Crypto · Risks, regulation and taxes
Crypto exchange failures: Mt. Gox, FTX, Celsius and the lessons
What happened to customers when Mt. Gox, QuadrigaCX, Celsius, Voyager and FTX failed, what they got back and when, and the patterns the failures share.
On this page
When a stock broker in the United States fails, its customers' shares are normally kept separate from the firm's own assets, and a fund set up under federal law, SIPC, steps in if some go missing. When a crypto exchange or lender has failed, customers have usually found themselves in a different position: creditors of a bankrupt company, waiting years for a share of whatever was left.
That has happened many times, and the best-documented cases follow a few patterns. Mt. Gox lost most of its customers' bitcoin in 2014 and was still repaying them in 2026. QuadrigaCX turned out to be a fraud. In 2022 a chain of failures ran from a collapsing stablecoin through a hedge fund and three lenders to FTX, then one of the largest exchanges.
This lesson goes through what happened in each case, what customers got back and when, and the common threads. The mechanics of custody, and why a dollar claim is not the same as the coins, are covered in Crypto exchanges vs self-custody: who holds the keys. This page is the history.
Owner or creditor: the question that decides everything
A customer who leaves coins on a platform holds one of two things. Either the platform keeps the coins for them, separate and untouched, and they can expect them back; or the customer has a promise from the platform to deliver coins, which is only as good as the platform. In a bankruptcy the difference is everything.
Even a large listed exchange could not promise the first. Coinbase's quarterly filing for the first quarter of 2022 warned that, in a bankruptcy, the crypto it held for customers could be subject to the proceedings and customers could be treated as general unsecured creditors.
Courts have looked at the platform's own terms to decide, as the Celsius case below shows. And when the coins are simply not there, because they were stolen, lost or spent, the question answers itself.
Mt. Gox: the first great collapse
Mt. Gox, based in Tokyo, was the dominant bitcoin exchange of its time. On February 28, 2014 it applied to the Tokyo District Court for civil rehabilitation, a Japanese restructuring process. Its announcement said about 750,000 bitcoin deposited by users and about 100,000 of its own had disappeared.
A few weeks later, on March 7, 2014, the company found about 200,000 bitcoin in an old-format wallet. That was 23.5% of the amount reported missing. The case then ran as a bankruptcy until June 22, 2018, when the court ordered civil rehabilitation instead and the bankruptcy proceedings were stayed. Trustee Nobuaki Kobayashi has run the case since.
Repayments in bitcoin and bitcoin cash began in July 2024, more than ten years after the collapse. The trustee has extended the deadline for completing them several times; the latest notice, of October 16, 2026, moved it from October 31, 2026 to October 31, 2027.
The lesson of Mt. Gox is time. A customer who could have sold in February 2014 instead held a claim for more than a decade, with no ability to trade it on the exchange or move it.
QuadrigaCX: fraud, not lost passwords
Canada's largest crypto exchange, QuadrigaCX, announced on January 14, 2019 that its co-founder and chief executive, Gerald Cotten, had died in India the month before. By February 5 the exchange had stopped operating and sought creditor protection.
The Ontario Securities Commission's staff review of the case looked at where the money went. More than 76,000 clients were owed C$215 million. The trustee recovered or identified only C$46 million, about 21%. Staff concluded that most of the C$169 million gap came from Cotten's fraud rather than from lost passwords:
- about C$115 million lost by trading against clients through accounts under false names, funded with balances that did not exist;
- about C$28 million lost on outside trading platforms;
- plus money taken to fund his lifestyle.
Staff wrote that Quadriga in effect operated like a Ponzi scheme, and noted it was not registered with any securities regulator. The report also says its conclusions are staff findings, not tested by a tribunal or court.
2022: one failure after another
The largest wave came in 2022, and the failures were connected. Each firm had lent to, borrowed from or held assets of the next.
Terra and Three Arrows Capital
In May 2022 the TerraUSD stablecoin lost its dollar peg and its sister token LUNA collapsed. The Justice Department later put investors' losses at over $40 billion; how the peg was meant to work, and why it broke, is in Stablecoins: how dollar tokens hold a $1 peg and how they fail. Its founder, Do Kwon, pleaded guilty to fraud in August 2025 and was sentenced to 15 years in December 2025.
Among the large holders hit was Three Arrows Capital (3AC), a Singapore hedge fund that had borrowed heavily from crypto lenders. On June 30, 2022 the Monetary Authority of Singapore reprimanded it for giving false information and for exceeding the assets it was allowed to manage. In 2023 the authority banned its two founders from the industry for nine years.
Celsius and Voyager
Celsius Network, a lender that paid interest on deposited coins, paused all customer withdrawals on June 12, 2022 and filed for Chapter 11 on July 13. Customers had about $4.7 billion on the platform. Bitcoin's weekly close fell from $28,389 in the week before the freeze to $18,949 in the week it began, a drop of 33.3%.
The question for its customers was whether their coins were theirs. In January 2023 Judge Martin Glenn ruled on the Earn program, about 600,000 accounts holding about $4.2 billion. The terms of use had given Celsius all right and title to the coins. So the Earn customers were unsecured creditors, and their recovery depended on what the bankruptcy plan paid unsecured creditors. Celsius's founder, Alexander Mashinsky, pleaded guilty to commodities fraud and securities fraud and was sentenced in May 2025 to 12 years in prison.
Voyager Digital filed for Chapter 11 on July 5, 2022, citing the default of Three Arrows Capital, against which it had claims of more than $650 million. The Federal Reserve and the FDIC had to order it on July 28, 2022 to stop making false and misleading statements about deposit insurance: Voyager itself was not FDIC-insured. The FTC later charged its former chief executive with falsely claiming that customer deposits were insured.
FTX
FTX filed for Chapter 11 on November 11, 2022. US regulators' complaints a month later described what had happened to customer money. The CFTC said FTX customer assets were routinely held by Alameda Research, a trading firm owned by FTX's founder, and commingled with Alameda's own funds; it put the loss of customer deposits at over $8 billion. The SEC described an undisclosed diversion of customer funds to Alameda.
Bitcoin's weekly close fell 21.7% across those weeks, from $21,300 in the week starting October 30 to $16,683 in the week starting November 13, and reached its low for the whole period, $16,451, the week after.
The founder, Samuel Bankman-Fried, was convicted on seven counts, including wire fraud, in November 2023 and sentenced on March 28, 2024 to 25 years in prison and forfeiture of over $11 billion. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction on June 12, 2026. A petition asking the Supreme Court to hear the case was docketed in September 2026 and had not been decided when this page was reviewed.
Genesis and BlockFi
Two more lenders followed. BlockFi filed for bankruptcy on November 28, 2022. Genesis Global, the lender behind the Gemini Earn program, filed on January 19, 2023. In May 2024 New York's Attorney General announced a settlement worth $2 billion with Genesis and its affiliates. It said they had defrauded hundreds of thousands of investors, at least 29,000 of them New Yorkers, who put more than $1.1 billion into Genesis through the Gemini Earn program.
Not every failure moved prices. Bitcoin rose in the weeks around Voyager's and Genesis's filings. A chart shows the market's mood; it does not show which customers were exposed to which firm, and that is what decided their losses.
What FTX customers got back
FTX is the clearest case of what "getting your money back" means for a crypto creditor.
The court valued each customer's claim in dollars as of the petition date, November 11, 2022, as US bankruptcy law requires: as if the bankruptcy had never happened. A customer with 1 bitcoin on FTX had a claim worth bitcoin's price that day, not the coin. FTX's own filing showed why coins could not simply be returned: FTX.com held only 0.1% of the bitcoin and 1.2% of the ether its customers believed it held.
The estate then recovered and sold assets for more than two years. The plan, confirmed on October 7, 2024, projected that 98% of creditors by number would receive about 119% of their allowed claims. It took effect on January 3, 2025, and distributions followed in rounds.
| Class | Paid by May 30, 2025 | Paid by July 31, 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Convenience class (claims ≤ $50,000) | 120% | 120% |
| Dotcom (international) customers | 72% | 105% |
| US customers | 54% | 105% |
| General unsecured creditors | not given | 103% |
The patterns the failures share
| Failure | When | What went wrong, per the primary record | Customers' position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mt. Gox | Feb 2014 | About 850,000 BTC missing | Creditors; repaid from 2024 |
| QuadrigaCX | Jan–Feb 2019 | CEO's fraud and trading losses (OSC staff) | About 21% recovered or identified |
| Celsius | Jun–Jul 2022 | Founder's fraud; Earn coins owned by Celsius | Earn holders unsecured creditors |
| Voyager | Jul 2022 | Over $650M of claims on a defaulted hedge fund | False FDIC claims; creditors |
| FTX | Nov 2022 | Customer funds diverted to an affiliate (CFTC, SEC) | 105% of dollar claims paid by July 2026 |
Read across the cases and the same features recur:
- Commingling. Customer assets were mixed with the company's or an affiliate's, so a loss anywhere became the customers' loss.
- Lending the deposits. Platforms that paid yield had to put deposits to work. Voyager had claims of more than $650 million against 3AC when the fund defaulted, and its customers carried the loss. Crypto lending and yield: where the interest comes from explains where such yield comes from.
- A related trading firm. FTX's link to Alameda and Quadriga's trading through fake accounts turned an exchange into the counterparty to its own customers.
- False assurances. Voyager's deposit insurance claims, and Quadriga's lost-password story, were untrue.
- No outside view of the books. Proof-of-reserves reports do not close the gap: the PCAOB, the US audit regulator, warned in March 2023 that they are not audits, cover one point in time, and likely do not address liabilities. Proof of reserves: what an exchange audit does and does not show explains the limits.
These are patterns of what went wrong, not a test that predicts the next failure. A platform can look healthy right up to the day it stops withdrawals.
How Finabase does it
Finabase is a market data and research site, not an exchange: it holds no customer crypto, takes no deposits and lends nothing, so none of the custody risks on this page apply to it.
The data behind this page is on the site. The bitcoin chart and the Coinbase chart show the 2022 fall on weekly bars. Coinbase stock, the listed shares of a US exchange and not a claim on any customer coins, fell 89.7% from the week of November 8, 2021 to the last week of 2022 on those weekly closes, and bitcoin 72.5% from mid-November 2021 to its low a year later. US crypto regulation: who regulates what in 2026 covers the rules written since.
Frequently asked questions
Did FTX customers get their money back?
In dollars, yes, and then some: by July 31, 2026 both the international and US customer classes had received 105% of their allowed claims, and small claims of $50,000 or less 120%. The claims were valued at prices of November 11, 2022, when the exchange filed, so customers did not get their coins back or any rise in their prices since.
What happened to Mt. Gox bitcoin?
Mt. Gox reported in February 2014 that about 850,000 bitcoin had disappeared, 750,000 of them customers'. About 200,000 were later found in an old wallet. Repayments in bitcoin and bitcoin cash started in July 2024, and the trustee's current deadline to finish them is October 31, 2027.
Are crypto exchange accounts insured like bank accounts?
No. Crypto held at an exchange or lender is not covered by FDIC insurance, and SIPC protection covers securities at member brokers, not coins at a crypto platform. In 2022 US banking regulators ordered Voyager to stop implying that it was FDIC-insured.
Why were Celsius customers treated as creditors?
Because Celsius's terms of use for its Earn program gave it title to the deposited coins. In January 2023 the bankruptcy judge held that the coins belonged to Celsius, so Earn customers were unsecured creditors who would be paid under the bankruptcy plan, not owners who could take their coins back.
Could an exchange failure happen again?
Nothing in the record rules it out. The failures on this page were at companies that were large and well known at the time. Holding coins on any platform means trusting that platform's custody and solvency; Crypto exchanges vs self-custody: who holds the keys compares that with holding your own keys, which carries risks of its own.
Summary
Crypto platform failures have repeatedly turned customers into creditors. Mt. Gox's customers waited more than ten years for repayments that still run to 2027. QuadrigaCX's got back about a fifth of what they were owed. Celsius's Earn customers lost title to their coins under the terms they had accepted, and FTX's were repaid in dollars at November 2022 prices after customer funds had been diverted to an affiliate. Commingling, lending customer deposits, related trading firms and false assurances run through all of them, and none was visible from the outside in time.
Check your understanding
5 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
A customer had 1 bitcoin on FTX when it filed on November 11, 2022. How was the claim valued in the bankruptcy?
- As 1 bitcoin, returned when the case closed
- In dollars, at bitcoin’s price on the filing date
- In dollars, at bitcoin’s price on the day the money was paid
Show the answer
B. In dollars, at bitcoin’s price on the filing date US bankruptcy law fixes a claim as of the petition date. FTX customers were paid in dollars against the value of their accounts on November 11, 2022, so later price moves did not change the claim.
Why did a federal judge rule in January 2023 that Celsius Earn customers were unsecured creditors?
- Because Celsius had been hacked
- Because the Earn terms of use gave Celsius title to the deposited coins
- Because the customers had not completed identity checks
Show the answer
B. Because the Earn terms of use gave Celsius title to the deposited coins The ruling turned on the contract. Under the Earn terms, ownership of the coins passed to Celsius, so customers had a claim against the company rather than property of their own.
What did the Ontario Securities Commission staff conclude about most of QuadrigaCX’s C$169 million shortfall?
- It was locked in wallets whose passwords died with the CEO
- It was lost to an outside hack
- It came mostly from the CEO’s fraud, including trading against clients with fictitious balances
Show the answer
C. It came mostly from the CEO’s fraud, including trading against clients with fictitious balances Staff found that about C$115 million was lost trading against clients through accounts under false names funded with fictitious balances, plus losses on outside platforms and money taken for the CEO’s lifestyle.
By July 31, 2026, FTX’s US customer class had received 105% of allowed claims. A US customer’s allowed claim was $8,000. How much had they received?
- $4,320
- $8,000
- $8,400
Show the answer
C. $8,400 105% of $8,000 is $8,400. The claim stayed a dollar amount fixed at November 2022 values, so this says nothing about what the coins themselves would have been worth.
Which feature appears in several of the failures on this page?
- Customer assets mixed with the company’s or an affiliate’s funds
- Customers being covered by FDIC insurance
- Losses caused only by falling coin prices
Show the answer
A. Customer assets mixed with the company’s or an affiliate’s funds Commingling ran through FTX (customer assets held by Alameda) and Quadriga (trading against clients). No crypto platform’s customers were FDIC-insured; Voyager was ordered to stop implying it.
Sources and further reading
- MtGox Co., Ltd. — Announcement of the application for civil rehabilitation (February 28, 2014)
- MtGox Co., Ltd. — Announcement on bitcoins found in an old-format wallet (March 20, 2014)
- Mt. Gox rehabilitation trustee — Commencement of civil rehabilitation proceedings (June 22, 2018)
- Mt. Gox rehabilitation trustee — Repayments from the beginning of July 2024 (June 24, 2024)
- Mt. Gox rehabilitation trustee — Repayment deadline changed to October 31, 2027 (October 16, 2026)
- Ontario Securities Commission — QuadrigaCX: A Review by Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission
- US Bankruptcy Court, D. Del. — In re FTX Trading Ltd., opinion on digital asset estimation (June 26, 2024)
- CFTC — Complaint against Samuel Bankman-Fried, FTX and Alameda Research (release 8638-22, December 13, 2022)
- SEC — Charges against Samuel Bankman-Fried (release 2022-219, December 13, 2022)
- US Attorney, SDNY — Samuel Bankman-Fried sentenced to 25 years (March 28, 2024)
- US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit — United States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 24-961 (June 12, 2026), as reproduced in the appendix to Supreme Court petition No. 26-349
- FTX — Plan of reorganization filed (May 7, 2024), confirmed (October 7, 2024), effective January 3, 2025
- FTX Recovery Trust — Second distribution (May 30, 2025) and fifth distribution (July 31, 2026) releases
- US Bankruptcy Court, SDNY — In re Celsius Network LLC, opinion on ownership of Earn account assets (January 4, 2023)
- US Attorney, SDNY — Celsius founder sentenced to 12 years (May 8, 2025)
- Voyager Digital — Commencement of Chapter 11 (July 5, 2022)
- Federal Reserve and FDIC — Letter demanding Voyager cease false statements on deposit insurance (July 28, 2022)
- Monetary Authority of Singapore — Reprimand of Three Arrows Capital (June 30, 2022) and prohibition orders (September 14, 2023)
- New York Attorney General — $2 billion settlement with Genesis (May 20, 2024)
- Coinbase Global — Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2022 (custody risk factor)
- PCAOB — Investor advisory on third-party proof of reserve reports (March 8, 2023)
- Finabase chart data — BTC.X, ETH.X and COIN weekly closes, November 2021 to June 2023
