Schools of economic thought Lesson 4 of 9
Economics · Schools of economic thought
Monetarism: Friedman, the money supply and what the data showed
What monetarists claim about money and inflation, the k-percent rule, the 1979–82 Volcker experiment, the breakdown of M2 velocity and what the 2020–21 M2 surge did.
On this page
Monetarism is the school of economics that puts the quantity of money at the center of inflation and of the business cycle. Its leader was Milton Friedman, and its founding document is A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, which he wrote with Anna Schwartz and published in 1963. Their message was blunt: the Great Depression was made far worse by the Federal Reserve letting the money stock collapse, and inflation is always the result of money growing faster than output.
Monetarism shaped central banking for two decades. It helped end the 1960s faith that policymakers could buy permanently lower unemployment with a bit more inflation, it guided the Federal Reserve's attack on inflation from 1979 to 1982, and it still frames how people argue about money printing. It also ran into a problem it could not solve: the link between money and spending stopped being stable.
This lesson states the monetarist case in its own terms, works through the arithmetic, and then tests it decade by decade on US data from 1960 to 2026, including the money surge of 2020–21.
What monetarists claim
Monetarism grew out of the older quantity theory of money, which goes back to David Hume and Irving Fisher. Friedman restated it in the 1950s and 1960s as a set of testable claims:
- Money matters most for nominal spending. Changes in the growth of the money stock are the main cause of changes in total spending in dollars (nominal GDP).
- In the long run, money only affects prices. Real output is set by labor, capital and technology. Faster money growth ends up as higher inflation, not more output. Friedman summed this up by calling inflation a monetary phenomenon in every time and place.
- In the short run, money affects output, with long and variable lags. A monetary squeeze can cause a recession, but its timing is hard to predict, so fine-tuning tends to misfire.
- The demand for money is stable. People hold money in a fairly predictable relation to their income and interest rates. This is what makes velocity predictable and the whole framework useful.
- Central banks cause most big swings. The Fed's failures, not private markets, turned the 1929 downturn into the Great Depression and allowed the inflation of the 1970s.
The policy conclusion follows: take discretion away from central bankers and give them a rule.
The quantity equation
The starting point is an identity, the equation of exchange. It is explained in detail in Money supply and M2: what it measures and what it tells you; here is the version monetarists use.
The identity is true by definition. The monetarist content is the claim that V is steady, so that M drives P × Y.
The k-percent rule
Friedman's best-known proposal, set out in A Program for Monetary Stability (1960), is a fixed rule: the central bank should make the money stock grow at a steady rate of k percent every year, close to the economy's long-run growth rate, whatever is happening in the economy. If velocity is stable, a steady k gives roughly stable prices over time.
The case for the rule is not that it is perfect but that discretion is worse. Policy works with long and variable lags, forecasts are poor, and central bankers are under political pressure to ease. A rule removes the temptation and lets everyone plan around a known path. The same argument about rules versus discretion later reappears in a different form in The Taylor rule: formula, worked example and Fed policy since 1990 and in New classical and New Keynesian economics: expectations to DSGE.
The strongest case: the Depression and the 1970s
The Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz documented an abnormally large fall in the money stock from 1929 to 1933, driven by waves of bank failures the Fed did little to stop. They also identified episodes where the Fed tightened (1928–29, October 1931) and the economy deteriorated, and the one spell of large-scale easing (open market purchases in the spring and summer of 1932) when it briefly improved. The book changed how economists read the Depression. In 2002, Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, ended a speech at Friedman's ninetieth birthday by conceding the point on the Fed's behalf: "You're right, we did it. We're very sorry."
The 1970s. In his 1968 presidential address to the American Economic Association, Friedman argued that there was no lasting trade-off between inflation and unemployment: push unemployment below its natural rate with easy money and you only get rising inflation. The 1970s, with inflation and unemployment both high, looked like a confirmation (see The Phillips curve: unemployment, inflation and expectations and Stagflation: high inflation, weak growth and the 1970s lesson).
The Volcker experiment, 1979–82
On 6 October 1979, the Fed under Paul Volcker announced that it would stop steering the federal funds rate day to day and instead control the quantity of bank reserves, to get firmer control over the growth of money. It was the closest a major central bank came to running monetarist policy, though in a form many monetarists criticized.
The effective fed funds rate (FRED series FEDFUNDS) went from 11.43% in September 1979 to 17.61% in April 1980, fell to 9.03% in July 1980, and peaked at 19.10% in June 1981. Interest rates swung far more than under rate targeting, as the Fed had warned they would. CPI inflation peaked at 14.6% (12-month change, March 1980) and was down to 3.8% by December 1982. The price was two recessions, with unemployment reaching 10.8% in November 1982.
In October 1982 the Fed stopped setting a target for M1, and over the following years it moved back to managing the funds rate (a St. Louis Fed study of the FOMC's transcripts dates the effective switch to 1982, others later). The experiment did end the high inflation. But it did not show that money targets were easy to hit: M2 grew about 8.5% to 8.7% in each of the three 12-month periods from October 1979 to October 1982, not far below its 1970s pace, and M1 was distorted by new kinds of interest-bearing checking accounts.
Velocity breaks down
The monetarist framework rests on a stable velocity. For thirty years M2 velocity (FRED series M2V) cooperated: it was 1.82 in Q1 1960, 1.79 in Q1 1970 and 1.87 in Q1 1980. Then it rose to 2.19 in Q3 1997, fell for two decades to 1.44 in Q4 2019, collapsed to 1.13 in Q2 2020 as people held cash they could not spend, and was 1.42 in Q3 2026.
Financial innovation, money market funds, the switch between deposits and other assets as interest rates moved, and very low rates after 2008 all changed how much money people wanted to hold. A given growth rate of M2 could now go with almost any inflation rate. In July 2000 the Fed told Congress it had stopped setting target ranges for money growth, partly because unstable velocity meant the ranges had not been useful benchmarks for many years.
What the data show, decade by decade
| Period | Predicted (M2 − real GDP) | Actual (deflator) | Velocity, a year |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1960s | 2.8% | 2.5% | −0.2% |
| 1970s | 6.5% | 6.7% | +0.4% |
| 1980s | 4.7% | 4.4% | −0.1% |
| 1990s | 0.7% | 2.1% | +1.5% |
| 2000s | 4.3% | 2.1% | −2.0% |
| 2010s | 4.0% | 1.7% | −2.2% |
| 2020–26 | 3.6% | 3.8% | +0.3% |
For three decades the simple rule worked well. From 1990 to 2020 it failed in both directions: in the 1990s inflation ran above the prediction as velocity rose, and in the 2000s and 2010s money grew about 4 points a year faster than output with inflation near 2%. Anyone using M2 alone to forecast inflation in the 2010s was wrong every year.
The 2020–21 surge: what it predicted and what it did not
M2 went from $15.49 trillion in February 2020 to $21.77 trillion in March 2022, and its 12-month growth peaked at 26.8% in February 2021, the fastest since the series began in 1959. High inflation did follow: CPI inflation reached 9.0% in June 2022, sixteen months after the M2 peak, and over the whole span from Q1 2020 to Q3 2026 the constant-velocity prediction (3.6% a year) and the actual deflator inflation (3.8%) came out close.
What the simple version missed:
- The size. From February 2020 to June 2022, M2 rose 39.6% but the CPI rose 13.8%. Velocity fell from 1.39 in Q1 2020 to 1.22 in Q3 2022, absorbing much of the money.
- The fall. M2 shrank in 2022–23, with 12-month growth as low as −4.7% in April 2023, the first declines in the series. Prices did not fall; inflation slowed but stayed positive, while velocity climbed back to 1.35 by Q3 2023.
- The cause. Bernanke and Blanchard (2023) attribute most of the surge from 2021 to price shocks (commodity prices, demand shifting between sectors, supply constraints) rather than to tight labor markets. Money growth and fiscal transfers were two sides of the same policy, so the episode cannot isolate money as the cause.
The critics' case
- Unstable velocity. The empirical core of monetarism, a stable demand for money, broke down from the 1980s on. Without it the k-percent rule targets the wrong thing.
- Which money? M1, M2 and broader measures often moved differently, and the Fed redefined them as banking changed. A rule needs a measure that stays meaningful.
- Central banks control interest rates, not money. In practice banks create deposits when they lend, and the central bank supplies the reserves needed at its chosen rate. Targeting money directly made rates volatile in 1979–82 without hitting the targets.
- Keynesian objections. Keynesians accept that money matters but argue that demand shocks, fiscal policy and liquidity traps also matter, and that at zero interest rates extra money may just sit idle, as it did after 2008 (Keynesian economics: demand, the multiplier and the evidence).
What survived
Monetarism lost as an operating method but won much of the argument. Today's central banks accept that inflation is ultimately their responsibility, that there is no permanent trade-off with unemployment, that rules and credibility beat discretion, and that the Fed's errors deepened the Depression. They express this through inflation targets and interest-rate rules rather than money targets.
| Question | Monetarist answer | Mainstream today |
|---|---|---|
| What causes lasting inflation? | Excess money growth | Policy that lets demand run |
| Policy instrument | Money stock | Short-term interest rate |
| Rule or discretion? | Fixed money rule | Inflation target + judgment |
| Long-run Phillips trade-off? | None | None |
| Role of fiscal policy | Small | Matters, especially at zero |
How Finabase does it
Finabase does not chart the money supply or velocity; the figures on this page are ours, built from public Federal Reserve and BEA series. What the app does show:
- The Economy page has the economic calendar with CPI and other releases (actual, forecast and previous), and five-year monthly charts of CPI inflation, the unemployment rate and the Fed funds rate, the instrument that replaced money targets.
- The Treasury page lists yields from 1 month to 30 years, where expectations of future policy and inflation show up.
- Discover's Fed topic collects Federal Reserve news.
Frequently asked questions
What is monetarism in simple terms?
It is the view that the money supply drives nominal spending, so steady money growth gives steady prices and erratic money growth causes inflation or recessions. Monetarists want a central bank bound by a simple money rule rather than one that steers by judgment.
Did monetarism predict the 2021–22 inflation?
Partly. The record surge in M2 in 2020–21 was followed by the highest inflation since the early 1980s. But prices rose far less than money, and when M2 shrank in 2022–23 prices kept rising, so the money numbers alone did not give the size or the timing.
Why did the Fed stop targeting the money supply?
Because velocity became unstable. From the 1980s on, the link between money and spending shifted with financial innovation and interest rates, so hitting a money target no longer delivered predictable inflation. The Fed dropped money targets in stages and stopped setting ranges altogether in 2000.
Is monetarism the same as the quantity theory of money?
No. The quantity theory is the older idea that prices move with the money stock; monetarism is Friedman's modern version, which adds a stable demand for money, long and variable lags, a natural rate of unemployment and the case for a money growth rule.
Summary
Monetarism holds that money growth in excess of output growth causes inflation, that unstable money causes booms and busts, and that a central bank should follow a fixed money rule. It explained the Depression and the 1970s well, and for three decades the simple quantity equation tracked US inflation within half a point a decade. From the 1990s, velocity stopped behaving, the forecasts failed, and central banks moved to interest-rate rules and inflation targets. The 2020–21 money surge and the inflation that followed revived the argument without restoring the stable link the theory needs.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
Over a decade, M2 grows 7% a year and real GDP grows 3% a year. Velocity stays constant. What does the quantity equation say inflation was, roughly?
- About 10% a year
- About 4% a year
- About 7% a year
Show the answer
B. About 4% a year In growth rates, money growth + velocity growth ≈ inflation + real growth. With velocity constant, inflation ≈ 7% − 3% = 4%. This simple calculation tracked US inflation closely in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
In the 2010s, M2 grew about 4 points a year faster than real GDP, but inflation averaged under 2%. Which part of the monetarist framework failed?
- The equation of exchange, which turned out to be false
- The assumption that velocity is stable: it fell about 2% a year
- The claim that real output is set by labor, capital and technology
Show the answer
B. The assumption that velocity is stable: it fell about 2% a year M × V = P × Y is an identity and always holds. What broke was the behavioral claim that velocity is steady. Velocity fell about 2.2% a year in the 2010s, absorbing the extra money.
A central bank follows Friedman’s k-percent rule with k = 3. A recession hits and unemployment rises sharply. What does the rule tell the central bank to do?
- Keep money growing at 3% a year
- Raise money growth until unemployment falls
- Cut money growth to prevent future inflation
Show the answer
A. Keep money growing at 3% a year The point of the rule is that it does not respond to the economy. Friedman argued that discretionary responses arrive with long and variable lags and often make things worse, so a steady path is better on average.
M2 shrank in 2022–23 for the first time since 1959. A strict reading of the quantity theory with constant velocity predicts falling prices. What happened instead?
- Prices fell, as predicted
- Inflation slowed but stayed positive, while velocity rose
- Inflation accelerated to new highs
Show the answer
B. Inflation slowed but stayed positive, while velocity rose CPI inflation came down from its 9.0% peak but prices kept rising. Velocity climbed from 1.22 in Q3 2022 to 1.35 a year later, so nominal spending kept growing even as M2 fell.
Exercise
One task to do in Finabase. Nothing is graded or saved.
M2’s 12-month growth peaked at 26.8% in February 2021, then M2 shrank, with growth as low as −4.7% in April 2023. Open the Economy page and find the peak of CPI inflation on its chart. Count the months from February 2021 to that peak. Then follow inflation through 2023, while the money stock was shrinking. Did prices fall?
Open the Economy pageWhat you should find
Inflation peaks in mid-2022, about 16 months after the M2 peak, the kind of long lag Friedman described. But when M2 shrank in 2022–23 inflation only slowed and stayed above zero: prices kept rising. The simple quantity equation got the direction, not the size or the timing, because velocity moved.
Sources and further reading
- Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton University Press for the NBER, 1963)
- Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability (Fordham University Press, 1960)
- Friedman, The role of monetary policy, American Economic Review 58(1), 1968
- Bernanke, On Milton Friedman’s ninetieth birthday, remarks at the University of Chicago, 8 November 2002, retrieved 2026-11-18
- Federal Reserve History — Anti-inflation measures (the 6 October 1979 announcement), retrieved 2026-11-18
- Thornton, When did the FOMC begin targeting the federal funds rate? What the verbatim transcripts tell us, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2004-015, retrieved 2026-11-18
- Federal Reserve Board — Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, July 2000 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 2000), retrieved 2026-11-18
- Bernanke and Blanchard, What caused the US pandemic-era inflation?, NBER Working Paper 31417 (2023), retrieved 2026-11-18
- Federal Reserve Board — M2 money stock, SA (FRED series M2SL), downloaded 2026-10-30
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis — Velocity of M2 money stock (FRED series M2V), downloaded 2026-11-18
- BEA — Real GDP and the GDP implicit price deflator (FRED series GDPC1, GDPDEF), downloaded 2026-10-30 and 2026-11-18
- BLS — CPI-U all items, SA (FRED series CPIAUCSL), downloaded 2026-10-30
- Federal Reserve Board — Effective federal funds rate (FRED series FEDFUNDS), downloaded 2026-10-30
