The global economy Lesson 4 of 11
Economics · Currencies, trade and commodities
Tariffs: who pays them, the effective rate and 2018–2026
What a tariff is, who bears its cost according to the evidence, how to compute the effective US tariff rate, and the 2018–19 and 2025–26 tariff rounds in dated detail.
On this page
A tariff is a tax on imported goods, charged when they cross the border. In the United States it is collected by Customs and Border Protection from the importer of record, the company bringing the goods in, usually as a percentage of their declared value. For most of the past half-century US tariffs were low and rarely news. Since 2018, and especially since 2025, they have been among the most consequential economic policies in the world.
Who pays a tariff is a different question from who remits it. The importer writes the check, but the cost can be passed on to American buyers through higher prices, absorbed in the importer's margins, or pushed back onto foreign producers if they cut their prices. Which of those happens is an empirical question, and economists have measured it.
This guide explains how tariffs work, what the research found about who bore the cost of the 2018–19 tariffs, how to compute the effective tariff rate from official data, and the dated sequence of tariff actions from 2018 to 2026. It describes policy; it does not judge it or say what will happen next. The short definition is in Tariff.
How a tariff works
Most US tariffs are ad valorem: a percentage of the customs value. Some are specific: a fixed amount per unit, such as cents per kilogram. Every product has a rate in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States; the ordinary rates that apply to members of the World Trade Organization are called most-favored-nation (MFN) rates. Free trade agreements, such as the USMCA with Canada and Mexico, set lower or zero rates for goods that qualify.
Additional tariffs are layered on top under specific laws:
| Law | Used for |
|---|---|
| Section 232, Trade Expansion Act of 1962 | Imports that threaten national security |
| Section 301, Trade Act of 1974 | Unfair foreign trade practices |
| Section 122, Trade Act of 1974 | Balance-of-payments problems, 150 days max |
| IEEPA (1977) | Claimed for tariffs in 2025; ruled out 2026 |
Who pays: the incidence
The statutory incidence falls on the importer. The economic incidence depends on how prices adjust, which depends on how sensitive buyers and sellers are to price; see Price elasticity of demand: formula, midpoint method and gasoline.
What the importer then charges its own customers is a second step. A retailer may raise shelf prices, accept a lower margin, or switch suppliers.
What the evidence says about 2018–19
Three widely cited studies looked at the 2018–19 tariffs product by product:
- Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019) found complete pass-through of the tariffs into the domestic prices of imported goods, so the incidence fell on US consumers and importers. They estimated a reduction in US real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018.
- Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy and Khandelwal (2020) found that the prices of targeted imports did not fall, implying complete pass-through to duty-inclusive prices. Losses to US consumers and firms that buy imports came to $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP; after counting tariff revenue and gains to protected US producers, the net loss in real income was $7.2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP.
- Cavallo, Gopinath, Neiman and Tang (2021) found that tariff pass-through at the border was much higher than exchange-rate pass-through, but that the effect on prices in US stores was more limited, suggesting retailers' margins fell.
The pattern: foreign exporters, on average, did not cut prices; US importers paid; retailers passed on part and absorbed part. Results for particular goods differed, and retaliation by other countries hurt US exporters, especially farmers. Studies of the 2025 tariffs were still appearing at the time of writing, and this page does not summarize them.
The effective tariff rate
The headline rates in announcements are not what is collected on average. Many goods are exempt, some qualify for trade agreements, and importers shift purchases toward lower-tariff sources. A simple measure of what is actually paid:
BEA publishes both, quarterly at seasonally adjusted annual rates: customs duties (FRED
B235RC1Q027SBEA) and imports of goods (FRED A255RC1Q027SBEA).
The rate was 7.5% in Q1 1960 and drifted down for decades as trade rounds cut tariffs, reaching 1.3% in Q3 2008. The 2018–19 tariffs lifted it to 3.5% by Q4 2019. The 2025 round took it from 2.85% in Q1 2025 to 8.3% in Q2, 10.3% in Q3 and 11.3% in Q4. It then fell, to 9.5% in Q1 2026, 8.2% in Q2 and 6.9% in Q3 2026, after the Supreme Court decision described below.
Two cautions. The national-accounts figures are a ratio of two annual-rate estimates, not the customs statistics of a single month. And the effective rate falls if imports shift toward low-tariff goods or countries, even with no change in policy, so it understates the rates on goods that are actually targeted.
The tariff rounds, dated
2018–2020
| Date | Action |
|---|---|
| March 23, 2018 | Section 232: 25% on steel, 10% on aluminum (Canada, Mexico exempt at first) |
| July 6, 2018 | Section 301 List 1: 25% on about $34 billion of Chinese goods |
| August 23, 2018 | List 2: 25% on about $16 billion |
| September 24, 2018 | List 3: 10% on about $200 billion |
| May 10, 2019 | List 3 rate raised to 25% |
| September 1, 2019 | List 4A: 10%, raised to 15% by a notice of August 30, 2019 |
| February 14, 2020 | List 4A rate cut to 7.5% |
2025–2026
| Date | Action |
|---|---|
| February 1, 2025 | IEEPA orders: 10% on most Chinese goods (from February 4), 25% on most Canadian and Mexican goods (paused to March 4) |
| April 2, 2025 | Executive Order 14257: "reciprocal" tariffs, 10% on all trading partners from April 5, higher country rates from April 9 |
| April 9, 2025 | Higher country rates suspended for 90 days, except for China |
| February 20, 2026 | Supreme Court: IEEPA does not authorize tariffs (Learning Resources v. Trump); executive order ends the IEEPA duties |
| February 24, 2026 | Section 122: 10% temporary surcharge, not on Section 232, USMCA-qualifying or other listed goods, to July 24, 2026 |
| July 23, 2026 | USTR Section 301 action: 10% or 12.5% on 60 economies covering 99.4% of US imports, excluding Section 232 goods |
The IEEPA tariffs were modified many times during 2025, with rates on Chinese goods raised and lowered several times; the table lists only the starting points. Section 232 tariffs, on steel, aluminum and other products, were outside the Supreme Court case. Whether and how importers are refunded duties paid under IEEPA was not decided by the Court's opinion.
Trade flows: China and Mexico
| Year | From China | From Mexico |
|---|---|---|
| 2017 | $505bn | $313bn |
| 2018 | $539bn | $344bn |
| 2023 | $427bn | $473bn |
| 2024 | $440bn | $503bn |
| 2025 | $309bn | $534bn |
| Jan–Sep 2026 | $215bn | $482bn |
Imports from China peaked in 2018, the year the Section 301 tariffs began, and fell by 2025 to 57% of that level. Imports from Mexico rose almost every year; Mexico passed China as the larger source in 2023. In January to September 2026, imports from Mexico were 21% higher than in the same months of 2025, and imports from China 11% lower.
Some of the shift is trade diversion: production or final assembly moved to other countries to avoid tariffs on Chinese goods, so the bilateral figures overstate how much US dependence on Chinese inputs fell. The overall deficit is a separate question; see Trade balance: how the US trade deficit is measured and read.
Pitfalls when reading tariff news
- Announced is not collected. Exemptions, trade-agreement rules and product exclusions mean the effective rate is far below headline rates.
- Rates change quickly. In 2025 several rates were set, paused, raised and cut within weeks. Always check the effective date in the Federal Register or the proclamation.
- Revenue is not the cost. Customs revenue counts what importers paid; the economic cost also includes higher prices of domestic substitutes, lost variety and retaliation.
- Bilateral balances mislead. A smaller deficit with one country can be offset by larger deficits with others.
- Price effects are spread out. Pass-through to shelf prices can take months and varies by product; a single month of CPI says little.
Comparison: tariffs and other trade measures
| Measure | What it does | Who collects / gains |
|---|---|---|
| Tariff | Tax on imports at the border | US Treasury |
| Import quota | Caps the quantity imported | Whoever holds the quota rights |
| Export subsidy | Pays domestic firms to export | Paid by the exporting country |
| Currency moves | Change all import prices at once | No one directly |
A tariff and a currency depreciation both make imports dearer, but a weaker currency also makes exports cheaper; see The US dollar and exchange rates: indexes, drivers and earnings. The case for trade itself is in Comparative advantage: why trade pays even for the better producer.
How Finabase does it
Finabase does not track tariff rates. The monthly trade balance release appears on the economic calendar of the Economy page with its actual, forecast and previous figures, and the Discover page's Economy topic collects news about trade policy. The effective-rate and import charts on this page are ours, built from BEA and Census Bureau data distributed through FRED; the dated actions come from the Federal Register, the White House, USTR and the Supreme Court's opinion.
Country ETFs give the market side: for example the iShares China Large-Cap ETF (FXI) and the iShares MSCI Mexico ETF (EWW), each with quotes, charts and news.
Frequently asked questions
Who pays a tariff?
The importer of record pays the duty to US Customs. Studies of the 2018–19 tariffs found that foreign exporters did not cut their prices, so the cost fell on US importers and their customers, with retailers absorbing part of it in lower margins.
What is the effective tariff rate?
It is customs duties collected divided by the value of goods imports. On BEA's quarterly data it was 2.7% in Q4 2024, 11.3% in Q4 2025 and 6.9% in Q3 2026.
What did the Supreme Court decide about tariffs in 2026?
In Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, decided February 20, 2026, the Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Tariffs imposed under other statutes, such as Sections 232 and 301, were not part of the case.
Do tariffs raise inflation?
They raise the prices of the goods they cover when they are passed through, which the 2018–19 evidence found at the border. The effect on overall inflation depends on how much of the cost reaches consumers, how large the taxed imports are relative to all spending, and what else is happening to prices; see Inflation: what it is, how it’s measured and what it does to money.
Is Mexico or China the bigger source of US imports?
Mexico, since 2023. In 2025 the US imported $534 billion of goods from Mexico and $309 billion from China, on Census Bureau data.
Summary
A tariff is a tax on imports, paid to US Customs by the importer; research on the 2018–19 tariffs found that foreign exporters did not cut their prices, so the cost fell on US importers and buyers. Customs duties divided by goods imports, the effective tariff rate, rose from about 2.7% at the end of 2024 to 11.3% in Q4 2025, the highest since 1959, and was 6.9% in Q3 2026 after the Supreme Court ruled that the IEEPA emergency law does not authorize tariffs. Rates have changed often since 2018, so dates and legal authority matter as much as the headline number.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
A 20% tariff is put on a $50 foreign part. The foreign supplier keeps its price at $50. What is the duty-inclusive cost to the US importer, and what is the pass-through?
- $50, zero pass-through
- $60, complete pass-through
- $55, half pass-through
Show the answer
B. $60, complete pass-through With no price cut abroad, the importer pays $50 plus a $10 duty. The whole tariff shows up in the duty-inclusive price, which is what the 2018–19 studies found on average.
Same 20% tariff, but the supplier cuts its price to $45 to keep the order. How is the burden of the would-be $10 duty split?
- The supplier bears $5 through its price cut; the importer pays $54 in total, $4 more than before
- The importer bears all $10
- The supplier bears all $10
Show the answer
A. The supplier bears $5 through its price cut; the importer pays $54 in total, $4 more than before The duty is 20% of $45, or $9, so the importer pays $54. The supplier gave up $5 of revenue per part, and the US side pays $4 more than without the tariff.
Headline tariff rates rise sharply, but customs duties divided by goods imports rise much less. Which explanation fits?
- Customs failed to collect the duties
- Exemptions, trade-agreement rules and a shift of purchases toward lower-tariff goods and countries mean the average collected rate is below announced rates
- Goods imports are measured after tariffs are paid
Show the answer
B. Exemptions, trade-agreement rules and a shift of purchases toward lower-tariff goods and countries mean the average collected rate is below announced rates The effective rate is an average over all goods imports. Exempt and agreement-qualifying goods pay little, and importers substitute away from the most heavily taxed sources.
US imports from China fall 40% while imports from Vietnam and Mexico rise. Why might US dependence on Chinese production have fallen by less than 40%?
- Because Census data exclude China
- Because some goods are assembled in third countries from Chinese parts, so they are counted as imports from those countries
- Because tariffs raise imports from China
Show the answer
B. Because some goods are assembled in third countries from Chinese parts, so they are counted as imports from those countries Trade statistics record the country of origin of the finished good. When final assembly moves, the bilateral figure falls even if Chinese inputs are still used.
Exercise
One task to do in Finabase. Nothing is graded or saved.
Open SPY’s two-year chart and find April 2, 2025, when the "reciprocal" tariffs were announced, and April 9, when the higher country rates were suspended for 90 days except for China. Then open FXI, a China large-cap fund, for the same weeks. How did each move after each date? In the weeks after the pause, did FXI recover as much as SPY?
Open the SPY chartWhat you should find
Both fell hard in the days after April 2 and jumped on April 9 with the whole market. China was left out of the pause, so look for whether FXI lagged as rates on Chinese goods were raised and lowered in the following weeks. Markets reacted to announcements; the effective rate actually collected peaked at 11.3% in Q4 2025, months later and far below the headline rates.
Sources and further reading
- Supreme Court of the United States — Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24–1287 (decided February 20, 2026), slip opinion
- The White House — Proclamation, Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems (February 20, 2026)
- Federal Register — Executive Order, Ending Certain Tariff Actions (91 FR 9437, signed February 20, 2026)
- USTR — Fact sheet: Section 301 action in response to the failure of 60 economies to ban imports produced with forced labor (July 2026)
- Federal Register — Executive Order 14257, Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff (90 FR 15041, signed April 2, 2025)
- Federal Register — Executive Order 14266, Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation and Alignment (90 FR 15625, signed April 9, 2025)
- Federal Register — Executive Order 14195, Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China (90 FR 9121, signed February 1, 2025)
- Federal Register — Proclamation 9705, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States (83 FR 11625, March 15, 2018); Proclamation 9704, aluminum (83 FR 11619)
- Federal Register — USTR Section 301 China notices: 83 FR 28710 (June 20, 2018), 83 FR 40823 (August 16, 2018), 83 FR 47974 (September 21, 2018), 84 FR 20459 (May 9, 2019), 84 FR 43304 (August 20, 2019), 84 FR 45821 (August 30, 2019), 85 FR 3741 (January 22, 2020)
- Amiti, Redding and Weinstein, “The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4), 2019
- Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy and Khandelwal, “The Return to Protectionism”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(1), 2020 (NBER Working Paper 25638)
- Cavallo, Gopinath, Neiman and Tang, “Tariff Pass-Through at the Border and at the Store”, American Economic Review: Insights 3(1), 2021
- BEA — Federal government current tax receipts: customs duties (FRED series B235RC1Q027SBEA), downloaded 2026-11-18
- BEA — Imports of goods (FRED series A255RC1Q027SBEA), downloaded 2026-11-18
- Census Bureau — US imports of goods from China (FRED series IMPCH) and from Mexico (IMPMX), downloaded 2026-11-18
