Glossary
MEV (maximal extractable value)
Profit that those who order the transactions in a block can take by inserting, reordering or leaving out transactions.
On a public blockchain, transactions wait in the open before they are included in a block. Whoever assembles the block chooses which transactions go in and in what order. MEV is the profit available from that power. The term began as "miner extractable value" and was renamed when Ethereum stopped using miners.
Main kinds
- Arbitrage. After a large trade moves the price in one pool, a bot trades immediately to bring it back in line with other markets. This harms nobody directly and keeps prices consistent.
- Liquidations. Bots compete to be first to liquidate an under-secured loan and collect the reward.
- Sandwich attacks. A bot sees a user's pending purchase, buys just before it to push the price up, lets the user buy at the worse price, and sells just after. This is a form of front-running, paid for by the user.
How the market is organized
Researchers described the problem in a 2019 paper titled "Flash Boys 2.0". Since then a supply chain has formed on Ethereum: "searchers" find opportunities, specialized "builders" assemble the most valuable block, and validators choose the block that pays them most. Much of the profit is competed away into payments to validators.
How users limit it
- A tight slippage limit, which caps what a sandwich can take.
- Private submission, which sends the transaction directly to builders and keeps it out of public view.
- Exchanges that batch orders and settle them at one price.
Limits
MEV cannot be eliminated on a chain where someone must choose the order of transactions. Published estimates of its size count only what can be detected on-chain.
