattacks: Form 8-K Item 1.05 and the 10-K explains the rules and how to read such a filing. The Equifax data breach of 2017: what happened and what it changed tells the story of the consumer breach that did more than any other to shape them, and Cyberattacks and stock prices: what happened after five disclosures looks at how share prices moved after recent disclosures.

Incident Date What was hit What the record shows What it changed
JPMorgan Chase Disclosed 2014 Confidentiality: customer contacts 76m households, 7m small businesses; no account data found Scale of data risk; threat information sharing
Bangladesh Bank February 2016 Integrity: payment orders $851m requested; about $81m stolen Security of each bank's own link to payment networks
ION Cleared Derivatives January 30, 2023 Availability: a shared vendor 16 of about 60 FCMs on manual work; no defaults Reviews of vendor and disaster recovery plans
ICBC Financial Services November 8, 2023 Availability: Treasury clearing First industry response meeting nearly 12 hours later Faster escalation and cross-industry coordination

What these cases do not show

Four well-known cases make a clear story, which is exactly why they should be read with care.

  • They are the visible ones. Before December 2023, Form 8-K had no item for cyber incidents, so public companies chose how and when to tell investors, and incidents at private firms are often never made public. The public record over-represents dramatic events.
  • Attribution comes from governments. The link between Bangladesh Bank and North Korea rests on US criminal charges and Treasury sanctions. Those are formal findings, but they are not court verdicts on every detail.
  • Numbers can change. First estimates of a breach often grow or shrink as investigations go on. The figures here are the ones in the documents cited, on the dates they were published.
  • Losses are often unknown. For ION and ICBC, no public source cited here gives a full dollar cost of the disruption, so this lesson does not estimate one.

How Finabase does it

Finabase is a research tool, not a bank or a broker. It holds no customer money, sends no payments and never asks for passwords, codes or bank details by message.

What it does offer is a way to look at the market side of an incident. Every listed company has a symbol page with its price history, a News tab with headlines about the company and a Comparison tab that plots the stock against SPY and QQQ by default. Open a bank's Comparison tab and pick a range that covers a disclosure date to see whether the stock moved apart from the market, then read the company's own filing before drawing any conclusion. Cyberattacks and stock prices: what happened after five disclosures does exactly that for four recent cases.

Frequently asked questions

Was the SWIFT network itself hacked in the Bangladesh Bank theft?

The US Treasury describes the fake orders as sent with stolen SWIFT credentials, meaning the attackers used Bangladesh Bank's own access to the network. The orders travelled through the normal channel, which is why they looked genuine to the receiving bank.

Did customers lose money in the 2014 JPMorgan breach?

JPMorgan Chase said in its October 2014 filing that it had not seen any unusual customer fraud related to the incident and that no account numbers or passwords were found to be compromised. The greater risk for customers was convincing phishing messages built from the stolen contact details.

What is ransomware, and why does it matter to markets?

Ransomware is malicious software that locks a victim's systems and is usually followed by a demand for payment. When the victim is a vendor or clearing firm that many others depend on, as ION and ICBC Financial Services were, the outage spreads to firms that were never attacked.

Do companies have to report cyberattacks now?

US public companies do, when the incident is material. Since December 18, 2023, they must file a Form 8-K under Item 1.05 within four business days of deciding an incident is material, with a later start for smaller reporting companies.

Summary

Cyberattacks on financial firms take three forms: theft of data, abuse of trusted channels and outages of systems others depend on. JPMorgan Chase in 2014 showed the scale of data at risk, Bangladesh Bank in 2016 showed that a payment network trusts whoever holds the credentials, and the ION and ICBC ransomware attacks of 2023 showed how one firm's outage can stall derivatives and Treasury markets. Each changed how firms and regulators prepare, and together they set the stage for the SEC's December 2023 rule requiring public companies to report material cyber incidents within four business days.

Check your understanding

4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.

  1. In the 2016 Bangladesh Bank theft, why did the fake payment orders look genuine to the receiving bank?

    1. They were sent with stolen SWIFT credentials, through the bank's normal channel
    2. They came from a website that imitated the Federal Reserve
    3. They were approved by a Federal Reserve official over the phone
    Show the answer

    A. They were sent with stolen SWIFT credentials, through the bank's normal channel The US Treasury says the orders were sent with stolen SWIFT credentials. A payment network trusts whoever holds a member's credentials, so the defence has to include the security of each member's own systems and checks on unusual instructions.

  2. JPMorgan Chase said in 2014 that no account numbers or passwords were taken. What was the main risk to customers from the contact details that were taken?

    1. Convincing phishing messages that appear to come from the bank
    2. Immediate withdrawals from their checking accounts
    3. Their credit scores falling automatically
    Show the answer

    A. Convincing phishing messages that appear to come from the bank Names, emails and phone numbers tied to one bank let criminals write messages that look like they come from that bank. The bank reported no unusual customer fraud; the follow-on danger was deception, not a direct theft from accounts.

  3. Only 16 of about 60 futures brokers used ION's XTP software. Why did the 2023 ION attack still worry regulators?

    1. One vendor's outage disrupted many firms at once, forcing manual processing and delaying CFTC reports
    2. It caused several futures brokers to default on margin calls
    3. It changed the prices of futures contracts on the exchanges
    Show the answer

    A. One vendor's outage disrupted many firms at once, forcing manual processing and delaying CFTC reports The FSOC's case study stresses concentration: a single software provider's outage reached a quarter of registered futures brokers and delayed the CFTC's Commitments of Traders report. Thanks to backup plans and manual work, no defaults occurred.

  4. What did the FSOC criticize most in the November 2023 attack on ICBC's US broker-dealer?

    1. How slowly the incident was communicated and escalated to other regulators and market participants
    2. That ICBC paid a ransom to the attackers
    3. That the Treasury market closed for two days
    Show the answer

    A. How slowly the incident was communicated and escalated to other regulators and market participants The Council noted that the event was not immediately communicated beyond the core affected parties and that the first industry response meeting came nearly 12 hours after the attack was identified.

Sources and further reading

  1. JPMorgan Chase & Co. — Form 8-K, Item 7.01, on the 2014 cyberattack (October 2, 2014, SEC EDGAR)
  2. US Treasury — Treasury Targets North Korea for Multiple Cyber-Attacks (September 6, 2018; Bangladesh Bank, $81 million)
  3. US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups (September 13, 2019; $851 million requested)
  4. Federal Reserve Bank of New York — Joint statement with Bangladesh Bank and SWIFT, Basel meeting (May 10, 2016)
  5. Federal Reserve Bank of New York — Joint statement with Bangladesh Bank and SWIFT (July 3, 2017)
  6. CFTC — Statement on ION and the Impact to the Derivatives Markets (February 2, 2023)
  7. CFTC — Release 8662-23, Postponement of Commitments of Traders Report (February 16, 2023)
  8. Financial Stability Oversight Council — 2023 Annual Report (Box H: ION Case Study; the ICBC broker-dealer attack)
  9. Financial Stability Oversight Council — 2016 Annual Report (cybersecurity and the Cybersecurity Act of 2015)
  10. SEC — Press release 2023-139, cybersecurity disclosure rules (July 26, 2023)