Crypto · Wallets, exchanges and custody
Seed phrases: how a wallet backup works and how to protect it
How 12 or 24 words encode a wallet under BIP 39, worked through a published test vector, with the arithmetic of guessing and the ways phrases are really lost.
On this page
A seed phrase is a list of 12 or 24 ordinary words that a wallet shows you once, when it is set up. It looks like a password, and it is far more than one. The words are a readable form of the single random number from which the wallet makes every key it will ever use. Whoever has the words has the wallet: every coin in it today, and every coin sent to it later.
That makes the phrase the most valuable thing a self-custody holder owns, and the thing thieves ask for most often. This lesson shows what the words encode, step by step on a published example, how hard a phrase is to guess and when that stops being true, and how phrases are lost in practice. The companion lesson Crypto wallets and custody covers the wider choice of who holds the keys.
What a seed phrase is
A crypto wallet holds private keys, the secret numbers that sign transactions. Early wallets made a fresh random key for every address and kept them in a file. Lose the file, or forget to back it up after making new addresses, and coins were gone.
Modern wallets work differently. They start from one random number and derive every key from it by a fixed recipe, so the same starting number always produces the same keys in the same order. These are called hierarchical deterministic wallets, and the recipe most of them share was published for bitcoin as BIP 32. A BIP is a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal: a public design document that wallet makers can follow so their products work together.
The starting number is hard for a person to copy. In hexadecimal a 128-bit number is 32
characters such as 7f7f7f7f…, and one wrong character gives a different, empty wallet.
BIP 39, published in 2013, solved that by turning the number into words. Words are easier
to write, read aloud and check, and the standard adds a way to detect errors.
A seed phrase is therefore not a password chosen by you and not a code stored by a company. It is your wallet's random number written in a form a person can handle. Wallets also call it a recovery phrase, a mnemonic or a secret recovery phrase.
How twelve words are made
The steps below follow BIP 39 exactly. The example is one of the test vectors published with the standard, which wallet developers use to check their code. Finabase recomputed its checksum and seed for this lesson.
- Entropy. The wallet draws 128 random bits. Everything depends on this draw being truly random, which is why it should happen on the device, never in your head.
- Checksum. The wallet hashes those bits with SHA-256 and takes the first 4 bits of the
result. In the example they are
1000. Added to the end, they make 132 bits. - Words. The 132 bits are cut into 12 groups of 11 bits. Eleven bits can express the
numbers 0 to 2,047, and the standard's word list has exactly 2,048 words, so each group
picks one word. The first group,
01111111011, is 1,019, and word 1,019 on the English list is "legal". - Seed. The phrase is run through PBKDF2, a function that repeats a hash 2,048 times, to produce a 512-bit seed. The seed feeds BIP 32, which derives the keys.
A 24-word phrase follows the same steps with 256 random bits and an 8-bit checksum, 264 bits in all.
What the checksum does
Look at the example again. Its entropy repeats the same byte, so words 1 to 3 repeat as words 9 to 11: legal, winner, thank. Word 4 is "year". If the pattern simply continued, word 12 would be "year" too. It is "yellow", the next word on the list, because the last group holds only 7 bits of entropy and then the 4 checksum bits.
Two practical consequences follow.
- A wallet can catch typing errors. For a given first 11 words, only 1 final word in 16 passes the checksum (1 in 256 for a 24-word phrase's last word, which carries 3 bits of entropy and 8 of checksum). A phrase with one wrong word will usually be rejected rather than opening an empty wallet.
- You cannot make up a phrase. Twelve words picked from the list by hand will fail the checksum 15 times in 16. More to the point, people are poor at randomness, and phrases built from favorite words have been guessed.
The words on the list were chosen so that the first four letters identify each one, which is why some metal backup products store only four letters per word.
One phrase, many addresses
The seed is the root of a tree. BIP 32 defines how to derive child keys from it, and BIP 44 defines a standard path through the tree for each coin and account, so that two wallets following the standards find the same addresses from the same phrase.
This is why a single backup made on day one still covers an address the wallet creates three years later. It is also why restoring a phrase in a different brand of wallet occasionally shows a zero balance: the coins are there, and the new wallet is looking along a different path. The fix is a setting, not a new phrase.
The optional passphrase
BIP 39 lets the user add a passphrase, sometimes marketed as a "25th word". It is mixed in
at step 4. The same 12 words with a different passphrase give an entirely different seed.
In the figure, the test vector with no passphrase produces a seed starting 878386ef…, and
with the passphrase "TREZOR" (the one the standard's test vectors use) a seed starting
2e890581….
A passphrase means that someone who finds the written words still cannot open the wallet. It also means there are now two secrets to keep. Every passphrase is "valid": a mistyped one opens a different, empty wallet with no error message. A forgotten passphrase is as final as a lost phrase.
How hard is a phrase to guess?
Security people measure this in bits of entropy: the number of yes-or-no choices in a secret. Each extra bit doubles the number of possibilities.
| Secret | Possibilities | Bits |
|---|---|---|
| 4-digit PIN | 10,000 | 13 |
| 8 random keyboard characters | 6.6 × 10^15 | 53 |
| 12-word phrase, 4 unknown | 1.8 × 10^13 | 44 |
| 12-word phrase | 3.4 × 10^38 | 128 |
| 24-word phrase | 1.2 × 10^77 | 256 |
A worked example
Suppose an attacker could test one trillion (10^12) phrases every second, far more than any known system manages for this job, since each test means 2,048 rounds of hashing before a key can even be derived.
2^128 phrases ÷ 10^12 per second ≈ 3.4 × 10^26 seconds
≈ 1.1 × 10^19 years
That is about 780 million times the age of the universe to try them all, and half that on average. Nobody steals coins this way. A 12-word phrase is as hard to brute-force as a bitcoin private key is in practice, which is why most wallets treat 12 words as enough and offer 24 as a margin.
Now change one assumption. The attacker has seen a photo of the backup sheet with four words covered by a thumb. Four unknown words leave 2,048^4, or 1.8 × 10^13, candidates. At one million tests a second that takes about 204 days; at one billion a second, under 5 hours. With one word missing there are 2,048 candidates, of which about 128 pass the checksum, and a laptop finishes at once.
The lesson cuts both ways. If you lose one word of your own phrase, recovery is feasible. If someone else learns most of yours, the remaining words protect nothing. A phrase is only as strong as the part that is still secret.
How phrases are really lost
Since guessing does not work, thieves ask instead, and accidents do the rest. The SEC's December 2025 investor bulletin on crypto custody treats the private key and its seed phrase the same way: as the thing that must be neither shared nor lost.
- Fake support and fake apps. A message says your wallet must be "validated" or "synchronized" and links to a page with twelve empty boxes. No real wallet, exchange or support agent ever needs the phrase. Typing it into any website hands over the wallet.
- Digital copies. A screenshot, a note in a notes app, an email to yourself or a photo that syncs to a cloud account turns one breach of that account into a loss of the coins. Malware also searches devices for word lists.
- A single copy. One sheet of paper is exposed to fire, water, a house move and simple forgetting. If the device then fails, the coins are unreachable for good.
- Too many copies. Every extra copy is another place to be found by a visitor, a contractor or a burglar.
- No plan for death or incapacity. Heirs who do not know that a phrase exists, or where it is, cannot recover anything. A plan that reveals the phrase too early creates the opposite problem.
Self-custody has no fraud department. A transfer signed with your keys is valid as far as the network is concerned, and confirmed transfers are not reversed. Losses of this kind are usually total and permanent.
Common ways to store a phrase
| Method | Protects against | Weak against |
|---|---|---|
| Paper, one copy | Online theft | Fire, water, loss |
| Paper, two places | Online theft, one mishap | Two places to be found |
| Stamped or engraved metal | Fire, water, time | Being found; cost and effort |
| Phrase plus passphrase | Someone finding the words | Forgetting the passphrase |
| Split backups or multisig | Any single loss or theft | Complexity; mistakes in setup |
| Photo, cloud note, email | Losing the paper | Any breach of that account |
| Password manager (encrypted) | Loss; casual discovery | Compromise of the master login |
This table describes trade-offs and is not a recommendation. What suits a holder depends on the amount involved, who else needs access and how much complexity they will maintain correctly for years. Splitting a phrase by hand, for instance writing six words on each of two sheets, is weaker than it looks: as the arithmetic above shows, each half leaves far fewer words to guess. Purpose-built schemes for splitting a secret exist for that reason.
Pitfalls
- Treating the device as the wallet. A hardware wallet is replaceable. The phrase is not.
- Testing a backup for the first time after a loss. A backup with a transposed or misread word is discovered too late. Many wallets offer a way to verify the phrase on the device without exposing it.
- Entering the phrase on a computer to "check" it. Sites and tools that offer to validate a phrase are a common theft method.
- Using a phrase someone else generated. A pre-printed card in the box, or a phrase supplied by a seller or "helper", belongs to whoever made it. A device that arrives already set up should not be used.
- Reusing a published phrase. The example on this page is public. Coins sent to its addresses would be taken by automated scripts within moments.
How Finabase does it
Finabase is a market-data product. It has no wallet, never asks for a seed phrase and cannot see what any address holds. No Finabase page, email or support reply will ever ask for one.
What it shows is prices. The crypto list ranks coins by market value, and each has a quote page with a chart and news, such as BTC.X for bitcoin. If you hold coins in your own wallet, the price on Finabase is a market reference; what you own is whatever your keys control on the blockchain. The figures on this page were computed by Finabase from the BIP 39 specification, not from any wallet.
Frequently asked questions
Is a 12-word seed phrase safe enough, or do I need 24?
A randomly generated 12-word phrase has 128 bits of entropy, which is beyond brute force by a margin of many orders of magnitude. Twenty-four words add margin, not practical safety against guessing. For both lengths the real risk is the phrase being seen, copied or lost.
Can I change my seed phrase?
Not for an existing wallet. The phrase is the wallet's random number, so a new phrase is a new wallet with new addresses. To "change" it, you create a new wallet and send the coins to it, which costs a network fee and should be tested with a small amount first.
What happens if I lose one word?
One missing word can be recovered by trying all 2,048 candidates, of which about 128 pass the checksum for a 12-word phrase, and checking which one leads to your known address. Several missing words quickly become impractical for an owner, though not always for a determined thief with part of the phrase.
Does the same seed phrase work in another wallet?
Usually, if both wallets follow BIP 39 and the same derivation paths. If the restored wallet shows no balance, the coins have not moved: the app may be looking at a different path or address type. Some wallets use their own formats that are not interchangeable.
Is a seed phrase the same as a private key?
No. A private key controls one address. A seed phrase generates all of a wallet's private keys, which makes it more sensitive than any single key.
Summary
A seed phrase is a wallet's random starting number written as words: 128 bits for 12 words or 256 for 24, each word carrying 11 bits from a list of 2,048, with a checksum built into the last word. A fixed recipe turns the phrase into a seed and the seed into every key the wallet uses, so one backup covers everything, and an optional passphrase changes the result completely. A full phrase cannot be guessed, with about 3.4 × 10^38 possibilities for 12 words, but a partly exposed one can, and nearly all real losses come from phishing, digital copies, accidents and missing plans. Nobody can reset a phrase, so the care taken with it is the whole of the security.
Check your understanding
5 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
Why does a 12-word BIP 39 phrase carry 128 bits of randomness and not 132?
- Because four of the 132 bits are a checksum computed from the other 128
- Because one of the twelve words is always the same
- Because the word list has only 128 words
Show the answer
A. Because four of the 132 bits are a checksum computed from the other 128 Twelve words of 11 bits make 132 bits. The last 4 are the first bits of the SHA-256 hash of the 128 random bits, so they add error detection, not randomness.
A wallet shows a new address three years after you wrote down its seed phrase. Do you need a new backup?
- Yes, each new address needs its own backup
- No, every key the wallet makes is derived from the same seed
- Only if the address is on a different exchange
Show the answer
B. No, every key the wallet makes is derived from the same seed A hierarchical deterministic wallet derives all its keys from the seed by a fixed recipe, so the original phrase regenerates the new address too.
A thief has a photo of a 12-word phrase with four words hidden. How does that change the difficulty of guessing it?
- It does not: all twelve words must still be guessed
- It falls from about 3.4 × 10^38 possibilities to about 1.8 × 10^13, which a computer can search
- It becomes impossible, because the checksum blocks partial guesses
Show the answer
B. It falls from about 3.4 × 10^38 possibilities to about 1.8 × 10^13, which a computer can search Only the unknown words need guessing: 2,048^4 is about 1.8 × 10^13. A phrase is only as strong as the part that is still secret.
You add a BIP 39 passphrase and later mistype it when restoring. What happens?
- The wallet shows an error and asks again
- The wallet opens a different, empty wallet with no warning
- The wallet falls back to the phrase without a passphrase
Show the answer
B. The wallet opens a different, empty wallet with no warning Every passphrase produces a valid seed. A wrong one simply leads to another set of keys, which is why a forgotten passphrase is as final as a lost phrase.
A support agent asks for your seed phrase to "resynchronize" your wallet. What does the request tell you?
- That the wallet has a fault only support can repair
- That it is an attempt at theft: no legitimate service needs the phrase
- That the phrase has expired and must be reissued
Show the answer
B. That it is an attempt at theft: no legitimate service needs the phrase The phrase generates every key in the wallet. Nobody needs it to help you, and nobody can reissue it, so a request for it has one purpose.
Sources and further reading
- BIP 39 — Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys (word list size, checksum, PBKDF2, test vectors)
- BIP 32 — Hierarchical deterministic wallets (deriving every key from one seed)
- BIP 44 — Multi-account hierarchy for deterministic wallets (derivation paths)
- SEC Office of Investor Education and Assistance — Crypto Asset Custody Basics for Retail Investors (Investor Bulletin, December 12, 2025)
- Finabase calculation — checksum, word indexes and seed of the BIP 39 test vector recomputed with SHA-256 and PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512; guessing arithmetic
