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Crypto · Risks, regulation and taxes

Crypto hacks and smart contract risk: how funds get stolen

How attackers steal crypto from exchange wallets, bridges and smart contracts, from The DAO to Binance, and what audits, backers or forks can fix.

On this page
  1. Two targets: keys and code
  2. What smart contract risk is
  3. Bridges: where the largest code losses happened
  4. Exchanges: the keys and the people
  5. Your own wallet
  6. What an audit does and does not prove
  7. What happens to the users afterwards
  8. How Finabase does it
  9. Frequently asked questions
  10. Summary
  11. Check your understanding

Crypto is stolen in two broad ways. Either an attacker gets hold of the keys, or the people and systems that use them, and signs transactions that look legitimate. Or the attacker finds a flaw in a smart contract, the code that holds the money, and makes it pay out. Neither needs the victim to be fooled personally, which is what separates a hack from a scam.

The sums are large. The three biggest thefts whose size a government or the victim has stated, at the exchanges Binance and Bybit and on the Ronin bridge, came to about $8.4 billion, and the FBI attributed all three to North Korea. The largest, at Binance in October 2026, was about four times the previous record.

This lesson explains where each kind of attack lands, using cases documented in primary sources from The DAO in 2016 to 2026, what an audit does and does not prove, and what has happened to users afterwards. It names projects only as historical examples.

Two targets: keys and code

Target How it is attacked Documented example
An exchange's hot wallet Keys or systems that sign from it are compromised Binance, October 2026
A cold wallet's signing The signing interface is masked, so signers approve the wrong transaction Bybit, February 2025
A bridge's contracts A check is missing or broken, so fake messages pass Wormhole and Nomad, 2022
A protocol's own logic The code allows a withdrawal its authors did not intend The DAO, 2016
Staff and support systems Insiders are bribed for customer data Coinbase, May 2025
The user's own wallet The owner signs a malicious approval Wallet drainers

The first and last rows have something in common with a bank robbery: the vault was sound and the attacker got the means to open it. The middle rows are different. Nobody's key was taken. The code did what it was written to do, and that turned out to be paying the attacker.

Four crypto thefts the FBI attributed to North Korea, with a stated loss Binance, Oct 2026 ≈$6.3B (Binance); “more than $6B” (FBI) Bybit, Feb 2025 ≈$1.5B (FBI) Ronin bridge, Mar 2022 ≈$620M (FBI, Treasury) Harmony bridge, Jun 2022 $100M (FBI) The first three are the largest stated losses; others, such as DMM Bitcoin ($308M, FBI), rank above Harmony. Values at the time of theft.
Four crypto thefts the FBI attributed to North Korea, with the dollar loss stated by the FBI, the US Treasury or the victim. The first three are the largest stated losses; Harmony is not fourth. Dollar values at the time of the theft.

What smart contract risk is

A smart contract is a program stored on a blockchain that holds funds and moves them according to its code. Anyone can call it. Nobody, not even its authors, can stop a call that the code allows, and a transfer it makes is as final as any other transaction. That is the point of DeFi: no company stands between the user and the money. It is also the risk. A bug in a bank's software is a problem for the bank to fix. A bug in a smart contract is an open offer to whoever finds it first.

Three features make contract bugs costly:

  • Public code, public money. Most contracts publish their code, and every balance is visible on the chain. Attackers can study both at leisure.
  • Composability. Contracts call each other. A flaw in one, or a manipulated price from an oracle it relies on, can be used to drain another that is itself bug-free.
  • Upgrades. Many contracts can be changed by an administrator, so bugs can be fixed. The same power means a faulty upgrade, or a stolen admin key, can break a contract that was safe the day before.

The DAO, 2016

The first large case set the pattern. The DAO was an investment fund run as a set of contracts on Ethereum. The SEC's later report of investigation records that between April 30 and May 28, 2016 it sold about 1.15 billion DAO tokens for about 12 million ether. On June 17, 2016 an unknown attacker began diverting ether from it, and took about 3.6 million, a third of what it had raised.

What happened next is unusual. Ethereum's community adopted a hard fork that took effect on July 20, 2016 and moved the diverted ether to a recovery address, where DAO token holders could exchange their tokens for ether. Hard forks and soft forks: how blockchains change their rules tells that story. It is the exception, not the rule: a blockchain that rewrote history after every hack would lose the property that makes it worth using, and the other cases on this page were not reversed. The SEC's report also concluded that DAO tokens were securities.

Where the attack landed: six incidents, from primary sources Incident Date What was attacked Loss as stated The DAO Jun 17, 2016 Its own contract code ≈3.6M ETH (SEC) Wormhole Feb 2, 2022 Bridge signature check 120,000 wETH minted Ronin bridge Mar 23, 2022 Bridge (method: see the text) ≈$620M (Treasury) Nomad bridge Summer 2022 A faulty contract upgrade ≈$186M (FTC) Bybit Feb 21, 2025 Cold wallet signing interface ≈$1.5B (FBI) Binance Oct 29–30, 2026 Exchange hot wallet ≈$6.3B (Binance)
Six incidents and where each attack landed, with the loss as stated by the SEC, the project, the FBI, the US Treasury or the exchange.

Bridges: where the largest code losses happened

A bridge lets a token move from one blockchain to another, usually by locking it on the first chain and issuing a wrapped copy on the second. The design is explained in Crypto bridges and wrapped tokens: how assets move between chains. For an attacker, a bridge is attractive because it keeps everything that has crossed it in one place, behind one set of contracts or signers.

  • Wormhole, February 2, 2022. The project's incident report says an attacker exploited a signature verification vulnerability to mint 120,000 wrapped ether on Solana that had no ether behind it. Jump Crypto, a backer, recapitalized the contract, so holders of the wrapped token kept their backing.
  • Ronin, March 2022. The bridge served the game Axie Infinity. The US Treasury says the Lazarus Group, a North Korean hacking group, carried out the theft on March 23, worth almost $620 million; it was reported on March 29. The FBI attributed it to North Korea on April 14, and the Treasury called it the largest virtual currency heist to date in its May 2022 release sanctioning Blender.io, the first virtual currency mixer it sanctioned. Accounts of exactly how the attackers got in come from Ronin's own post, which we could not open, so this page does not describe the method.
  • Harmony Horizon, June 2022. The FBI attributed the theft of $100 million from this bridge, reported on June 24, 2022, to the same group.
  • Nomad, summer 2022. Nomad's root-cause analysis, published August 5, 2022, says an implementation bug, introduced by a contract upgrade on June 21, 2022, caused its Replica contract to fail to authenticate messages properly. In October 2026 one man was extradited to the United States, charged with exploiting the bridge to take $2.89 million. Nomad's report gives no total. The Federal Trade Commission, announcing a proposed settlement with Nomad's operator, Illusory Systems, in December 2025, said the flaw led to the loss of $186 million, and that after the company recovered some of it consumers lost about $100 million.

A flaw in a message check is not limited to one attacker. Once a transaction that works is visible on the chain, anyone can study it and send their own version, so a single bug can be exploited by many people within hours.

Exchanges: the keys and the people

A centralized exchange keeps most customer coins in its own wallets. Some are hot wallets, online and ready to pay withdrawals; some are cold wallets, kept offline and moved only through a slower signing process. Hot wallets vs cold wallets: which risks each one carries explains the trade-off. Both have been robbed.

  • Bybit, February 21, 2025. Bybit said it detected unauthorized activity in one of its ether cold wallets during a routine transfer, and that the attack altered the wallet's smart contract logic while masking the signing interface, so the people approving the transfer saw something other than what they signed. The FBI attributed the theft of about $1.5 billion to North Korea, in activity it calls TraderTraitor.
  • Binance, October 29–30, 2026. In a post on its own Binance Square account, Binance said a hot wallet was attacked, with a loss of token assets worth about $6.3 billion. Later reports of how the loss was covered could not be confirmed on a primary source. The FBI said North Korea was responsible for the theft of more than $6 billion. It is the largest crypto theft on record.
  • Coinbase, May 2025. Not a theft of coins, but a reminder that people are part of the attack surface. Coinbase reported to the SEC that attackers had paid contractors and employees in support roles outside the United States for customer data: names, addresses, partial Social Security numbers, ID images and balances. No passwords or private keys were taken. Coinbase refused a $20 million ransom demand, estimated the cost at $180 million to $400 million, and said it would reimburse customers tricked into sending funds to the attackers. Leaked data of that kind is what makes an impersonation call convincing.

The cold-wallet case matters most for understanding risk. Offline storage protects keys from being copied. It does not protect a signing process from being shown a false transaction.

Your own wallet

Self-custody removes the exchange from the picture but not the attacker. The FBI described in August 2023 how phishing sites persuade users to connect a wallet and sign a transaction that gives a drainer contract permission to move their coins and NFTs. The keys never leave the device; the owner signs the theft. Common crypto scams: how they work and how to spot them covers the lures, and Seed phrases: how a wallet backup works and how to protect it covers the other route, a stolen recovery phrase.

What an audit does and does not prove

Before launch, many projects pay a security firm to review their contracts. An audit is useful: reviewers find bugs, and an unaudited contract that holds large sums is a warning in itself. Its limits are just as real:

  • It covers the code at one moment. An upgrade afterwards is new, unreviewed code, which is how Nomad's bug arrived.
  • It covers the contract, not its surroundings: the oracles it reads, the contracts it calls, and who holds the keys that can upgrade or pause it.
  • It reviews what the auditors were asked to review, in the time they had. "Audited" is a statement about effort, not a guarantee of safety.

What happens to the users afterwards

Case Who covered the loss Result for users
The DAO Ethereum's community, by hard fork Ether returned through a recovery address
Wormhole A backer, Jump Crypto Wrapped ether stayed backed
Binance Not confirmed on a primary source Not confirmed on a primary source
Nomad Nobody; the operator recovered part Consumers lost about $100M (FTC)

No rule makes anyone cover a theft. A crypto theft is not insured by the FDIC or SIPC, and a large enough loss can sink the platform itself, at which point users are creditors, as in Crypto exchange failures: Mt. Gox, FTX, Celsius and the lessons. Law enforcement sometimes freezes or seizes stolen funds, but that is neither quick nor certain.

Questions to ask of any place that holds your coins

  • Who can move the funds: one key, several signers, or only the code?
  • Can the contract be upgraded, and by whom, with what delay?
  • Does it depend on a bridge, an oracle or another protocol?
  • How large is the pool? The more it holds, the more an attacker will spend to break it.
  • If it is robbed, who has said they would pay, and could they?

These do not rank one platform over another. They describe where a loss could come from.

How Finabase does it

Finabase is a market data and research site. It holds no customer coins and runs no smart contracts, so it has no wallet to rob. Its pages let a reader see some of what this lesson describes in prices.

A wrapped token tracks its original only while its backing is intact. The WBTC.X versus BTC.X comparison shows how closely wrapped bitcoin has followed bitcoin; a break in backing would show up as a gap between the two lines. The crypto list shows each coin's price and market value, where a sharp fall in a protocol's token may be the first public sign of trouble. Prices show the market's reaction, not the size of the theft, which only the project's and investigators' reports can state.

Frequently asked questions

What was the largest crypto hack?

The theft from Binance on October 29–30, 2026: Binance put the loss at about $6.3 billion, and the FBI said more than $6 billion and attributed it to North Korea. The previous record was Bybit's loss of about $1.5 billion in February 2025.

What is a smart contract exploit?

It is a theft that uses a flaw in a smart contract's code, such as a missing check on who may withdraw or a message that is not properly verified, to make the contract pay out funds its authors did not intend. No password or key is stolen: the contract is used exactly as its code allows.

Can stolen crypto be reversed?

Not by the network. Transactions are final, and Ethereum's hard fork after The DAO in 2016 remains the notable exception. Users have been made whole when a backer, the exchange or another party chose to cover the loss, and law enforcement sometimes seizes stolen funds, but neither is guaranteed.

Does an audit make a smart contract safe?

No. An audit lowers the chance of known kinds of bugs in the code reviewed. It does not cover later upgrades, the contract's dependencies such as oracles and bridges, or the people who hold its admin keys, and no review can prove that code has no bugs.

Why are bridges hacked so often?

Because they hold everything that has crossed them in one place, behind one set of contracts or signers, and their code must verify messages from a different blockchain, which is hard to get right. Wormhole, Ronin, Harmony and Nomad all lost funds in 2022.

Summary

Crypto gets stolen through keys or through code. Exchanges have been robbed through hot wallets, signing processes and staff, culminating in the roughly $6.3 billion taken from Binance in October 2026; smart contracts and bridges through bugs, from The DAO's loss of a third of its ether in 2016 to Wormhole's unbacked mint and Nomad's faulty upgrade in 2022. The FBI attributed the three largest thefts with a stated loss to North Korea. A blockchain will not reverse a theft, an audit is not a guarantee, and whether users get anything back depends on whether someone chooses, and can afford, to pay.

Check your understanding

5 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.

  1. What separates a smart contract exploit from a stolen-key theft?

    1. In an exploit, the contract pays out because its code allows it; no key is taken
    2. An exploit can only happen on Bitcoin
    3. In an exploit, the victim is tricked into sending the funds
    Show the answer

    A. In an exploit, the contract pays out because its code allows it; no key is taken An exploit uses a flaw in the code, such as a missing check, so the contract does exactly what it was written to do and pays the attacker. A stolen-key theft signs transactions with keys the attacker should not have. A victim tricked into sending funds is a scam.

  2. The DAO raised about 12 million ether for 1.15 billion tokens, and about 3.6 million ether was diverted. By how much did the ether behind each token fall?

    1. About 3.6%
    2. About 30%
    3. About 70%
    Show the answer

    B. About 30% 3.6 million of 12 million is 30%. Backing per token fell from about 0.0104 ETH to about 0.0073 ETH for every holder at once.

  3. Bybit’s stolen ether sat in a cold wallet. How did the attackers get it out, according to Bybit?

    1. They guessed the wallet’s seed phrase
    2. The signing interface was masked, so the people approving a routine transfer signed something else
    3. An employee sold the wallet on purpose
    Show the answer

    B. The signing interface was masked, so the people approving a routine transfer signed something else Bybit said the attack altered the smart contract logic while masking the signing interface during a routine transfer. Keeping keys offline does not protect a signing process that is shown a false transaction.

  4. A contract passed an audit last year and was upgraded last month. Which statement is accurate?

    1. The audit covers the upgrade automatically
    2. The upgraded code has not been covered by that audit, and an upgrade can introduce a new bug
    3. Upgradable contracts cannot be exploited
    Show the answer

    B. The upgraded code has not been covered by that audit, and an upgrade can introduce a new bug An audit reviews code at one point in time. Nomad’s bridge bug arrived with a contract upgrade in June 2022. Who can upgrade a contract, and how, is part of its risk.

  5. Wormhole’s bridge was drained in February 2022, yet holders of its wrapped ether kept their backing. Why?

    1. Solana reversed the theft
    2. A backer, Jump Crypto, recapitalized the contract
    3. FDIC insurance covered it
    Show the answer

    B. A backer, Jump Crypto, recapitalized the contract Nothing obliges anyone to cover a crypto theft. In this case a backer chose to replace the missing ether. Blockchains do not reverse thefts as a rule, and no deposit insurance applies.

Sources and further reading

  1. SEC — Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a): The DAO (Release No. 81207, July 25, 2017)
  2. FBI — Statement on attribution of the Ronin theft to the Lazarus Group (April 14, 2022)
  3. US Treasury — Sanctions on the virtual currency mixer Blender.io (release jy0768, May 6, 2022)
  4. Wormhole — Incident report, February 2, 2022
  5. Nomad — Bridge hack root cause analysis (August 5, 2022)
  6. US Attorney, Northern District of California — Israeli national extradited over the Nomad Bridge exploit (October 30, 2026)
  7. FBI — Lazarus Group responsible for the Harmony Horizon bridge theft (January 23, 2023)
  8. FTC — Illusory Systems (Nomad) to return money stolen by hackers; the bridge flaw led to a $186 million loss (December 16, 2025)
  9. FBI, DC3 and Japan NPA — TraderTraitor responsible for theft of $308 million from Bitcoin.DMM.com
  10. FBI IC3 — PSA I-022625-PSA: North Korea responsible for $1.5 billion Bybit hack (February 26, 2025)
  11. Bybit — Incident update: ETH cold wallet incident (February 21, 2025)
  12. FBI — North Korea responsible for $6 billion Binance attack (October 31, 2026)
  13. Binance — Security Incident Update Announcement #2 (October 30, 2026), Binance Square
  14. Coinbase Global — Form 8-K on a data theft involving support staff (May 14, 2025)
  15. Coinbase — Protecting our customers: standing up to extortionists (May 15, 2025)
  16. FBI IC3 — PSA on cryptocurrency wallet drainers (August 4, 2023)