The global economy Lesson 2 of 11
Economics · Currencies, trade and commodities
The dollar as reserve currency: COFER data and de-dollarization
Why the US dollar dominates reserves, trade invoicing and finance, what IMF COFER data show since 1999, the exorbitant privilege debate and de-dollarization claims.
On this page
A reserve currency is one that central banks and governments hold in large amounts as part of their foreign exchange reserves, and that the world uses to price trade, borrow, lend and settle payments. Since the Second World War the US dollar has filled that role more than any other currency. In mid-2026 it made up 56.7% of the world's official foreign exchange reserves, nearly three times the euro's share, and it was on one side of 89% of all foreign exchange trades.
That position is regularly declared to be ending. Sanctions, China's growth, the euro, gold and digital payments have each been cited as reasons for de-dollarization. Some of the data do show a slow decline, but the decline is smaller, slower and spread across more currencies than the headlines suggest.
This guide explains what makes a reserve currency, what the IMF's COFER data show from 1999 to 2026, how the dollar is used beyond reserves, the "exorbitant privilege" debate from Triffin to Eichengreen, and how to judge claims about de-dollarization. Exchange rates themselves, and the dollar indexes, are covered in The US dollar and exchange rates: indexes, drivers and earnings.
What makes a reserve currency
Central banks hold reserves to pay for imports in a crisis, to defend their exchange rate, and to reassure markets. What they want from a reserve asset is the same as what any careful saver wants, at very large scale:
- Deep, liquid markets. The US Treasury market is the largest government bond market in the world, and billions can be sold in a day without moving prices much; see Treasury bills, notes and bonds: the US government’s debt menu.
- Convertibility and open capital markets. Holders can move money in and out freely.
- Rule of law and stable institutions. Contracts and property rights are enforced.
- Network effects. A currency that others already use for trade and debt is cheaper to use, so usage reinforces itself.
These features matter more than the size of an economy alone. China's economy is the second largest, but capital controls limit how freely the renminbi can be moved, which is one reason its reserve share remains small.
What the COFER data show
The IMF's Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) survey collects the currency breakdown of reserves from 147 reporters each quarter. Reporting is voluntary and country figures are confidential; the IMF publishes world totals. Since the 2025 Q3 release the IMF has eliminated the "unallocated" residual back to 2000 Q1, so shares cover all reserves, and it publishes the part it imputed: 10.6% of total reserves in 2026 Q2.
| Currency | 1999 Q4 | 2014 Q4 | 2021 Q4 | 2026 Q2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US dollar | 71.0% | 62.7% | 59.4% | 56.7% |
| Euro | 17.9% | 20.5% | 19.8% | 20.6% |
| Japanese yen | 6.4% | 4.1% | 5.5% | 5.0% |
| Pound sterling | 2.9% | 4.7% | 4.9% | 4.6% |
| Renminbi | — | — | 2.9% | 2.1% |
| Canadian + Aussie | — | 4.1% | 4.4% | 4.7% |
Total reserves were $13.22 trillion in Q2 2026, against $1.61 trillion in Q1 1999.
Three facts stand out. The dollar's share has drifted down by about half a point a year on average since 1999. The euro's share has gone nowhere since its first decade. And the renminbi, first reported separately in Q4 2016, rose to 2.85% in Q4 2021 and has since slipped. "Other currencies" grew from 1.6% to 6.1%, though part of that comparison is definitional: the Canadian and Australian dollars were inside "other" until they got their own lines in Q4 2012.
Valuation effects
COFER shares are in dollars at market exchange rates. If the euro rises 10% against the dollar, every euro bond a central bank holds is worth 10% more in dollars, so the euro's share rises and the dollar's falls, even if no one bought or sold anything. In 2025 the Fed's broad dollar index fell from 130.0 on January 13 to 119.1 on September 16, an 8.4% drop, and the dollar's reserve share fell from 58.4% at the end of 2024 to 56.5% at the end of 2025. Part of that was valuation. The IMF's quarterly data briefs discuss exchange-rate effects; to compare intent with mechanics, look at changes in holdings at constant exchange rates rather than shares alone.
Beyond reserves: how the dollar is used
Reserves are only one use. The Federal Reserve's 2025 review of the dollar's international role and the BIS's 2025 survey show the dollar's share in several:
- Foreign exchange. The dollar was on one side of 89.2% of trades in April 2025, up from 88.4% in 2022. Because each trade involves two currencies, shares add up to 200%; the euro was on one side of 28.9%. Two banks swapping Korean won for Brazilian reais often go through the dollar, because each currency trades more cheaply against it than against the other.
- Trade invoicing. Outside Europe, the Americas and Asia-Pacific, 79% of exports were invoiced in dollars over 1999–2019, including trade that never touches the United States.
- Debt. About 60% of foreign-currency debt issued since 2010 was in dollars, against 26% in euros.
- Banking. About 55% of cross-border loans and 60% of deposits in foreign currencies are in dollars.
- Banknotes. More than $1 trillion of US currency, roughly half of all dollar notes, was held abroad in early 2025.
- Treasuries. Foreigners held about $9 trillion of Treasuries in Q1 2025, 32% of the marketable total, down from almost 50% in 2014 as US debt grew faster than foreign demand.
The Fed's summary index of international currency use has stayed between about 65 and 70 for the dollar since 2010, against about 24 for the euro.
The dollar as safe asset
In a global panic, investors and banks scramble for dollars to repay dollar debts and buy Treasuries. The Fed's broad dollar index shows it:
| Episode | Start | Peak | Move |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global financial crisis | Jul 15, 2008: 85.9 | Mar 3, 2009: 106.0 | +23.5% |
| Pandemic dash for cash | Mar 3, 2020: 116.5 | Mar 23, 2020: 126.1 | +8.3% |
The dollar rose even though the 2008 crisis started in the US. The Fed lent dollars to other central banks through swap lines in both episodes, which says how much of the world's financial system runs on dollar funding.
April 2025 was an exception that drew attention. After the April 2 tariff announcements the broad dollar index fell from 126.9 on April 8 to 122.3 on April 21, while the 10-year Treasury yield rose from 4.01% on April 4 to 4.48% on April 11. A falling currency together with falling bond prices is unusual for the US in a period of stress, and economists debated whether it reflected a change in the dollar's safe-haven role or a short episode. The data so far do not settle it.
The exorbitant privilege debate
In the 1960s French finance minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is usually credited with calling the dollar's position an "exorbitant privilege". The privileges commonly cited:
- Cheaper borrowing. Foreign demand for Treasuries lowers US interest rates.
- Seigniorage. Foreigners hold over $1 trillion of non-interest-bearing US banknotes.
- Borrowing in its own currency. US debts to the world are mostly in dollars, so a falling dollar does not raise their burden, unlike for many emerging economies.
- Sanctions power. Control over dollar clearing gives US policy reach abroad.
Economists also point to costs. A strong dollar, kept up by foreign demand for dollar assets, makes US exports dearer. And in crises the US acts as the world's insurer, lending dollars and seeing its assets abroad fall in value just when others need help.
Robert Triffin saw a deeper problem in 1960. Under the Bretton Woods system, the world could get more dollars for its growing reserves only if the US ran deficits with the rest of the world. But persistent deficits would eventually undermine confidence in the dollar's convertibility into gold. The Triffin dilemma was resolved in its original form when the US ended gold convertibility in 1971, but its logic, that the reserve issuer must supply safe assets in ways that may weaken its own position, still shapes the debate about US deficits; see Trade balance: how the US trade deficit is measured and read and How the Treasury finances the deficit: bills, coupons and cash.
Barry Eichengreen argued in Exorbitant Privilege (2011) that the dollar's dominance reflected history and network effects as much as merit, that the world could support several reserve currencies at once, as it did in the 1920s, and that the dollar's role would erode gradually rather than collapse. The COFER data since then are closer to that description than to either a collapse or a permanent monopoly.
De-dollarization: claims and data
| Claim | What the data show |
|---|---|
| "Central banks are dumping the dollar" | Share down about 15 points since 1999, slowly; dollar holdings in USD terms grew |
| "The renminbi is replacing the dollar" | Renminbi 2.1% of reserves in 2026 Q2, below its 2021 peak |
| "Trade is moving off the dollar" | Dollar on one side of 89.2% of FX trades in 2025, up from 2022 |
| "Foreigners won't buy Treasuries" | Foreign share of Treasuries fell to 32%, but holdings were about $9 trillion |
| "Sanctions will push countries away" | Diversification is visible in "other" currencies and the euro, not in a single rival |
Dollar reserves themselves kept growing: about $1.14 trillion in Q1 1999 (71.2% of $1.61 trillion) and $7.49 trillion in Q2 2026 on COFER data. The share fell because total reserves grew faster and holdings spread across more currencies. Gold, which some central banks have been buying, is outside COFER entirely, since COFER covers foreign currency reserves only. A full picture of reserve diversification needs gold data alongside it.
None of this predicts the future. A reserve role built over decades can erode slowly or shift quickly after a policy or institutional shock; history includes sterling's long decline after the First World War. The data describe where things stand.
How Finabase does it
Finabase does not publish reserve-currency data; the COFER chart on this page is ours, from IMF data frozen on November 18, 2026. The app shows the market side of the dollar: the Forex page lists major currency pairs, each pair has its own page such as EUR/USD, and the Treasury page shows the yield curve of the world's main safe asset. Gold, which some central banks buy as an alternative reserve, can be followed through ETFs such as GLD.
Frequently asked questions
What share of world reserves is in US dollars?
56.7% in the second quarter of 2026, on IMF COFER data, down from 72.1% in 1999. The euro was second with 20.6%.
Is de-dollarization happening?
Slowly, by some measures. The dollar's reserve share has fallen about 15 points since 1999, but its share of foreign exchange trading rose between 2022 and 2025, and no single currency has taken its place.
Why is the dollar the world's reserve currency?
Because the US offers the deepest and most liquid government bond market, open capital flows, stable institutions and a currency already used by everyone else, which makes it cheapest to keep using. History, including the Bretton Woods system, also matters.
What is the exorbitant privilege?
It is the set of advantages the US gets from issuing the main reserve currency: cheaper borrowing, debts in its own currency, seigniorage on banknotes abroad and financial reach. The phrase is attributed to French finance minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the 1960s.
What is the Triffin dilemma?
Robert Triffin's 1960 argument that a national currency used as the world's reserve asset must be supplied through the issuer's deficits, which over time undermine confidence in that currency.
Summary
The US dollar remains the world's main reserve currency: 56.7% of official foreign exchange reserves in Q2 2026, on one side of 89% of currency trades, and the currency of most trade invoices and foreign-currency debt. Its reserve share has drifted down from 72% in 1999, mostly toward the euro and smaller currencies rather than the renminbi, and part of any short-term move is exchange-rate valuation. The exorbitant privilege brings cheaper borrowing and reach, at some cost to exporters and as insurer of last resort; claims of rapid de-dollarization are best checked against COFER and BIS data.
Check your understanding
4 questions on this lesson. Each answer comes with the reason, and nothing is scored.
Over a quarter the euro rises 5% against the dollar, and no central bank buys or sells any reserves. What happens to the dollar’s share in COFER?
- It stays the same, because holdings did not change
- It falls, because euro reserves are now worth more when measured in dollars
- It rises, because the dollar became cheaper to buy
Show the answer
B. It falls, because euro reserves are now worth more when measured in dollars COFER values all reserves in dollars at market exchange rates. A stronger euro raises the dollar value of euro holdings, so the dollar’s share falls through valuation alone.
The dollar’s share of world reserves fell from about 72% to about 57% between 1999 and 2026. Which statement is consistent with the data?
- Central banks sold most of their dollars
- Dollar reserves grew in dollar terms, but total reserves grew faster and spread across more currencies
- The renminbi took most of the dollar’s lost share
Show the answer
B. Dollar reserves grew in dollar terms, but total reserves grew faster and spread across more currencies Dollar reserves rose from about $1.14 trillion to $7.49 trillion. The euro, sterling and smaller currencies gained share; the renminbi held about 2% in 2026.
A bank in Korea wants to swap won for Brazilian reais. Why does the trade often go through the dollar?
- Because US law requires it
- Because won/dollar and dollar/real markets are deep and cheap to trade, while a direct won/real market is thin
- Because the dollar is backed by gold
Show the answer
B. Because won/dollar and dollar/real markets are deep and cheap to trade, while a direct won/real market is thin Network effects: since everyone trades against the dollar, those markets have the tightest spreads, so two trades through the dollar can cost less than one direct trade. That is why the dollar is on one side of about 89% of FX trades.
Under Bretton Woods, why did Triffin think the dollar’s reserve role was unstable?
- Because the US economy was too small
- Because the world could get more dollar reserves only through US deficits, which would eventually erode confidence in converting dollars to gold
- Because the euro was a stronger rival
Show the answer
B. Because the world could get more dollar reserves only through US deficits, which would eventually erode confidence in converting dollars to gold The Triffin dilemma: supplying the world’s reserve asset requires the issuer to send out more of its currency than it takes in, which over time undermines the promise behind it. The euro did not exist until 1999.
Exercise
One task to do in Finabase. Nothing is graded or saved.
Open the chart of UUP, a fund that tracks the dollar against six major currencies, on its longest range. Find the second half of 2008 and March 2020, then April 2025. Compare each with SPY over the same months. In which episodes did the dollar rise while stocks fell, and which one broke the pattern?
Open the UUP chartWhat you should find
The dollar rose in the 2008 crisis and in March 2020 as investors scrambled for dollars and Treasuries, even though 2008 began in the US. April 2025 was the exception: the dollar fell while stocks fell, and Treasury yields rose. UUP follows a euro-heavy basket, not the Fed’s broad index, so its moves differ in size from the lesson’s 23% and 8%.
Sources and further reading
- IMF — Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), dataset IMF.STA:COFER, world quarterly series to 2026 Q2 (published September 30, 2026), downloaded 2026-11-18 and frozen as JSON
- Federal Reserve Board — Bertaut, von Beschwitz and Curcuru, “The International Role of the U.S. Dollar – 2025 Edition”, FEDS Notes, July 18, 2025
- BIS — Triennial Central Bank Survey: OTC foreign exchange turnover in April 2025
- Robert Triffin, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (Yale University Press, 1960)
- Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (Oxford University Press, 2011)
- Federal Reserve Board — Nominal broad US dollar index (FRED series DTWEXBGS), downloaded 2026-10-30
- Federal Reserve Board — 10-year Treasury constant maturity yield (FRED series DGS10), downloaded 2026-10-30
